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to the capital markets and institutional environment of China.
China Journal of Accounting Research
Website: http://www.cnjar.com
http://www.cb.cityu.edu.hk/research/cjarProduction and hosting by Elsevier
Radarweg 29, 1043 NX Amsterdam, The Netherlands
ISSN 1755-3091
  China Journal of Accounting Research
Founded by Sun Yat-sen University and City University of Hong Kong
Sponsored by:
Published quarterly in March, June, September, and December
All rights reserved. No part of this journal may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any means, elec-
tronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of Editorial Ofﬁce of China Journal of
Accounting Research.
Notice
No responsibility is assumed by China Journal of Accounting Research nor Elsevier for any injury and/or damage to persons,
property as a matter of product liability, negligence, or otherwise, or from any use or operation of any methods, products, in-
structions, or ideas contained in the material herein. Although all advertising material is expected to conform to ethical stan-
dards, inclusion in this publication does not constitute a guarantee or endorsement of the quality or value of such product or of
the claims made of it by its manufacturer.
Guidelines for Manuscripts Submitted to
The China Journal of Accounting Research
The China Journal of Accounting Research ‘‘CJAR’’ (ISSN 1755-3091) publishes quarterly. It contains peer-reviewed
articles and commentaries on accounting, auditing and corporate governance issues that relate to the greater China region.
We welcome the submission of both theoretical and empirical research papers pertinent to researchers, regulators and practi-
tioners. Authors should note:
1 Submissions must be original contributions and not under consideration by any other journal. The author must state the work
is not submitted or published elsewhere.
2 Authors submitting articles, notes and comments will be entitled to two free copies. Each author of a book review will receive
a copy of the relevant issue.
3 Authors should submit their manuscripts (in Word format) via email to china.jar@gmail.com. All text, including endnotes,
must be double-spaced. Authors will be notiﬁed when manuscripts are received by CJAR.
4 Authors should note:
• a cover page showing the title of the paper, the author’s name, title and afﬁliation, e-mail address, and any acknowledge-
ment should be included.
• to promote anonymous review, author(s) should conﬁne his/her identify (such as name, afﬁliation, biographical informa-
tion, and acknowledgment) to the cover page only.
• supply an abstract of about 120 words, stating the study’s ﬁndings, sample and methodology in that order.
• key terms used in the text should be deﬁned or explained as early as possible after they are ﬁrst introduced.
• words in a foreign language are to be in italics.
• all citations in the text should refer to the author’s (or authors’) name and the year of publication.
Examples: ‘‘the debt contracting explanation for conservatism (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Basu, 1997; Ahmed et al,
2002). Using the Basu (1997) asymmetric timeliness regression’’
• include a list of reference for works cited as follows:
• reference to a journal publication:
Basu, S., Waymire, G.B., 2006. Record keeping and human evolution. Accounting Horizons 20 (3), 201–229.
• reference to a book:
Watts, R.L., Zimmerman, J.L., 1986. Positive accounting theory. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ.
• reference to a chapter in an edited book:
Ball, R., 2001. Infrastructure requirements for an economically efﬁcient system of public ﬁnancial reporting and disclo-
sure, 127–169. In: Litan, R., Herring, R. (Editors), Brookings-Wharton Papers on Financial Services. Brookings Institution
Press, Washington, DC.
• omit all full stops in abbreviations. Example: ‘eg’, ‘ie’, ‘Co’, ‘Ltd’, ‘etc’
• dates are in the order – date, month, year, eg ‘5 May 1975’
• quotation marks are single, but within a quotation are double.
• use endnotes rather than footnotes.
• put each table on a separate sheet; do not embed in the text but indicate where the table would best be inserted.
5 China Journal of Accounting Research copyright in works published by CJAR.
For additional information, please contact Irene Li, Department of Accountancy, City University of Hong Kong, Tat Chee Avenue,
Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong. Telephone: +852 3442 7932. Fax: +852 3442 0349. E-mail: acwoo@cityu.edu.hk.CHINA JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
Volume 7/2 (2014)
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
ScienceDirect
Production and hosting by ElsevierConsulting Editors:
Bin Ke
Nanyang Technological University
T.J. Wong
The Chinese University of Hong Kong
Editors-in-Chief
Jeong-Bon Kim
City University of Hong Kong
Minghai Wei
Sun Yat-sen University
Associate Editors
Donghua Chen
Nanjing University
Yuan Ding
China Europe International Business School
Clive S. Lennox
Nanyang Technological University
Oliver Zhen Li
National University of Singapore
Feng Liu
Xiamen University
Oliver Meng Rui
China Europe International Business School
Xijia Su
China Europe International Business School
Editorial Board
Sudipta Basu, Temple University
Jeffrey Callen, University of Toronto
Charles J.P. Chen, China Europe International Business School
Shimin Chen, China Europe International Business School
Shijun Cheng, University of Maryland
Zhaoyang Gu, The Chinese University of Hong Kong
Thomas Jeanjean, Essec Business School
Guohua Jiang, Peking University
Changjiang Lv, Fudan University
Zengquan Li, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics
Bin Lin, Sun Yat-sen University
Gerald Lobo, University of Houston
Suresh Radhakrishnan, University of Texas at Dallas
Yifeng Shen, Xiamen University
Dan A. Simunic, The University of British Columbia
Herve ´ Stolowy, HEC Paris
Yuetang Wang, Nanjing University
Donghui Wu, The Chinese University of Hong Kong
Liansheng Wu, Peking University
Joanna Shuang Wu, University of Rochester
Xi Wu, Central University of Finance and Economics
Zezhong Xiao, Cardiff University
Yu Xin, Sun Yat-sen University
Tianyu Zhang, The Chinese University of Hong Kong
Language Advisor
John Nowland, City University of Hong KongAccruals: An overview
James A. Ohlson
Stern School of Business, NYU, United States
Cheung Kong GSB, China
ARTICLE INFO
Article history:
Received 8 March 2014
Accepted 8 March 2014
Available online 26 April 2014
Keyword:
Accruals
ABSTRACT
The paper provides a broad discussion of the topic “accruals”. Though much
of what is said is familiar from the literature on accruals, the paper tries to
develop concepts and show how theses forge tight links across a variety of
themes. The starting point of the analysis concerns the construct of an accrual.
The case is made that it should rest solely on consecutive balance sheets
and the splitting of assets/liabilities into (i) cash and approximate cash,
assets/liabilities and (ii) all other kinds of assets/liabilities. Given this divide
of assets/liabilities one can measure the components in the foundation
equation: cash earnings + net accrual = comprehensive earnings. The paper
then proceeds to discuss how the net accrual relates to growth in a ﬁrm’s oper-
ating activities and the extent to which it can be informative or misleading.
This topic in turn integrates with the issue of a ﬁrm’s quality of earnings
and the role of accounting conservatism. Among the remaining topics, the
paper discusses how one conceptualizes diagnostics to assess whether or not
a period’s accrual is likely to be biased upwards or downwards. It gives rise
to a consideration of how one constructs accruals that may be more informa-
tive than GAAP accruals and the role of value-relevance studies to assess the
information content of accrual constructs. The paper ends with a list of
suggestions how future research may be modiﬁed in light of the discussions
in this paper.
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Research on “accruals” has grown signiﬁcantly over the past 15 years, the most well-known papers being
due to Jones (1991) and Sloan (1996). While this extensive literature deals with a variety of questions, most of
the papers in one way or another consider the statistical properties of accruals – or the properties of cash ﬂows
vs. earnings. These ﬂow variables prompt the issue of how one converts ﬁnancial data into a period’s cash
ﬂows or accruals. A review of the literature bears out that there are numerous approaches to the measurement
of accruals. Some of these depend on changes in balance sheet accounts; other studies start from statements of
cash ﬂows and adjust key numbers using information extracted from income statements. Speciﬁc details in
individual studies can also vary, so readers may be left with an uneasy feeling that research executions allow
for too many degrees of freedom.
1 One can safely assert that the literature oﬀers no “standardized” way of
putting the 3 components – cash ﬂows, earnings and accruals – together. Nevertheless, the various eﬀorts
at measuring accruals would seem to be based on a common understanding as to the nature of accruals; when
studies discuss the measurement of accruals they do move (broadly speaking) in a similar direction.
2
Missing in all of this empirical research is an analysis of the concept or construct of an accrual and its impli-
cations.
3 Such absence makes it hard to assess whether there are other workable (perhaps better) alternatives
to the accrual measurements found in speciﬁc studies. These hypothetical alternatives could lead to diﬀerent
(or less robust) empirical ﬁndings, suggesting the need for an accrual concept. In the background lurks a more
fundamental issue, however. Only after a construct is in place can one examine the circumstances under which
accruals have a practical role in valuation because they beneﬁcially complement cash earnings. This sets the
stage for an analysis of when accruals tend to misinform rather than inform investors.
This paper develops and evaluates an accrual construct which I view as particularly useful. It is not new.
Textbooks, like Penman (2009), refer to it as “change in net operating assets.” Much of what is discussed in
this regard reaﬃrms what many readers have seen elsewhere. Yet in key respects the analysis here diverges
from what the literature puts forward. This paper places the emphasis on ideas and how theses forge links
as opposed to a critical evaluation of the work that has been done (and how it perhaps could be improved).
It applies to any accounting that satisﬁes the basic stocks-ﬂows reconciliation built into accounting. Thus
the paper tries to deal with questions of broad interest which hopefully should supply a conceptual foun-
dation for those individuals who try to familiarize themselves with the literature, or who aspire to a better
sense of what one may call the “big picture.” Following that, the paper discusses empirical questions related
1 As an illustration of implementation “details”, in many studies earnings serve as an ingredient to measure either cash ﬂows or accruals.
The researcher must then decide on the earnings number to use: which, if any, special items should be excluded?
2 This paper does not compile extensive references to the large literature, empirical and conceptual, that deals with accruals and linked
topics. I should further underscore that there are really few new ideas in this paper and yet I have not tried to attribute various insights to
originators as is commonly done. It would have been too diﬃcult and thorny to develop the relevant citations. The topics covered – like the
general idea of an accrual – have long histories with non-standardized terminology and an enormous number of applications in research.
To get started on navigating the literature, the following papers should prove useful. Jones (1991) and Sloan (1996) have been mentioned
in the main text’s ﬁrst paragraph and thus they have a signiﬁcant status as “classics”. With respect to textbooks, Penman (2009) provides
an introductory discussion of the quality of earnings issue as it relates to accruals. See also the textbook by Easton et al. (2009). For a very
broad perspective on the quality of earnings topic, see Dechow et al. (2009). Melumad and Nissim (2009) discuss quality of earnings
speciﬁcs for numerous line items such as the accounting for pensions, inventories, deferred revenues, etc. Quality of earnings evaluations as
it relates to changes in balance sheet conservatism can be found in Penman and Zhang (2002). Ohlson and Aier (2009) discuss what they
refer to as modiﬁed cash accounting (“MCA”) earnings – a measure of cash earnings – as opposed to accrual earnings and they explain
how MCA ﬁts into the quality of earnings literature. The paper particularizes the cash assets/liabilities vs. other assets/liabilities
dichotomy and it discusses the full range of judgment issues, including the use of footnote disclosures to measure cash earnings. Empirical
work related to GAAP accruals – their reversal properties as well as trading strategy opportunities – Allen et al. (2009) summarizes what
one may refer to as the most recent state-of-the-art of accrual research when it comes to empirical work. Richardson et al. (2009) review
the literature on accruals and anomalies, and it lists just about all references that one can reasonably hope for.
3 To be sure, the concept of an accrual as employed in this paper always refers to a (period’s) ﬂow. The reason for noting this obvious
convention here is that an often cited paper by Dechow et al. (2002) suggests that they have modeled accruals, which in my mind is
unfounded insofar that they are actually dealing with stock variables. Speciﬁcally, in my reading of the paper, it has the ﬂavor of a model
of “errors” in balance sheet accounts – which are stocks and not ﬂows. The errors pick up biases (upwards or downwards) as to the
expected cash that will be realized at the end of the period. In my interpretation, therefore, rather than capturing accruals the model in
question develops the consequences of fair market valuations when these can reﬂect an upward or downward bias.
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or not.
Because this paper deals with topics and themes that are by no means novel, much will be familiar to indi-
viduals versed in the literature. That said, how the various ideas connect with each other may be less so. As the
links often involve subtleties, the paper envisions that one obtains a much better understanding of subject mat-
ter if one proceeds step by step without distracting discussions of empirical research papers and their ﬁndings.
In sum, the ﬂow and interdependence of ideas will be central.
To give the reader a sense of topics covered, the following supplies a list that the paper develops in some
detail:
  The construct of an accrual depends solely on (consecutive) balance sheets and the classiﬁcation of
assets/liabilities into approximate cash assets/liabilities as distinguished from other assets/liabilities.
The latter class of assets/liabilities can be thought of as those related to operations as opposed to ﬁnan-
cial activities.
  Conceptually and practically, to identify an accrual via cash ﬂows statements combined with earnings
confuses issues. Nor does it generally help to identify non-cash expenses such as depreciation if the
focus is on a period’s total accruals.
  In terms of economics, an accrual relates to the growth in operating activities alone. Under ideal cir-
cumstances the measurement of growth in operating activities and the accrual has a one-to-one corre-
spondence. Financial activities do not inﬂuence the accrual measurement though these activities do of
course reconcile with operating activities.
  The quality of earnings dependence on accruals is essentially independent of balance sheet conserva-
tism; it is the change in the degree of conservatism that counts.
4 Similarly, the information content
of accruals should not be conceptualized in terms of the extent to which operating assets/liabilities devi-
ate from their fair market values.
  An informative accrual measures the growth in operating activities without a subsequent reversal: a
serial correlation in total accruals is prima facie evidence of “bad” accounting.
  Dealing with the quality of earnings issue per GAAP reduces to attempts to come up with measures of
growth in operating activities that are more informative than the accruals implied by GAAP. Such com-
peting measure of growth in operating activities should facilitate the forecasting of future (operating)
GAAP earnings. The growth of sales is potentially useful insofar that it generally ought to relate to
growth in operating activities. As a practical matter, it leads to the hypothesis that the quality of earn-
ings is low when the growth in sales is less than the growth in net operating assets.
  Traditional value relevance (cross-sectional) regressions – stock market returns on same-period
accounting data – can assess the information content of accruals by putting it on the RHS with
cash earnings. The methodology also permits a comparison of GAAP accruals to what one
may hypothesize to be more informative measures of accruals. A particularly interesting question
relates to the issue if one can construct an accrual that loads the same in the regression as cash
earnings, in which case the two numbers aggregate without loss of information (in other words,
on the regression’s RHS one can add cash earnings and the accrual without signiﬁcantly reducing
the R
2).
2. Basics: Accruals and ﬁnancial statements
Without referring to any particular accounting principles, accounting introduces accruals because transac-
tions may, or may not, have a cash component:
4 In the context of this paper, “quality of earnings” pertains to the idea that the current (net) accrual inﬂuences the forecasting of
earnings in an upward or downward direction. If upwards (downwards) then the current earnings are of high (low) quality.
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This relation is deﬁnitional and thus not subject to challenge (the accrual, to be sure, is the total for the
period.)
5 If the RHS is determined by GAAP (of any jurisdiction) and cash earnings are determined by some
other accounting regime consistent with the term cash earnings, then the accrual is implied. More generally,
any one of the three quantities can be inferred from the remaining two, of course. In the literature one ﬁnds a
mixture of approaches though it does seem as if earnings (before or after some special items) are always taken
as a given. But this observation about practice in empirical research should not be confused with some notion
that the measurement of accruals or cash earnings presupposes an earnings number. Such thinking is unnec-
essarily rigid.
As a practical matter, one might well measure accrual earnings such that the number derives from two inde-
pendently established components, cash earnings and an accrual. One can thereby think of accruals as having
been measured independently of some existing balance sheets or an integrated set of ﬁnancial statements. To
consider the measurement of accruals without reference to earnings, balance sheets or cash ﬂows is by no
means fanciful. This approach becomes the modus operandi in the discussion of the topic “quality of earn-
ings” as it relates to accruals. This paper revisits this idea in the discussion of this topic later. Before getting
to that point the focus will be on cases when speciﬁc assets/liabilities and their carrying values are in place, i.e.,
what one might call “regular accounting.”
In regular accounting, start- and end-of-period balance sheets underpin earnings measurements. The claim
applies no less to the measurement of cash earnings than to (accrual) earnings since both cases require that the
ﬂows reconcile with the beginning–ending stocks. Cash earnings and regular accrual earnings accordingly dif-
fer only in the listing of assets/liabilities (and their carrying values) that support the two earnings measure-
ments. While the speciﬁcs of how one identiﬁes the two sets of assets/liabilities raises its own issues, which
will be discussed later, here we note that to conceptualize cash earnings independently of supporting balance
sheets removes us from regular accounting.
Suppose next that, (i) the accounting satisﬁes clean surplus for both concepts of earnings, and (ii) the div-
idends and capital contributions are of a cash variety, i.e., the two accounting regimes treat these transactions
the same. It follows that the accrual equals the diﬀerence between the two regime’s net worth changes (ending
minus beginning balances).
The last sentence is awkward in its claim that the accrual derives from diﬀerences after having looked at
changes over a period. Elementary algebra helps to communicate the statement. In the interest of simplicity,
assume zero dividends and capital contributions. First note that one infers earnings from the clean surplus
relation, i.e., the increase in net worth (or book value). Second, suppose that all asset/liabilities must be clas-
siﬁed into one or the other out of two kinds:
ca = cash assets and the approximate equivalent of cash, positives net of negatives.
oa = other assets/liabilities, net.
Then
fcaðtÞþoaðtÞg   fcaðt   1Þþoaðt   1Þg ¼ earningsðtÞ
5 One can ask whether cash earnings and cash ﬂows are two diﬀerent labels for the same thing. The literature lacks a standardized
terminology if and how one distinguishes between the two terms. Most papers (if not all) use the terminology “cash ﬂows” and make no
reference to cash earnings, explicitly or implicitly. In doing so it seems that one should not generally equate cash ﬂows to cash earnings.
Such is my judgment at least. It is mostly based on the fact that authors seem to have in mind that the cash ﬂows in question pertain to
current cash ﬂows, with no adjustment for capital expenditures. Jones’s paper illustrates that; the average accrual is negative because it
excludes the eﬀect due to the average increase in PPE. Hence this paper does not embed a concept of cash earnings. Other papers deals with
accruals much the same, though there are exceptions such as some of the more recent Sloan papers. It is my opinion that the cash earnings
construct – with an emphasis on earnings – should serve as a starting point in any analysis of accruals, empirical or theoretical. Thus I
maintain this perspective throughout, and I do not discriminate between cash earnings and cash ﬂows.
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caðtÞ caðt   1Þ¼cash earningsðtÞ
One trivially infers that
oaðtÞ oaðt   1Þ¼accrualðtÞ
In other words, the diﬀerence in non-cash assets (net of non-cash liabilities) identiﬁes the accrual. As the last
expression shows, it is inferred from assets/liabilities other than cash (and its approximate equivalents, positive
or negative).
The above development disregards dividends and capital contributions. But such transactions do not
change the analysis as long as both accounting schemes account for these the same. One modiﬁes the deﬁnition
of earnings by replacing ca(t) with ca(t) + net dividend(t), keeping ca(t   1), oa(t) and oa(t   1) the same.
(There are no apparent reasons why the accounting for dividends/capital contributions should not be the same
for the two earnings measurements.)
A delicate point must be noted. Because the arrangement embeds clean surplus accounting, each of the
earnings measurements must be comprehensive. Any alternative approach would have to re-deﬁne the three
ingredients in the foundation equation.
6 For example, one can try to identify how “other comprehensive
gains/losses” impact on the 3 elements in the foundation equation. It should be doable. (That said, the liter-
ature does not provide clear guidance as to whether this is the right way to proceed or not.)
Though the relations impose discipline on how diverse pieces ﬁt together, nothing has been said about what
characteristics should identify a cash asset/liability as opposed to “other” assets/liabilities. This practical, and
essential, topic is dealt with later. But there is of course substantial agreement on the diﬀering nature of the
two classes of assets/liabilities. Consider, for example, a balance sheet comprising the following prototype
assets/liabilities: (i) cash, (ii) liquid marketable securities, (iii) inventories, (iv) net property, plant and equip-
ment, (v) accrued expenses, (vi) accounts payable, and (vii) bank loans. Most people would then surely agree
that (i), (ii) and (vii) fall into the category of ca(t). The liability (vi) may seem less than obvious, but it, too,
should be part of ca(t) if it represents an outstanding liability as long as a deﬁnite amount of cash must be paid
to extinguish the debt (in other words, its economic essence does not diﬀer from a bank loan). The remaining
assets/liabilities fall into the oa(t) category by necessity.
7,8
The above development, simple as it is, lays bare that to add back depreciation and other so-called
non-cash items to earnings are, at best, an around-about way when one construes cash earnings. The point
reinforces that the concept of an accrual rests on a consistent classiﬁcation of assets/liabilities in consecutive
balance sheets, not on evaluating the line items in an income statement and ﬁnding their (non-) cash compo-
nents. Moreover, to measure a GAAP accrual, there are no compelling reasons why one must turn to a state-
ment of cash ﬂows per GAAP. The simple balance sheet framework shows that an accrual construct hinges
6 With the notable exception of Hribar and Collins (2002), the literature on accruals does not pay attention to this point. It leads to a
slippery slope: the deﬁnition of earnings can vary widely across studies in their treatments of special items.
7 To be sure, empirical studies that deal with accruals have often conceptualized measured accruals in ways that diﬀer from the approach
suggested in this paper.
8 Textbooks, like Penman (2009) and many papers refer to NOA as representing “net operating assets”. Does it correspond to oa(t)? The
answer is a qualiﬁed yes. There are diﬀerences insofar that NOA tend to pertain to operations rather broadly, and thus it typically includes
accounts receivable and payable plus even some portion of cash necessary to operate the business. I tend to think of oa(t) more narrowly
like in Ohlson and Aier(2009). Now ca(t) includes (oa(t) excludes) all assets/liabilities that one can reasonably add/deduct from cash
without losing information. Thus high quality accounts receivables and accounts payable are not treated as being accounted for via
accruals. (The reader has to use his/her own judgment what makes the most sense.) At any rate, as Richardson et al. (2009) makes clear,
many recent papers on accruals deﬁne the net accrual in terms of the change in NOA which of course in its essence does not diﬀer from the
accrual construct considered in this paper.
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advocate otherwise at the very least demands some justiﬁcation.
9
The above assets/liabilities example illustrates what most accountants take for granted, namely that
measurements related to cash assets/liabilities are less “ambiguous” than the remaining ones (oa). Cash
assets/liabilities (ca) are relatively unambiguous insofar that their carrying values for (most) practical
purposes approximate their market values. One can take this observation one step further and argue that
cash assets/liabilities by deﬁnition are those assets and liabilities that generally match their market values.
In contrast, all assets/liabilities falling into the oa(t) category have ambiguous carrying values: the
accounting principles and their applications truly come into play (e.g., depreciation schedules, the equity
method for unconsolidated subsidiaries, restructuring charges, pension liabilities, inventory accounting).
There is no requirement that the carrying values of these other assets approximate their fair values or
market values. In fact, the assets/liabilities comprising oa(t) would be no easier to deal with if one tried
market (or fair) valuations because value-creating assets/liabilities are intrinsically illiquid. (At a minimum,
one has to confront the relevance and practical meaning of net realizable value when the market is
indistinct.)
10
While the idea of splitting book value into ca(t) and oa(t) is predicated only on a basic understanding of
accounting, implementations of the framework put the onus on judgments. To illustrate, consider accounts
receivable. If these are of high quality – only an immaterial allowance for bad debts is needed – then they
ﬁt neatly into the ca(t) category. Under the circumstance they are in their economic essence similar to market-
able securities; both can be sold with some ease for predictable amounts. A material balance in the allowance
account relative to accounts receivable, in contrast, suggests that the net receivable is likely to be ambiguous; it
naturally leads to an oa(t) classiﬁcation. But the subjective nature of picking the appropriate cut-oﬀ point
related to the percentage of allowance balance is unavoidable. Similar subjective judgments as to the ca(t)
vs. oa(t) classiﬁcation must be faced in case of assets such as ﬁnance receivables and more or less illiquid
investments (like partnerships). Liabilities are no less problematic when it relates to cash estimates, such as
obligations outstanding to employees and suppliers. An amount that seems relatively predictable tilts the clas-
siﬁcation in favor of a cash liability, of course.
3. The economics of accruals
The relations and observations so far deal solely with deﬁnitions, classiﬁcations and the structure of
accounting. In no substantive way have we tackled what one may call “the information content” of accruals
9 In much of the literature one ﬁnds that papers make no attempt at measuring the period’s accrual in its totality. Instead, the idea is to
focus on something referred to as the “current accrual”. Thus one may consider the case when oa is split into two categories, {1, 2}. Let
oa(1, t) + oa(2, t) = oa(t), and similarly deﬁne accr(1, t) + accr(2, t) = accr(t). One can then write ce(t) + accr(2, t) = earn(t)   accr(1, t)
where one can interpret the accrual term on the RHS as the current accrual. With some slight abuse of language one can then refer to the
RHS as a calculation of “cash ﬂows”. Roughly, it can be thought of as corresponding to “cash provided from current operations” before
depreciation and amortization. That said, one needs to keep in mind that it is implicit that there are other accruals that must be accounted
for to derive cash earnings. (Just as one needs to keep in mind that it makes a diﬀerence if one considers comprehensive earnings as
opposed to some other measure of earnings.)
10 An elaboration of the word “ambiguity” helps to appreciate the operating vs. ﬁnancial activities distinction. Ambiguous valuation of
operating assets means that they interconnect and have a perceived value which is entirely idiosyncratic to a ﬁrm and depends on its
strategic plan. These contextual use values are inherently very subjective. It leads to the imperative of transactions-contingent GAAP rules
to generate carrying values for the balance sheet. Thus the income statement depends on the accrual – the change in the carrying values –
though it is understood that the book values of operating assets do not in any real sense have much of a connection with the market values
of operating assets, separately or in their totality. Cash assets and liabilities, in contrast, can be valued with less (or ideally no) ambiguity in
that their use value and they are nowhere near as contextual and dependent on a ﬁrm’s strategy. Thus the use of the word “ambiguity” is
not to be thought of as “arbitrary”, “non-nonsensical” or “best disregarded” or anything like it, but rather that contextual use values
become exceedingly diﬃcult to pin down from a balance sheet perspective. But that of course does not preclude that non-fair value rules
can be quite useful in the measurement of earnings.
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accounting accruals serve? Why recognize assets/liabilities with inherently ambiguous carrying values? Can
one generally expect accruals to add to cash earnings without loss of information? Or are they more like apples
and oranges?
Traditional accounting concepts speak to these kinds of questions by referring to two slightly diﬀerent
approaches: either one focuses on the end-of-period balance sheet or on the period’s income measurement.
Both approaches rely on the idea that accrual accounting countermands the deﬁciencies inherent in cash
accounting when there are costly strategic activities that serve as the foundation for potentially creating value
in subsequent periods.
From a balance sheet perspective, any reasonable concept of asset (liability) suggests that the lack of ambi-
guity of an asset’s carrying value cannot be a requirement to recognize an asset. To invest in operations, ﬁrms
must incur expenditures that are intrinsically diﬃcult to value since their eﬃcacy depends on the business
strategy. But at least some of these expenditures oﬀer expected future beneﬁts in terms of subsequent sales,
however ambiguous and hard to evaluate these connections may be. Such future beneﬁts ought not to be dis-
missed and treated as a period expense if one looks for a more comprehensive picture of a ﬁrm’s economic
condition. In other words, assigning zero value to expenditures that generally enhance subsequent sales con-
tradicts basic economics.
If one focuses on earnings measurement directly, then cash earnings alone mislead as a measure of perfor-
mance when the company incurs expenditures that beneﬁt the future. An adjustment in the form of an (net)
accrual is now necessary insofar the ﬁrm has increased the size of its operations. After all, a ﬁrm cannot
expand operations without disbursing cash or its approximate equivalent thereby reducing cash earnings; cash
earnings decrease as the ﬁrm invests in the future in a one-to-one fashion if the presumption is the benchmark
of zero NPV. In this way an accrual can be interpreted as having a one-to-one correspondence with growth.
More precisely, the oa(t)’s percentage increase equals accrual(t)/oa(t   1); it serves as a measure of a ﬁrm’s
growth in operating activities. The sign of the accrual, accordingly, determines if a ﬁrm expands or reduces its
operating activities.
There is a subtlety involved that needs to be underscored. Why does the measurement of growth center
solely on oa(t) as opposed to the total book value, oa(t)+c ( t)? The answer requires an appreciation of tra-
ditional ﬁnance precepts with its demarcation of operating vs. ﬁnancial activities. Within this framework other
assets, oa(t), stands for operating assets. These are the assets that pertain to ex ante value creation – an inher-
ently subjective and uncertain economic activity when it comes to assessing the likelihood of future success –
thereby causing the ambiguity in the valuation of such assets. In contrast, the assumption is that changes in
cash assets/liabilities are objectively neutral when it comes to forward looking value creation – zero NPV is
implied – which is precisely why they are comparatively easy to account for. Unsurprisingly, carrying values
for the cash and cash equivalent assets are close to their fair (market) values. In the spirit of Modigliani and
Miller, one naturally deﬁnes the cash assets/liabilities as the ﬁnancial assets/liabilities because of their value cre-
ation neutrality. Hence the cash (equivalent) assets/liabilities, and their changes, cannot tell us anything about
the growth of the value creating activities. Any change in ca(t) adjusted for the net dividend – cash earnings –
is of course inﬂuenced by operating activities, but that aspect does not bear on the change in the operating
activities per se.
11
The above discussion hints at the possibility that the accrual’s magnitude should bear on the subsequent
expected cash earnings (or cash ﬂows, to follow the literature). Is such the case? On heuristic grounds the
answer would seem to be “yes.” After all, the accrual captures a net incremental investment, and one can think
of this investment as increasing the expected future sales. With an unchanged margin, it follows indeed that
one should expect improved cash earnings. This argument permits tightening; one can develop precisely how
11 One can reasonably claim that this paper stretches language-usage insofar that it equates the accounting for operating activities with
accruals and ﬁnancial activities with cash-equivalence. Such a one-to-one correspondence is at variance with text-books in some respects.
But these exceptions are minor. Thus here the understanding is that the accounting for, say, the amortization of a discount related to a
bond is not an accrual. It is also understood that there is no cash necessary for operating purposes. In the grand scheme of problems
discussed in this paper we believe this is reasonable. That said, one can certainly entertain reﬁnements of the framework laid out in this
paper.
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(though this helps to motivate the conclusion).
12
Readers familiar with the concept of “Free Cash Flows”, FCF, may ask how a measure of cash earnings
relates to FCF. To address this issue, two issues must be dealt with. First, FCF often classiﬁes A/R and A/P as
operating rather than ﬁnancial. But this seems rather arbitrary, so one can assume that all qualifying cash
assets/liabilities relevant for cash earnings coincide with ﬁnancial assets/liabilities. Second, with this require-
ment in place FCF simply equals cash earnings adjusted for income/expenses related to ﬁnancial activities. In
particular, if one conﬁnes such expenses to interest items with a common interest rate, then FCF equals resid-
ual cash earnings.
4. Linking growth to accruals: A model
This section presents a stylized model of “proper” accruals. It formalizes that growth and accruals
constitutes two sides of the same coin. Points made in the previous section should thereby be reinforced.
Let ce(t) denotes the current cash earnings (ﬂows) for the period t and assume that these are paid out in
dividends (to keep matters simple). Students of ﬁnance then learn that under perpetual, geometric expected
growth the value of the ﬁrm follows from the well-known formula
V ðtÞ¼ceðtÞð1 þ gÞ=ðr   gÞ
where
g = growth rate (e.g., 0.04% or 4%))
r = discount factor (e.g., 0.1% or 10%)
ce(t) = ca(t)   ca(t   1) + net dividend(t) = cash earnings(t)
Accountants diﬀer from ﬁnance theorists in that they focus on earnings, ce(t) + accr(t), as the key input in
the valuation as opposed to future cash earnings. Under idealized circumstances they have complete conﬁ-
dence in the accrual – it comes with no error whatsoever – so the earnings are also error free. The accountant
can therefore refer to earnings capitalization to value the future cash earnings:
V ðtÞ¼½ ð 1 þ rÞ=r ½ceðtÞþaccrðtÞ    ceðtÞ
12 The literature suggests that a valid accrual should perform as a leading indicator of (or forecast of) subsequent cash earnings (or cash
ﬂows). The idea seems reasonable enough, though it’s ﬁrming up is perhaps less so. Any modeling of how period t’s accruals lead to t +1
cash earnings must confront that the future cash earnings interact with the same-period expected accrual. The point cannot be ﬁnessed.
Future cash earnings depend directly on future growth in investments in operating activities; in turn the latter investment determines the
future accrual. It gives rise to the question: as a matter of concept, how does the current accrual relate to future cash earnings when one
allows for growth in the accrual? To answer this question, we need (i) an assumption on the meaning of a valid (or “properly measured”,
perfect) accrual, and (ii) an assumption on the signiﬁcance of cash earnings in valuation. As to the latter, (ii), assume that the market value
of operating assets is determined by the present value of cash earnings (to be sure, the market value generally diﬀers from oa(t)). To keep
the modeling simple, assume that the cash earnings are paid out in dividends. With respect to the ﬁrst assumption, (i), assume that a perfect
accrual satisﬁes V(t)=[ ( 1+r)/r][ce(t) + accr(t)]   ce(t) and where thus, per (ii), V(t) = PV of expected cash earn-
ings =
P
sP1ð1 þ rÞ
 sEt½ e ceðt þ sÞ . (There is no need to specify the date t conditional information.) With these two assumptions in
place, no more and no less, routine derivations lead to the dynamic Et½ð g accrðt þ 1ÞþD e ceðt þ 1Þ  ¼ ð1 þ rÞðaccrðtÞÞ The expression shows
that the current accrual forecasts the change in cash ﬂows plus an adjustment for the future expected accrual. In the special case when the
expected accrual in the next period is zero (a no growth setting), then, and only then, does the current accrual forecast the change in the
expected change in cash earnings (deﬂated by (1 + r)). More generally, denoting the growth rate in operations by g (which can be
information dependent so we could actually write g(t)), one obtains the answer to the question posed above:
Et½D e ceðt þ 1Þ  ¼ ðr   gÞðaccrðtÞÞ Note that at date t it may be the case that r = g. Now the RHS equals zero so that current cash
earnings provide an unbiased estimate of next-period’s cash earnings, regardless of the current accrual. A similar forecast also applies if the
current accrual is zero, i.e., there has been no new net investment in operating activities. The concept of an accrual, as deﬁned here, means
the (net) accrual is equivalent to the (net) new investment in operating activities. To underscore this point, consider what explains the
expected change in operating earnings: If ox(t + 1) denotes expected operating earnings (cash earnings plus accrual), then one readily
shows that ox(t +1 )  ox(t)=r.accr(t). This relation is of course precisely what one should expect. One obtains this result without
restrictions on the time-series behavior of accr(t), the point being that the model embeds no such restrictions.
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Can the accountant and ﬁnance student both be right? Yes: equivalence holds if and only if the accrual
equals
accrðtÞ¼g   V ðtÞ=ð1 þ gÞ
In other words, the accrual must emulate the growth in the expected cash earnings. (Routine algebra proves
the equivalence). And note that as an approximation one can leave out (1 + g) so that accr(t) is approximated
by g   V(t). (The inverse of (1 + g) is applied to V(t) to estimate the start-of-period value of V, V(t   1).) The
expression shows that the greater the growth, the greater the accrual and conversely.
Simple as the above model is, it does achieve the insight that, under idealized conditions, ce(t) and accr(t)
add without loss of information. Knowing earnings suﬃces to infer the cum-dividend value of the ﬁrm, yet one
cannot infer the accrual or cash earnings. (In general, the dividend need not equal the cash ﬂow, in which case
one cannot infer the two components of earnings.)
As an obvious implication of the model, cash accounting measures earnings without error if and only if the
ﬁrm is in a steady state, g = 0. Thus one can think of a steady state as a condition when there is no need for an
accrual. These observations build in the so-called cancelling error property: zero growth corresponds to no
change in the oa(t) and hence the magnitude of oa(t) = oa(t   1) itself is irrelevant when one measures earn-
ings. As we will see in the following sections, the no growth benchmark can usefully guide practical ﬁnancial
statement analysis.
5. Accruals and the quality of earnings
While the above modeling may help us appreciate the economics of accruals, the real world is of course far
messier. There is no such thing as a true and observable accrual, but rather a sense that an accrual can mis-
inform as well as inform depending upon circumstances. Practical ﬁnancial statement analysis has long recog-
nized the problems inherent in GAAP balance sheets and the accruals embedded in income statements.
Because the operating asset’s carrying values are intrinsically ambiguous, there is undeniably a sense that
GAAP accounting can result in distortions and misinformation. The reasons for potential misinformation
are diverse. They include the sheer complexity of accounting rules, and perhaps even malevolent management
intentions. In the latter case “earnings management” tends to be the standard terminology. Thus ﬁnancial ana-
lysts become aware that “earnings management” can lead to misleading earnings through the accruals. In
research one often ﬁnds references to “discretionary” accruals, which is of course what Jones’s model aims
at. But this behavioral aspect should not be exaggerated. No less important are GAAP-consistent non-recur-
ring charges that can have a very material eﬀect on current and subsequent accruals, especially when these
charges involve no cash. (A write-oﬀ reduces the current accrual and increases subsequent accruals, of course.)
Because of potentially inherent deﬁciencies in GAAP, misleading accruals should not be ruled out even in the
case of honest managers. The point deserves pondering insofar that much of the literature puts the onus on
managers when accruals have undesirable properties.
Early on the paper emphasized that accounting relies on accruals because at least some assets/liabilities do
not adequately connect with (approximate) cash values or, as accountants tend to put it, fair values. This
observation may suggest that the problems with accruals can be traced to the lack of fair valuations for all
assets/liabilities. Such a claim, however, is at best misleading: deviations from this presumed ideal should
not be thought of as the source of erroneous accrual measurements. Such reasoning puts us on the wrong track
because it suggests that “good” accounting is founded on fair market valuation. Traditional accounting rejects
this approach because of its emphasis on income measurement; it builds on historical cost accounting includ-
ing its extensions that stipulate realization principles for revenues and proﬁts.
Nor does the degree of (or lack of) balance sheet conservatism act as a material culprit when an accrual
misleads. The substantive issue revolves around the extent to which there is a change (date t compared to date
t   1) in the degree of conservatism. Increasing the degree of conservatism improves the quality of earnings
and conversely when it is decreased.
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and conversely. This observation in essence captures accrual reversals. It can also be thought of as being no
diﬀerent from overstatements and subsequent understatements of reported growth in net operating assets,
which in turn reﬂects the “quality of earnings.” Thus it becomes clear that, (i) understanding the characteris-
tics of the period’s accrual is necessary and arguably suﬃcient to understand a ﬁrm’s operating income, and
(ii) one needs to focus on changes in the degree of conservatism not the degree of conservatism itself, a point
developed below. And as one thinks about the quality of earnings one must always keep in mind that the rel-
evant construct – the validity of the growth in oa(t) – disregards the cash & (approximate) cash equivalent
assets/liabilities. This aspect appeals because such easy-to-value assets/liabilities cannot be a source of mis-
leading accounting (assuming no auditing type problems).
Of course, the “correct” oa(t) are never observable, and more importantly, nor is the “correct”
oa(t)   oa(t   1) or growth in oa(t) observable. It still helps to conceptualize the ideas of quality of earnings
and reversals in terms of the correct oa(t). The motivating algebra runs as follows.
Suppose the oa(t) are correct and that these grow at a steady rate, g > 0. Consider next, two periods that
end at dates t + 1 and t, respectively. Now suppose the reported oa(t) exceeds the correct oa(t). It follows triv-
ially that the observed period t + 1 growth is less than g, whereas the observed period t growth is larger than g.
In this sense the low quality of earnings builds in a reversal in accruals. As an interesting special case, noted
earlier, if the true g equals 0, then any accrual acts as “pure noise” and negative accruals are followed by posi-
tive ones and conversely. Thus one can safely say that the accruals should be regarded as uninformative. A
steady state setting thereby serves as an easy to appreciate case when accruals are both non-informative
and negatively serially correlated.
Balance sheet conservatism does not by itself bring on measurement biases, provided that the extent of con-
servatism has been consistently applied across dates and the focus is on growth itself. To demonstrate this,
suppose one scales the oa(t)’s with a constant, k > 0, which serves as index of lack of conservatism. In other
words, write k   oa(t) so that the accounting is more conservative in relative terms as one decreases k. It is read-
ily seen that the growth rate in operating assets remains the same for all k, that is [k   oa(t +1 )  k   oa(t)]/
k   oa(t) does not depend on k. More generally, without resorting to an index scalar, the quality of (operating)
earnings for period t + 1 is poor if and only if the degree of conservatism has decreased, date t + 1 compared
to date t. This analysis changes somewhat if one shifts the attention from a growth perspective to one which
scales the diﬀerence oa(t +1 )  oa(t) by a constant. Now there will be an eﬀect: the accrual decreases as the
degree of conservatism increases. However, within practical bounds this eﬀect is relatively small (and the sign
remains intact). Thus the substantive quality of earnings issue reduces to the extent there has been a change in
the degree of conservatism from one period to the next.
6. How to conceptualize accrual biases as a practical matter
The notion of an under- or overstated accrual suggests, at least implicitly, that there is something like an
accurate, or at least more accurate, accrual. The claim is awkward since the degree of accuracy in accruals is
never observable, no matter how much time has passed. Shall we then overlook what good/bad accounting is
all about and accept that one has to live with the accruals as provided by GAAP? The answer to this question,
I think, must be a resounding “no”: practical ﬁnancial statement analysis will always be concerned with
accrual biases because over time overstated accruals reverse. It leads to the saying “the (operating) earnings
reported for the current period can be a poor indicator of what will be reported in the future due to the cur-
rent/past accruals.”
So, how do we assess the degree of bias, or the potential for future reversals, in any GAAP accrual? To
answer this question one tries to make the most of the accrual and growth connection.
Two separate steps show the way to an estimate of a competing accrual. First, one estimates the current
value of the ﬁrm’s net operating assets, which thus second guesses the actual accounting oa(t). Let est_oa(t)
denote this estimate. Second, one estimates the current growth independently of the current growth in oa(t).
Independence is essential since the presumption is that the actual accrual, oa(t)   oa(t   1), may diﬀer from its
“true” measure. Let U denote an independently estimated growth in operations. The product of the two terms
then yields an estimate of the “appropriate” accrual, which competes with the one implied by GAAP. Put
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hypothesis that this accrual could be misleading: the sign and diﬀerence between the estimated accrual vs.
the GAAP accrual establishes the accrual bias or “the quality of earnings” conclusion.
As to the ﬁrst step, the est_oa(t) term, it may seem natural to estimate it using a ﬁrm’s market capitalization
adjusted for ca (net ﬁnancial position). But this approach has the drawback that it essentially presumes that
the accounting is unbiased as opposed to conservative (from a balance sheet perspective). Under such circum-
stances the estimated accrual will not be directly comparable to a GAAP-based accrual since GAAP embraces
balance sheet conservatism. In addition, one can also argue against this market value method because it pre-
sumes rational pricing (an “eﬃcient” stock market); it puts the cart in front of the horse since the ﬁnancial
analysis tries to assess whether the price diﬀers from the ﬁrm’s intrinsic value. These objections suggest that
it makes more sense to use accounting based estimates of est_oa(t). Obvious candidates are GAAP’s net oa(t),
or some combination of oa(t) and oa(t   1). Of course these numbers can be viewed as being in error due to
misapplications of GAAP, or problems inherent in GAAP itself, but the percentage error should generally be
manageable in the scheme of things. The approach actually provides a more critical advantage. It addresses
the quality of earnings issue solely focusing on whether the actual growth in oa is too large/small relative
to an independent estimate of the growth in oa, namely C.
What about the second step, estimates of C? Here the current growth in sales revenues serves as a natural
candidate. It is reasonably similar in concept to the Jones model of non-discretionary accruals, which in turn
originates from traditional FSA analysis: the growth in (operating) earnings is of low quality whenever it
exceeds the growth in sales. In other words, generally speaking, an improvement in a ﬁrm’s proﬁt margin does
not give the same warm feeling as when a ﬁrm grows its sales, though both of these changes lead to improved
earnings.
13
Using sales growth as an estimate of C one can estimate a GAAP-competing accrual:
accrðtÞ¼growth in salesðtÞ est oaðtÞ
where est_oa(t) is either
oaðtÞ=ð1 þ growth in salesðtÞÞ
or
oaðt   1Þ
or some weighted average of the two numbers.
To measure the growth in operating activities using sales growth does not necessarily work all the time, of
course. A company that changes its marketing strategy from high margin/pricing to low margin/pricing will
increase its sales without increasing its investments. So the idea of measuring growth via sales revenues is by
no means perfect, and, in fact, somewhat arbitrary unless one believes that the there has been no (material)
change in the “true” proﬁt margin. This observation concerning the limits to using sales growth suggests that
it can be worthwhile to consider alternative methods that estimate C.
What are the alternatives to sales growth? Because C refers to growth of the operating business, one may
consider the growth in capital expenditures as a growth anchor. This approach would seem to be quite work-
able as long as one can postulate that in the previous period the capital expenditures were normal relative to
sales. But this presupposition may be hard to validate, and the capital expenditures in the previous year may
have been exceptionally small in which case the estimated growth will be biased upwards. To handle this objec-
tion one may consider measuring growth by looking at capital expenditures (net, the current period) relative to
the depreciation incurred. More general procedures that averages over the past capital expenditures and
13 When it comes to accounts receivable, the so-called “modiﬁed Jones model” makes an adjustment in the major independent variable,
change in sales (normalized by total assets) to recognize the potential accrual classiﬁcation of accounts receivable changes. In paper after
paper, the Jones model is reconﬁgured by deducting the change in accounts receivable from the change in sales. It seems like an odd
reconﬁguration; rather than taking the change in accounts receivable, and deduct from the change in sales, it should of course be the
change in the change in accounts receivable if one wants to obtain the change in cash sales. (Analytically, the correction to change in sales
should be (AR(t)   AR(t   1))   (AR(t   1)   AR(t   2)).) It also seems as if one ought to make an adjustment for deferred revenues.
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measure of the underlying growth in the operating business.
The problem of second-guessing a GAAP-based accrual with one’s own measurement is an intrinsically
hard problem. We can never know if we are coming up with something better. That said, sometimes we have
good reasons to believe the GAAP accrual is potentially materially distorted, as is the case when we believe
that the company is, or has been, applying so-called “big bath” charges. Now one’s own estimate of an accrual
might well be an improvement. But ultimately this, too, is plain conjecture unless one evaluates its usefulness
empirically.
7. A discussion of methodologies that assess accruals empirically: Stock price based approaches
Suppose we can agree on how to classify the assets/liabilities into their two kinds without controversy. Sup-
pose further we have some measure of accruals, either via GAAP or, say, some estimating procedure like
growth in sales times oa(t   1). Can we then evaluate if the accrual measurements are informative? I think
the answer is a qualiﬁed yes. It has to be qualiﬁed insofar that one has to buy into some criterion as to what
the desirable properties ought to be.
The accounting literature oﬀers a number of possibilities as to how one assesses the usefulness of accru-
als. In the spirit of Sloan’s early paper, as a ﬁrst possibility one may consider whether GAAP accrual mea-
surements allow us to make money in the stock market. (One could also do this for non-GAAP estimates of
accruals.) This criterion suggests the back-testing of portfolio strategies on the basis of accruals.
14 For
example, one can calculate accrual-to-price ratios, keep cash earnings to price ratios constant, and then
evaluate the returns for portfolio strategies that use this scheme to select long vs. short positions. As Sloan’s
empirical results suggest, superior returns might well be available, and, if true, this state of aﬀairs is obvi-
ously of great practical interest (to put it mildly).
15 From a more academic perspective, however, this
approach seems doubtful insofar that it runs counter to the disciplining hypothesis that the stock market
is eﬃcient. A delicate issue lurks in the background. The possibility of making excess returns depends on
the accrual being misleading so that the market potentially gets “deceived” and prices thereby become inef-
ﬁcient. But to say that an accrual is useful because others misinterpret the accrual does not deal with
whether the accrual is informative in a more traditional sense that presumes homogenous and “accurate”
beliefs.
There is no need to rely on investment strategies and the forecasting of returns to assess the utility or role of
accruals, whether GAAP or not. The huge literature on “value-relevance” can also guide the research. Specif-
ically, accounting researchers conventionally rely on (cross-sectional) returns –earnings regressions to examine
the value-relevance of earnings and its components. (The returns, earnings and any other variables on the
RHS, are contemporaneous; the start-of-period price scales the RHS variables.) Applying such value-rele-
vance methodology, one can thus regress annual cross-sections r(t) (market returns) on two variables, cash
earnings and the estimate of the accrual (or, as a competing alternative, the GAAP accrual). One can then
declare a degree of success if both the estimated coeﬃcients achieve statistical signiﬁcance and they exceed
one. Greater than one is essential since it shows that a dollar of cash and a dollar of earnings are at least worth
a dollar in the market. An even better result is obtained if additionally the estimated coeﬃcients are (approx-
imately) the same for the two independent variables. Such a ﬁnding means that the two earnings components
aggregate without loss of information, an essential feature of “good” accounting.
One can also consider an accrual construct based on a model that competes with a GAAP-based accrual. In
such a regression the related two independent variables, cash earnings and the model accrual, one can hypoth-
esize that the related R
2 exceeds those that are associated with GAAP earnings or a regression with cash
earnings plus GAAP accruals on the RHS. If signiﬁcant, the result points toward the model accrual being
more informative than the GAAP accrual. Yet another horse race between a model based accrual construct
14 From this observation it should be apparent that one cannot practically distinguish the accrual anomaly from the so-called “investment
anomaly”. Richardson et al. (2009) discuss the investment and accruals anomalies and their close connection.
15 The growth-accrual connection makes it presence felt in evaluations of the (Sloan type) accrual anomaly: can it not instead be a growth
stock anomaly? See in particular Fairﬁeld et al. (2003) and the review paper by Richardson et al. (2009).
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regression to explain returns. One then evaluates which of the two competing accruals contributes the most
to the R
2.
Is it likely that model accruals work better than GAAP accruals in regressions explaining returns? It is hard
to say, especially since there are more than a few devils in the details, i.e., how to measure the cash earnings
and the estimated model accrual. There are also all kinds of speciﬁcation issues, like the role of expectations
and other potential confounding variables. But it certainly would seem to be worth a try to pursue these kinds
of research hypotheses.
What about the possibility that the R
2 is disappointing because the stock market happens to be, in fact,
ineﬃcient? To handle this problem one can simply add yet another RHS variable to the returns-earnings-
accruals regressions, namely, the subsequent period’s market return, r(t + 1). This additional variable will
ﬁlter out the noise in the contemporaneous returns-earnings regression due to any market ineﬃciencies as
manifest in the predictability of future returns.
16
8. A discussion of methodologies that assess accruals empirically: Without reference to stock prices or returns
Sloan and others consider the problem of how one tests empirically whether (GAAP) accruals appropri-
ately inform investors without referring to stock prices (or returns). He argues that GAAP accruals tendency
to reverse requires a separation of accruals and cash ﬂows when one forecasts subsequent earnings. Speciﬁ-
cally, because accruals hypothetically have lower persistence than cash ﬂows, in the forecasting equation
the accrual should have a lower weight as compared to the weight on cash earnings. The idea exerts a pull
in ﬁnancial analysis since it suggests that accruals can misinform if added to cash earnings. Having said that,
one still has to keep in mind that the setting is not as straightforward as one would like because a cross-sec-
tional setting requires a deﬂation of the variables to adjust for size. Sloan picks total assets as the deﬂator var-
iable. One can thus think of Sloan’s approach as addressing a practical problem that forecasts ROA using two
independent variables, current cash earnings deﬂated by total assets and the current accrual also deﬂated by
total assets. As a drawback, the forecasting of ROA does not seem to be prominent in practice.
Focusing on practical problems, one may consider forecasting the change in ﬁrms’ (operating) proﬁt mar-
gins per GAAP. It is of obvious practical interest since analysts tend to forecast operating earnings via a fore-
cast of sales growth combined with an (operating) proﬁt margin. But this forecasting perspective also
addresses the issue of the quality of (current) earnings. If current earnings can be identiﬁed as of poor quality,
then such an evaluation leads to the forecasting of a decline in the future proﬁt margin. Thus the operating
proﬁt margin can serve as a useful dependent variable because it confronts the quality of earnings issue head
on yet it is also of practical interest. And now one naturally extends the analysis to check whether competing
accruals (like those previously discussed) can aid in the forecasting of the change in the operating proﬁt mar-
gin. To be speciﬁc, does the diﬀerence between a GAAP accrual and a model accrual facilitate the forecast of
change in the GAAP proﬁt margin?
9. Assessing reversals empirically
The proﬁt margin comprises two parts: the cash margin (cash earnings scaled by sales) and the margin due
to the accrual component. This simple observation suggests that one can evaluate whether the accrual com-
ponent has a negative serial correlation, i.e., it reverses. (One can use a linear model or an n by n contingency
table to evaluate this empirical hypothesis). This analysis looks reasonable enough, yet it is unsatisfactory in a
cross-sectional setting. The reason is that for growing ﬁrms one should expect positive accruals to be followed
by positive accruals; for non-growth ﬁrms low accruals should be followed, on average, by low accruals. This
merely amounts to saying that the reversal property in the accrual margin does not ﬁt a cross-sectional mode
16 If one assumes market eﬃciency in its weak form – the market returns are serially uncorrelated, corr[r(t + 1), r(t)] = 0 – then r(t +1 )o n
the RHS in the regression loads if and only if it correlates with the remaining variables (date t) on the RHS. Hence the market is not
eﬃcient in the so-called semi-strong form since date t variables correlate with the subsequent returns. The general problem of value
relevance and correcting for ineﬃcient markets is extensively discussed by Aboody et al. (2002).
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looking at accruals over two adjacent years for a large number of ﬁrms cannot tell us much about reversals.
Statistical power has been lost.
So what can be done if we want to analyze reversals in a cross-sectional setting? Answer: we need a model of
what a ﬁrm’s accrual ought to be in any given period. Thus, to implement the statistics, one relies on the
observation
faccrðtÞ per GAAPg=salesðtÞ minus faccrðtÞ per Modelg=salesðtÞ
where the “per Model” corresponds to what was discussed in a previous section, namely, in a base case, put
accr(t) per Model = growth in sales(t)   oa(t   1). In this way of looking at the problem, under the alternative
hypothesis the reversal direction of the GAAP accrual can be assessed by looking at the sign of the actual
accrual minus the model accrual; pluses are followed by minuses and conversely (on average). Now one
has a framework to examine the reversal in a cross-sectional setting, but at the “cost” of having to maintain
an assumption on how the “correct” accrual should be measured.
17
Another, perhaps more direct, approach simply looks at the growth in oa(t) per GAAP and uses growth in
sales as the benchmark. Thus the unit of observation for purposes of statistics reduces to
foaðtÞ  oaðt   1Þg=oaðt   1Þ minus fsalesðtÞ salesðt   1Þg=salesðt   1Þ
A hypothesis of reversals now implies that these observations have a negative serial correlation: negative
values tend to be followed by positive values with a probability greater than 50–50. And this test can be
applied for any 2 adjacent years in an n by n contingency table or, alternatively, as a simple (rank) correlation.
This way of looking at reversals takes us back to very traditional FSA: The change in a ﬁrm’s so called asset –
turnover provides an indicator of the quality of earnings.
18 A drawback with this approach is that it may not
work well when sales relative to oa is large; it could create excess volatility in the growth in oa as compared to
the growth in sales. And of course, there are issues involved insofar the oa-growth should precede the sales
growth; an assumption that the two growth measures should move contemporaneously may be too
stringent.
19
Should one conclude predictable, and material, reversals in GAAP’s accruals reﬂect either earnings
management (in the spirit of Jones’s “discretionary accruals”) or poor accounting standards? As to earnings
management, I think not. As to poor accounting standards, I think at most “maybe”. The point that needs to
be appreciated is the possibility of non-recurring items (or special items to use a diﬀerent jargon). These items
can of course be present in both accruals and cash earnings (not to mention earnings), but there are good rea-
sons to hypothesize that they are much more pervasive in accruals than cash earnings due to write-oﬀs and
restructuring charges. If such is indeed the case, then it makes sense to hypothesize that the non-recurring
items have a material impact and possibly compel empirical results in favor of a reversal conclusion. But spe-
cial items do not necessarily reﬂect earnings management since they generally are consistent with GAAP. And
they reﬂect “bad” accounting only if one now buys into the prior proposition that GAAP is too lenient when it
comes to the use of special items. Stated somewhat diﬀerently, if one makes the case that sound accounting
should leave ample room for non-recurring items when one accounts for operating activities, then there are
reasons to expect that the period’s net accrual reverses.
10. Some implications for future research
As noted in the introduction, it is outside the scope of this paper to critically evaluate the (essentially empir-
ical) literature on accruals. The task would have been as formidable as tricky insofar that it is all too easy to
17 More generally, the probability of seeing a negative GAAP-accrual minus model accrual should depend on the extent to which there
has been a positive observation not only in the previous period but also in periods prior to the previous one.
18 Changes in ATO (sales divided by oa) acting as a leading indicator of changes in earnings haves been assessed by Fairﬁeld and Yohn
(2001). Again, many papers dealing with FSA issues can be thought of equally well as dealing with accrual reversals.
19 One can ask whether reversals in accruals relate to Basu’s concept of (conditional) accounting conservatism. Though the analysis needs
to be worked out, it would seem so. The reason is that bad news tends to correlate with write-oﬀs, and write-oﬀs lead to signiﬁcant negative
accruals (on average), which in turn would clear the deck for subsequent positive accruals.
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worthwhile to look toward future research. In this spirit I will state what I view as some of the more signiﬁcant
implications related to previous discussions. I do not claim novelty; no doubt a careful literature review will
ﬁnd papers that come very close to making arguments not all that diﬀerent to those stated below. My choice of
points made depends primarily on the extent I believe they can usefully guide research on accruals without
concern given to speciﬁc topics.
  In dealing with accruals it makes sense to always use, as a starting point, the framework that recognizes
comprehensive earnings and (comprehensive) cash earnings as reconciling with the net accrual. To
implement this approach it helps to clarify which particular assets/liabilities have been classiﬁed as cash
vs. those that are operating. Following that a researcher may well introduce some measure of “cash
ﬂows” to distinguish these from cash earnings. Thus a researcher may, for example, concern herself with
“cash provided by current operations” (as he/she chooses to deﬁne it) and in a complimentary fashion
identify the related accruals. This approach should paint a coherent picture; it allows a reader to see
more clearly the construct and measurements that motivate the research design. From a broad perspec-
tive, the issue at hand is: what should be the generally understood framework when dealing with accru-
als? If comprehensive earnings and cash earnings are not the core ingredients, then what makes more
sense?
  Researchers help readers by making it clear whether they rely on the “apples” and “oranges” metaphor
to set the stage for the research question. In other words, is it crucial that the accruals and cash earnings
may not add because it would lead to signiﬁcant loss of information? If this theme is expanded on, like
in research settings that bear on value relevance or market ineﬃciency, a researcher can eﬀectively com-
municate research objectives or maintained hypotheses. It also helps if the researcher spells out whether
the apples & oranges dichotomy depends on a particular context (such as the presence of write-oﬀs or a
ﬁrm going to the capital market to obtain additional ﬁnancing) or applies more broadly.
  In case there is a need to deﬂate/scale accruals or cash earnings, a ﬁrm’s sales revenue seems preferable
to its total assets. The argument here is that a ﬁrm’s (operating) proﬁt margin is of great interest in the
ﬁnancial community. The same cannot be said for ROA. Moreover, the forecasting of the proﬁt mar-
gin, and its two components (cash margin and accrual margin), in terms of current accrual diagnostics
can become part of quality of earnings research. It also naturally complements growth in sales which
plays such a crucial role to understand the cash earnings/accrual mix.
  Research that concerns itself with “bad” accruals, such as “reversals” and “quality of earnings” issues,
can help the reader by suggesting how one might measure an accrual so it becomes more informative.
That is, this task addresses what eﬀective ﬁnancial statement analysis should look like as a practical
matter. The research can also spell out why, or why not, it makes sense to evaluate competing accruals
as to their information content or other properties.
  A researcher helps a reader by stating whether the setting invokes a perspective where the measured
accrual corresponds to a measurement of the growth in a ﬁrm’s operating activities, and operating
activities alone. It is a matter of avoiding confusion since one can reasonably argue that, in fact, there
are accruals related to ﬁnancial activities.
  Finally, given the enormous increase in the literature on accruals and the high likelihood of seeing no
abatement in the future, it helps if the researcher spells out his/her concept of an accrual and how it may
diﬀer from alternative uses of the term. Nobody has a monopoly on how to use accounting jargon, and
thus the need for clarity has escalated as the literature has grown.
11. Concluding remarks
Most discussions of accruals tend to have a negative tenor and rarely do they fail to mention the dangers of
interpreting accruals as cash equivalents. In an extreme view accruals purportedly act as “noise” due to the
arcane/arbitrary historical cost accounting rules inherent in GAAP: as a consequence accruals are best dis-
missed. Finance texts occasionally still espouse this view, though of course most accountants would argue
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provide useful information as indicators of future cash ﬂows and earnings that go beyond the information in
current cash earnings. As Sloan and many others have argued, the-numbers-do-not-add qualiﬁer means that
ﬁnancial analysis beneﬁts from splitting earnings into their cash earnings and accrual components. That said,
it is well to note that at least in principle one can visualize a third perspective, namely accruals that do not
reverse; in other words under such idealized conditions accruals add to cash earnings without loss of informa-
tion. How to implement such accounting is an open question, though I hope some of the points made in this
paper provide a sense of direction about how it may be done. It goes to the heart of accounting when it works
at its best: what does it take to ensure that the bottom line need not be split into components? The question
would seem to be interesting not only as a matter of accounting theory but also as matter of dealing with
quality of earnings issues. To appreciate this third perspective on accruals, one can even consider a fourth
possibility which is rarely hypothesized. Under some circumstances one can argue that earnings should be split
into its two components because a dollar of an accrual is worth more than a dollar of cash earnings. This
possibility arises in settings with conservative accounting and growth in expected operating assets.
20
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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the eﬀects of board aﬃliation on the corporate pay gap.
Using a sample of Chinese listed ﬁrms from 2005 to 2011, we ﬁnd that boards
with a greater presence of directors appointed by block shareholders have
lower pay gaps. Furthermore, the governance eﬀects of board aﬃliation with
and without pay are distinguished. The empirical results show that board
aﬃliation without pay is negatively related to the pay gap, while board
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1. Introduction
Compensation packages are an important part of a modern company’s incentive system. Most relevant
research has focused on examining the level of executive pay and the diﬀerent components of executive com-
pensation, while ignoring further discussion about a company’s pay gap. Originally, the pay-gap phenomenon
could be chieﬂy explained by tournament theory. That is, an appropriate pay gap increases employee
motivation and productivity. However, in recent years, company pay gaps have continuously widened, which
appears to be due to company executives manipulating the formulation process of compensation to increase
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journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/cjartheir salaries beyond the optimal level (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). According to the executive-power theory,
executive misuse of their power to obtain excessive pay has a series of negative economic consequences, such
as the failure of salary–incentive mechanisms and a decline in overall company performance (Bebchuk et al.,
2011).
Within the ongoing development of the Chinese economy, the compensation received by executives in
Chinese companies is increasing rapidly and company pay gaps are widening. For example, the 2010 annual
report of China International Marine Containers (Group) Ltd. (stock code 000039) indicates that the com-
pany’s largest compensation package of that year was 6.0 million RMB yuan, while its average annual
employee wage was only 65,800 yuan. In 2011, the highest executive compensation reached 9.6 million yuan,
while the average annual employee wage was only 78,600 yuan. The company’s pay gap thus increased
between 2010 and 2011, from a highest 90 times of the average employee pay, to a highest 121 times of the
average employee pay. When considering the possible negative eﬀect of the pay gap, it is necessary to deter-
mine whether the company’s governance mechanisms are able to eﬀectively reduce its pay gap and ease the
agency problem during the process of formulating compensation packages.
In China’s speciﬁc institutional setting, block shareholders are entitled to appoint personnel to listed com-
panies as directors. This is one of the major ways for block shareholders to supervise company executives.
Once the block shareholders of a company have realized that an agency problem is aﬀecting the salary-setting
process, they appoint certain personnel as company directors responsible for supervising executives’ opportu-
nistic behavior. However, the governance eﬀect of board aﬃliation may diﬀer substantially due to diﬀerences
in receiving compensation. Currently, the directors appointed by block shareholders may either receive or not
receive pay from the listed companies for which they work. Salaried directors appointed by block shareholders
are more reliant than their non-salaried counterparts on the executives of the listed company, which may
reduce director independence and thus impair the eﬃciency of their executive supervision. In contrast, non-
salaried directors appointed by the block shareholders are more independent, better able to represent the inter-
ests of block shareholders to supervise executives, and ultimately achieve a better supervision eﬀect. As a
result, only non-salaried directors appointed by block shareholders can help signiﬁcantly to ease the agency
problem and reduce a company’s pay gap.
Using a sample of Chinese A-share listed ﬁrms from the 2005–2011 period, we examine the eﬀects of the
company-governance mechanism of board aﬃliation on the pay gap. Following other studies on this topic,
we interpret the pay gap between executives and employees, and the pay gap among executives as proxies
for the pay gap (Bu and Peng, 2010; Banker et al., 2011; Kato and Long, 2011). We measure board aﬃliation
using the ratio of the number of directors appointed by block shareholders to the total number of directors on
the board (Yeh and Woidtke, 2005; Chen et al., 2013). We also examine the diﬀerent roles of salaried and non-
salaried directors appointed by block shareholders. We measure the proportion of salaried directors as the
ratio of the number of salaried directors appointed by block shareholders to the total number of directors
on the board. We measure the proportion of non-salaried directors as the ratio of the number of non-salaried
directors appointed by block shareholders to the total number of directors on the board.
Consistent with our prediction, we ﬁnd that board aﬃliation is negatively related to the pay gap.
Furthermore, the results show that a greater presence of salaried directors appointed by block shareholders
is associated with a higher pay gap, whereas a greater presence of non-salaried directors appointed by block
shareholders is associated with a lower pay gap. These ﬁndings still hold when tested with a two-stage
regression model, so endogeneity issues are less likely to bias our empirical ﬁndings.
Next, we investigate certain factors that may aﬀect the relationship between board aﬃliation and the pay
gap. We begin by examining whether diﬀerences in product market competition aﬀect how board aﬃliation
reduces the pay gap. If a ﬁrm uses its pay gap as an incentive mechanism and the product market is highly
competitive, the salaried directors appointed by the ﬁrm’s block shareholders will increase the pay gap to
stimulate executives to work hard. However, under the same conditions, non-salaried directors appointed
by block shareholders will decrease rather than increase the pay gap. We ﬁnd that the governance eﬀect of
board aﬃliation on the pay gap is particularly prominent in industries in more competitive product markets.
Second, we investigate whether diﬀerences in ownership aﬀect the extent that board aﬃliation reduces the
pay gap. The results indicate no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the eﬀects of salaried and non-salaried directors
appointed by block shareholders on the pay gap between state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises. This
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holders in both state-owned ﬁrms and non-state-owned ﬁrms.
Third, as controlling and non-controlling shareholders may have diﬀerent motivations for appointing direc-
tors, we separately examine the eﬀects on the pay gap of directors appointed by controlling shareholders and
those appointed by non-controlling shareholders. We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the governance function
of board aﬃliation between controlling shareholders and non-controlling shareholders.
Finally, we determine whether diﬀerent administrative duties aﬀect the extent to which board aﬃliation
reduces the pay gap. We distinguish between the administrative duties of the highest-paid executives and inves-
tigate the relationship between board aﬃliation and the pay gap in each case. The results suggest that diﬀer-
ences in administrative duties do not aﬀect the governance function of board aﬃliation.
This paper contributes to the literatures in the following ways. First, it oﬀers supportive evidence on com-
pany pay gaps. For example, Bebchuk et al. (2011) ﬁnd that executive pay gaps are associated with lower ﬁrm
value and lower future cash ﬂows. Our results suggest that the presence of non-salaried directors appointed by
block shareholders decreases the pay gap. Second, our study provides implications for research on board aﬃl-
iation. For a sample of Japanese companies, Colpan and Yoshikawa (2012) investigate the governance eﬀect
of directors appointed by block shareholders on the agency problem. Our paper adds to the literature by using
a sample of Chinese listed ﬁrms and explores the diﬀerent roles of salaried and non-salaried directors
appointed by block shareholders.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we review the relevant literature. In Section 3, we
develop hypotheses based on an analysis of the institutional background. In Section 4, we describe our sample,
variables and research design. In Section 5, we present our empirical results and analysis. Section 6 concludes
the paper.
2. Literature review
Recently, the rapid growth in executive compensation has caused company pay gaps to bigger. Bebchuk
and Grinstein (2005) examine the changes in executive compensation in U.S. listed companies from 1993 to
2003, and ﬁnd that the growth in executive compensation during this period was much higher than company
growth in terms of size and performance, with the growth in CEO compensation exceeding the total growth in
the compensation of executives at the second, third, fourth and ﬁfth levels. Speciﬁcally, the proportion of CEO
compensation in the total compensation received by top-ﬁve executives increased from 39% in 1993 to 43% in
2003. Li (2011) examines 1993–2006 data on executive compensation in U.S. capital-market listed companies
and ﬁnds that the diﬀerence between CEO compensation and No. 2 executive compensation increased from
40% in 1993 to 60% in 2006. Using a sample of Canadian listed companies during 2000–2005, Sapp (2008)
reports that within this six-year period, the pay gap between CEOs and other executives doubled. Investigating
Chinese listed companies in 1999 to 2000, Lin et al. (2003) report that the compensation received by CEOs was
1.43 times greater than the compensation provided to other executives. The pay gap has also expanded after
2001, with CEO compensation 2.328 times that of other executives’ compensation in 2009.
In addition to the widening pay gap among executives, the pay gap between executives and employees is
also expanding. Hall and Murph (2003), using S&P500 ﬁrms as their sample, report that executive compen-
sation increased from 30 times that of other employees in 1970 to 1990 times in 2002. Studies on Chinese listed
companies describe a similar phenomenon. The proportion of companies with the pay gap within ﬁve times is
declining, while the companies with the pay gap more than eight times increased from 10% to 24.53% (Zhang,
2008). In a recent study, Liu and Sun (2010) ﬁnd that the absolute pay gap between executives and employees
in state-owned enterprises reached 290,000 yuan in 2007, which is almost double the pay gap in 2004. Thus,
the expansion of company pay gaps now seems to be a common worldwide phenomenon.
“Tournament theory” has been used to explain the eﬀects of the pay gap. This theory explains that increas-
ing the pay gap can help enhance executives’ enthusiasm for work, reduce supervising costs and ultimately
improve corporate performance. When a company designs a compensation package based on tournament the-
ory, the level of executive compensation depends on relative performance rather than absolute performance.
As a result, the pay gap gradually increases as promotions occur (Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Rosen, 1986). This
kind salary structure can have a positive and incentivizing eﬀect on executives, prompting them to exert more
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vising executives has become a more diﬃcult and costly process, companies’ need for an internal pay gap has
increased. An appropriate pay gap can help to reduce opportunistic behavior among competitive executives,
therefore reduce supervising costs. Research in this area has also addressed the necessity of a company pay gap
from the perspective of internal CEO candidate structure and CEO succession risk (Schwarz and Severinov,
2010). With these criteria in mind, an internal pay gap is one of the most important means for a company to
motivate employees and attract the talents, making it a form of valuable expenditure that shareholders are
willing to accept. It can thus have a positive eﬀect on company performance.
However, the phenomenon of the continuously widening pay gap has in recent years led people to reﬂect
and sometimes cast doubt on the positive, incentivizing eﬀect of tournament theory. “Executive-power theory”
explains that widening pay gaps lead to excessive pay gaps as a result of executive misuse of their power to
increase their own level of pay and obtain private beneﬁts (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). Fundamental to this
theory is the assumption that company executives, especially CEOs, are eager to pursue and secure greater
power. With a suﬃcient level of power, they can control the board of directors and thereby inﬂuence the
design of their companies’ compensation contracts to increase their own compensation without the constraints
and limitations imposed by shareholders and regulators. This leads to the expansion of the company pay gap
(Adams et al., 2005). According to executive-power theory, therefore, excessive pay gaps are likely to result
from the misuse of executive power to inﬂuence the design of compensation contracts.
The ﬁndings of recent empirical studies support the executive-power theory. Bebchuk et al. (2011) analyze
12,011 U.S. companies from the 1993–2004 period and report that the larger the pay gaps between the top-ﬁve
executives, the lower the value of the company. Chen et al. (2011b) examine U.S. listed companies between
1993 and 2007, and argue that a large pay gap between executives signiﬁes to those external to the company
that the company has a serious agency problem. This leads to a signiﬁcant increase in the company’s cost of
capital. The authors also observe that the agency problem is more serious in companies with greater cash ﬂows
and those that have experienced changes in executive structure. In other words, the positive relationship
between the pay gap and agency problems is much stronger under these conditions.
3. Institutional background and research hypothesis
3.1. Institutional background
Until the end of 1992, although the Chinese government encouraged enterprises to widen their pay gaps to
some extent when designing employee-compensation plans, a clear restriction was still in place: executive com-
pensation was not permitted to exceed three times that of the average employee. However, egalitarian com-
pensation designs tend to reduce employee enthusiasm, thus impairing overall company productivity. To
accelerate the development of China’s market economy, the government advocated from 1993 to 2003 that
companies “give priority to eﬃciency with due consideration to fairness.” Relevant laws and regulations were
introduced to facilitate the expansion of pay gaps “among all kinds of personnel” to increase employee enthu-
siasm and maximize social wealth. Encouraged by the government, companies’ internal pay gaps expanded
rapidly. The data disclosed by the SASAC (the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commis-
sion) show that executive compensation in China’s central government controlled enterprises was 12 times
than average employee salary in 2002, reached 13.6 times in 2003, and continues to expand.
The negative eﬀects of these excessive pay gaps aroused great concerns from China’s government, which
accordingly made several adjustments to its policy during major conferences. In 2009, during the ﬁrst session
of the 11th National People’s Congress, the government expressed the intention to “progressively reverse” the
widening trend of the pay gap. In 2012, during the second session of the 11th National People’s Congress, it
promised to “speedily reverse” the trend. Analysis of the rhetoric of the Congress suggests that the govern-
ment became less tolerant of the excessive pay gap and thus increased its eﬀorts to reduce the excessive pay
gap. From expressing “encouragement” of the widening gap, it proposed “gradually reversing” this trend,
and eventually described a “resolute” and “speedy” reversal. This indicates that the negative eﬀects of an
excessive pay gap on the development of China’s economy now urgently require a solution from the Chinese
government.
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Once the block shareholders in a company realize that the company’s excessive pay gap is due to the agency
cost of executive power, they are likely to introduce governance mechanisms to mitigate these agency prob-
lems. Fama and Jensen (1983) point out that a company’s board of directors plays an important role in super-
vising executives and reducing the agency costs. It is common for block shareholders to directly appoint
personnel to a company’s board of directors in a supervisory capacity, in order to ensure that executives eﬃ-
ciently represent the interests of the company’s shareholders (Yeh and Woidtke, 2005). The contribution of a
shareholder-appointed director signiﬁcantly improves company governance. For example, Colpan and
Yoshikawa (2012) examine Japanese listed companies and ﬁnd that directors appointed by block shareholders
can reduce companies’ agency problems by enhancing the sensitivity of the relationship between compensation
and performance. In supervising executives, the directors represent shareholders’ interests and deploy eﬀective
governance mechanisms to control the pay gap caused by the misuse of executive power, thereby reducing the
opportunistic behavior of executives in pursuit of excessive compensation, and ultimately reducing the com-
pany’s overall pay gap. We thus propose the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1. The ratio of directors appointed by shareholders to the total number of directors is negatively
related to the company pay gap.
Generally, company directors have two main functions: supervising other employees and providing strate-
gic recommendations (Brickley and Zimmerman, 2010). However, high performance in one area may compro-
mise the success of the other. Masulis et al. (2012) report that based on their sample, foreign independent
directors hired by U.S. listed companies successfully provide strategic advice, such as helping executives to
implement cross-border mergers and acquisitions strategies, and achieve high returns. However, the authors
also observe that such directors fail to fulﬁll their supervisory role. They are frequently absent from board
meetings and CEO compensation tends to be too high. Moreover, when company performance is poor, for-
eign independent directors often fail to dismiss incompetent CEOs in a timely fashion. Investigating directors’
supervisory role, Faleye et al. (2011) report that in companies with stronger director supervision, there is a
greater correlation between change in CEO and performance. In addition, the CEOs of these companies
receive less excessive compensation and perform less earnings management. However, the strategic perfor-
mance of the directors of these companies is comparatively weak.
Two kinds of directors may be appointed by block shareholders to China’s listed companies: salaried and
non-salaried directors. Salaried directors appointed by block shareholders often provide executives with stra-
tegic management advice and either participate in or are responsible for company management. Such directors
are independent, but are also more susceptible to the inﬂuence of other executives, making it diﬃcult for them
to eﬀectively perform the duties required of them by the company shareholders. In contrast, non-salaried
directors appointed by shareholders who receive compensation directly from the shareholders and work to
further their interests through participation in company governance and the supervision of executive behavior.
Such directors are less susceptible to the inﬂuence of the listed company’s other executives and thus act more
independently. In short, when directors appointed by shareholders receive compensation from the companies,
they are more susceptible to the constraints of executive power when participating in company governance and
making decisions. As they are also more likely to share the interests and priorities of the company executives,
they may sacriﬁce shareholders’ interests to gain more private income, which increases the company’s pay gap.
In contrast, when directors appointed by shareholders receive compensation from the shareholders, they do
not have a direct economic connection with executives and are more likely to share and pursue shareholders’
interests by strengthening their supervision of executive behavior, and ultimately reducing the company’s pay
gap. This suggests the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2. The ratio of salaried directors appointed by shareholders to the total number of directors is
positively related to the company pay gap.
Hypothesis 3. The ratio of non-salaried directors appointed by shareholders to the total number of directors is
negatively related to the company pay gap.
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4.1. Sample
The 2005 revision of the “Annual Reporting Standards” required listed companies for the ﬁrst time to dis-
close executive compensation on an individual basis. To ensure the integrity of the sample and to eﬀectively
investigate the relationship between shareholder-appointed directors and the pay gap, we examine listed com-
panies in the 2005–2011 period, using all types of listed companies in our initial study sample except ﬁnancial
and insurance companies. After excluding incomplete observations, our sample comprises 9186 observations.
Ownership data of listed companies was hand-collected from company annual reports and compensation and
ﬁnancial data were obtained from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. As
the sample is composed of diﬀerent companies in diﬀerent years, giving mixed (pooled) data, the annual obser-
vations of a given company do not meet the requirement of independence, which could lead us to overvalue
the statistical signiﬁcance of the regression results. To correct this statistical problem, we use a “clustering”
method to adjust the standard error of the estimated coeﬃcient for each company (Petersen, 2009).
4.2. Variables
4.2.1. Company pay gap
In line with existing research, we use the relative pay gap between executives and employees, and the rel-
ative compensation among executives to measure the company pay gap (Bu and Peng, 2010; Banker et al.,
2011; Kato and Long, 2011).
We use the following equation to calculate the relative pay gap between executives and employees.
LEGap ¼ Ln MaxMPay
CashPay þ SalPayCh   TotMPay
EmpNum   TotMNum
 
ð1Þ
We use the following equation to calculate the relative pay gap between the highest paid top executive and
the other top executives.
LMGap ¼ Ln MaxMPay
TotMPay   MaxMPay
TotMNum   1
 
ð2Þ
In the equations above, LEGap represents the natural logarithm of the relative pay gap between executives
and employees, LMGay represents the natural logarithm of the relative pay gap between the highest paid top
executive and the other top executives, and MaxMPay represents a company’s highest executive compensa-
tion. CashPay represents the cash paid by the company to its employees, SalPayCh represents the change
in the employee compensation paid by the company, TotMpay represents the total executive compensation
awarded by the company, EmpNum represents the total number of employees and TotMNum represents
the total number of executives.
4.2.2. Directors appointed by shareholders
Our measure of directors appointed by block shareholders is represented by the ratio of the number of
directors appointed by block shareholders to the total number of directors on the board (Yeh and
Woidtke, 2005; Chen et al., 2013). In Chinese listed companies, directors appointed by shareholders may
receive compensation directly from the company for which they work, or from a source external to the com-
pany. Therefore, we deﬁne the following three variables: (1) directors appointed by shareholders (TPR), which
is represented by the ratio of the number of directors appointed by shareholders to the total number of direc-
tors on the board; (2) salaried directors appointed by shareholders (PR), which is represented by the ratio of
the number of shareholder-appointed directors who receive compensation directly from the listed company for
which they work to the total number of directors on the board; and (3) non-salaried directors appointed by
shareholders (NPR), which is represented by the ratio of the number of shareholder-appointed directors who
do not receive compensation directly from their companies to the total number of directors on the board.
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Following recommendations made in the literature, we include the following control variables (Fang, 2009;
Xin and Tan, 2009; Chen et al., 2011a): (1) Chairman and CEO duality (CEOD), which is equal to 1 if the
chairman also holds the position of CEO, otherwise 0; (2) the size of the board of directors (Bsize), which
is equal to the natural logarithm of the number of directors on the board; (3) independent directors (IndepR),
which is equal to the ratio of the number of independent directors to the total number of directors on the
board; (4) compensation committee (Commit), a dummy variable equal to 1 if the company has a compensa-
tion committee in the year under study, otherwise 0; (5) company performance (ROA), which is equal to the
ratio of the company’s net proﬁt to its year-end total assets; (6) company size (Size), which is equal to the nat-
ural logarithm of the company’s total assets in that year; (7) the company’s leverage (Lev), which is equal to
the ratio of the company’s year-end long-term liabilities to its year-end total assets; (8) company risk (Risk),
which is equal to the standard deviation of the monthly returns of the company’s stock in that year; (9) com-
pany growth potential (Q), which is equal to the ratio of the sum of the company’s tradable stock-market
value, non-tradable stock-market value and liabilities to its last-year-end total assets; (10) cross-listing (Exch),
which is equal to 1 if that year the company was also listed on other overseas exchanges, otherwise 0; and (11)
special treatment (ST), which is equal to 1 if that year the company was under ST or
 ST, otherwise 0.
4.3. Research model
First, we use the following regression model to examine the relationship between the presence of share-
holder-appointed directors and the pay gap.
Gap ¼ a þ b1TPR þ b2CEOD þ b3Bsize þ b4IndepR þ b5Commit þ b6ROA þ b7Size þ b8Lev
þ b9Risk þ b10Q þ b11Exch þ b12ST þ Year fixed effect þ Industry fixed effect þ e ð3Þ
Table 1
Variable deﬁnitions.
Variables Deﬁnitions
Pay-gap variables
EGap Ratio of the highest executive compensation to average employee (excluding executives’) compensation
LEGap Natural logarithm of EGap.
MGap Ratio of the highest executive compensation to the average compensation of other executives
LMGap Natural logarithm of MGap
Shareholder-appointed director variables
TPR Ratio of the number of directors appointed by block shareholders to the total number of directors on the board.
PR Ratio of the number of directors appointed by block shareholders who receive salaries from the listed company to the total
number of directors on the board.
NPR Ratio of the number of directors appointed by block shareholders who do not receive salaries from the listed company to
the total number of directors on the board
Board of director variables
CEOD Equal to 1 if the chairman also holds the position of CEO, otherwise 0
Bsize Natural logarithm of the number of directors on the board
IndepR Ratio of the number of independent directors to the total number of directors on the board
Commit Equal to 1 if that year the company has a compensation committee, otherwise 0
Company variables
ROA Ratio of the company’s net proﬁt to its year-end total assets
Size Natural logarithm of the company’s year-end total assets
Lev Ratio of the company’s year-end long-term liabilities to its year-end total assets
Risk Standard deviation of the monthly returns on the company’s stock in that year
Q Ratio of the sum of the company’s tradable stock-market value, non-tradable stock-book value and liabilities to its last-
year-end total assets
Exch Equal to 1 if that year the company was also listed on other overseas exchanges, otherwise 0
ST Equal to 1 if that year the company was under ST or
 ST, otherwise 0
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and non-salaried directors appointed by block shareholders.
Gap ¼ a þ b1PR þ b2NPR þ b3CEOD þ b4Bsize þ b5IndepR þ b6Commit þ b7ROA
þ b8Size þ b9Lev þ b10Risk þ b11Q þ b12Exch þ b13ST þ Year fixed effect
þ Industry fixed effect þ e ð4Þ
The deﬁnitions of the variables used in the model are listed in Table 1. “Gap” signiﬁes either LEGap or
LMGap, as appropriate.
5. Empirical results and analysis
5.1. Descriptive statistics
To mitigate the eﬀect of extreme values on our empirical analysis, we winsorize the top and bottom 1% of
values for all continuous variables. Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics. In Panel A, we provide descrip-
tive statistics for sub-groups of ﬁrms with and without directors appointed by shareholders. In ﬁrms with
directors appointed by block shareholders, the mean (median) of the pay gap between executives and employ-
ees is 2.003 (1.978). In ﬁrms without directors appointed by block shareholders, the mean (median) of the pay
gap between executives and employees is 1.916 (1.875). The diﬀerences between the mean and median for the
two groups are signiﬁcant at the 1% level (t = 3.575, z = 3.912). There are also signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the
mean and median of executives’ pay gap between ﬁrms with and without directors appointed by shareholders.
In Panel B, we divide ﬁrms with shareholder-appointed directors into ﬁrms with company-salaried and non-
company-salaried directors to analyze diﬀerences in the company pay gap. In ﬁrms with salaried shareholder-
appointed directors, the mean (median) of the pay gap between executives and employees is 2.085 (2.065) and
the mean (median) of the pay gap between executives is 0.998 (0.956). In ﬁrms with non-salaried shareholder-
appointed directors, the mean (median) of the pay gap between executives and employees is 1.810 (1.761) and
the mean (median) of the pay gap between executives is 0.872 (0.805). Furthermore, the pay gap in ﬁrms with
salaried directors appointed by shareholders is signiﬁcantly larger than that in ﬁrms with non-salaried direc-
tors (t = 15.731, z = 15.430; t = 15.768, z = 16.299). This is probably due to the tendency for salaried directors
appointed by block shareholders to increase the pay gap and for non-salaried directors appointed by block
shareholders to decrease the pay gap.
In Panel C, we report the descriptive statistics for this paper’s main variables. The average pay gap between
executives and employees is 9.385, with the highest at 53.735. The average pay gap between executives is 2.706
and the highest is 8.290. The mean of the ratio of directors appointed by shareholders is 0.296. As the mean of
the ratio of salaried shareholder-appointed directors is 0.103 and the mean of the ratio of non-salaried share-
holder-appointed directors is 0.192, the ratio of non-salaried directors appointed by shareholders is nearly
twice that of salaried directors. These ﬁndings indicate that the shareholders of the listed companies under
study appoint more non-salaried than salaried directors. Regarding board of director variables, it is uncom-
mon for CEOs to also be chairmen of the board, and there is little variation in the size of the boards of direc-
tors. Generally, independent directors comprise nearly one third of the board of directors and most of the
companies have a compensation committee in the year under study. Of the sample companies, 3.2% are
cross-listed and 9.3% are classiﬁed as ST in the year under study.
5.2. Correlation analysis
In Table 3, we provide the results of the correlation analysis of the main variables. The correlation coeﬃ-
cients of TPR and LEGap or LMGap are  0.046 and  0.043, respectively, and are signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
The correlation coeﬃcients of PR and LEGap or LMGap are 0.140 and 0.141, respectively, and are signiﬁcant
at the 5% level. The correlation coeﬃcients of NPR and LEGap or LMGap are  0.158 and  0.155, respec-
tively, and are negatively signiﬁcant at the 5% level. The results show that there is a negative correlation
between the ratio of directors appointed by shareholders and the pay gap. More speciﬁcally, the ratio of
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90 S. Chen et al./China Journal of Accounting Research 7 (2014) 81–100salaried directors appointed by shareholders is positively correlated with the pay gap, while the ratio of non-
salaried directors appointed by shareholders is negatively correlated with the pay gap. This indicates that due
to diﬀerences in their means of receiving compensation, directors appointed by shareholders have diﬀerent
eﬀects on the pay gap. The pay gap increases with the increased presence of shareholder-appointed directors
who receive compensation from a listed company, and decreases with the increased presence of shareholder-
appointed directors who do not receive compensation from the company. Company risk (Risk), company
growth potential (Q) and special treatment (ST) are negatively correlated with LEGap and are signiﬁcant
at the 5% level, whereas the other variables are positively correlated with LEGap. The size of the board of
directors (Bsize) and the company’s size (Size), leverage (Lev), risk (Risk) and growth potential (Q) are neg-
atively correlated with LMGap, whereas the other variables are positively correlated with LMGap.
5.3. Regression analysis
Table 4 shows the regression results for the eﬀects on the pay gap of directors appointed by block share-
holders, salaried directors appointed by block shareholders and non-salaried directors appointed by block
shareholders. We ﬁrst examine the eﬀects on the pay gap of the ratio of directors appointed by block share-
holders and provide the corresponding regression results in columns (1) and (2) of Table 4. When the depen-
dent variable is LEGap, TPR’s regression coeﬃcient is  0.197 and is signiﬁcant at the 5% level (t =  2.53).
This shows that when the ratio of directors appointed by block shareholders increases by one standard devi-
ation, the pay gap between executives and employees will signiﬁcantly decrease, by 3.63%. When the depen-
dent variable is LMGap, TPR’s regression coeﬃcient is  0.006, so the pay gap between executives and
employees will decrease by 1.10% with a one standard deviation increase in the ratio of directors appointed
by shareholders. However, this coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcant (t =  0.15). Overall, these regression results show
that the higher the ratio of directors appointed by block shareholders, the smaller the pay gap. This means that
directors appointed by shareholders are to some extent able to represent shareholders’ interests by eﬀectively
supervising executives, reducing their opportunistic behavior in pursuit of excessive pay, and thereby decreas-
ing the company’s pay gap. The regression results described above thus support our ﬁrst hypothesis.
The directors appointed by block shareholders can be further divided into salaried directors appointed by
block shareholders and non-salaried directors appointed by block shareholders, according to whether they
receive compensation from the listed companies for which they work. We compare the eﬀects on the pay
gap of salaried and non-salaried directors appointed by block shareholders and report the corresponding
regression results in columns (3) and (4) of Table 4. When the dependent variable is LEGap, the regression
coeﬃcient of the variable PR is 0.403, and that of the variable NPR is  0.532, both signiﬁcant (t = 4.01;
t =  6.10) at the 1% level. These results show that when the ratio of salaried directors appointed by block
shareholders increases by one standard deviation, the pay gap between executives and employees increases
by 5.56%. When the ratio of non-salaried directors appointed by shareholders increases by one standard devi-
ation, the pay gap between executives and employees decreases by 9.36%. When the dependent variable is
LMGap, PR’s regression coeﬃcient is 0.282 and NPR’s regression coeﬃcient is  0.165, and both are signif-
icant at the 1% level (t = 5.51; t =  4.07), which is consistent with the results for LEGap given in column (3).
The results show that the higher the ratio of salaried directors appointed by block shareholders, the larger the
pay gap, and the higher the ratio of non-salaried directors appointed by block shareholders, the smaller the
pay gap. This suggests that only non-salaried directors appointed by block shareholders are able to provide
eﬀective supervision and thereby a better governance eﬀect, namely decreasing the company pay gap. When
the directors appointed to a listed company by its block shareholders receive compensation from the listed
company itself, they are more likely to rely on the company’s executives than to act independently on behalf
of shareholders. As a result, they increase the company’s pay gap further. In contrast, when the directors
appointed by shareholders do not receive compensation from the listed company, they are more independent
and are able to represent shareholders’ interests by supervising executives and reducing their opportunistic
eﬀorts to obtain excessive pay. As a result, non-salaried directors reduce both agency costs and the company
pay gap. The regression results provide supportive empirical evidence for our second and third hypotheses.
To eliminate the potential adverse eﬀects of endogeneity, we also use the instrumental-variable regression
method. In line with recent studies (Hoechle et al., 2012; Wintoki et al., 2012; Jayaraman and Milbourn, 2012),
S. Chen et al./China Journal of Accounting Research 7 (2014) 81–100 91our instrumental variables for the two-stage least-squares regression are the industry’s mean and the previous
year’s value of the ratio of directors appointed by shareholders (ratio of salaried directors appointed by block
shareholders and ratio of non-salaried directors appointed by block shareholders). Following the recommen-
dations by Larcker and Rusticus (2010), we also conduct a validation test on the correlation conditions and
exogenous conditions of the two instrumental variables.
In Table 5, we report the results of the instrumental-variable correlation test, the exogenous test and the
instrumental-variable regression. When the dependent variable is LEGap, the instrumental-variable correla-
tion test gives F-values for PR and NPR that are both larger than 10 (F = 963.62 > 10; F = 1531.82 > 10),
which means that our selected instrumental variables fulﬁll the correlation conditions. The results of the
instrumental-variable exogenous test do not have statistical signiﬁcance (J = 3.170, P = 0.2049), so we cannot
reject the null hypothesis. That is, our results pass the instrumental-variable exogenous test. As they fulﬁll
both the correlation conditions and the exogenous conditions, our instrumental variables can be considered
Table 4
Regression results for the eﬀects on pay gap of directors appointed by block shareholders.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: LEGap Dependent variable: LMGap Dependent variable: LEGap Dependent variable: LMGap
TPR  0.197
**  0.006
( 2.53) ( 0.15)
PR 0.403
*** 0.282
***
(4.01) (5.51)
NPR  0.532
***  0.165
***
( 6.10) ( 4.07)
CEOD 0.114
*** 0.064
*** 0.089
** 0.052
***
(3.14) (3.45) (2.47) (2.82)
Bsize 0.131 0.079
** 0.161
** 0.093
**
(1.58) (2.10) (1.98) (2.51)
IndepR 0.061 0.470
***  0.018 0.432
***
(0.21) (3.23) ( 0.06) (2.97)
Commit 0.067
** 0.054
*** 0.064
** 0.052
***
(2.10) (3.62) (2.03) (3.59)
ROA 1.763
*** 0.363
*** 1.704
*** 0.334
***
(10.12) (4.36) (9.88) (4.07)
Size 0.112
***  0.024
*** 0.117
***  0.022
***
(6.15) ( 2.92) (6.60) ( 2.67)
Lev 0.221 0.128
* 0.184 0.110
(1.41) (1.72) (1.19) (1.51)
Risk  0.337
*  0.071  0.267  0.038
( 1.68) ( 0.74) ( 1.34) ( 0.40)
Q  0.017
**  0.007  0.018
**  0.007
*
( 2.07) ( 1.57) ( 2.30) ( 1.79)
Exch 0.105 0.047 0.052 0.021
(1.00) (0.94) (0.50) (0.44)
ST  0.089
** 0.023  0.070 0.033
( 2.01) (1.08) ( 1.59) (1.57)
Intercept  0.905
** 1.009
***  1.025
** 0.952
***
( 2.17) (5.31) ( 2.53) (5.04)
Industry Control Control Control Control
Year Control Control Control Control
N 9186 9186 9186 9186
Adj. R sq 0.124 0.040 0.145 0.063
N_clust 1985 1985 1985 1985
F 15.176 6.426 18.289 9.251
Note: All coeﬃcient estimates are adjusted using heteroskedasticity and company clustering to obtain robust standard errors. Adjusted t-
Statistics are provided in brackets.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level (two-tailed test).
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% levels (two-tailed test).
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% levels (two-tailed test).
92 S. Chen et al./China Journal of Accounting Research 7 (2014) 81–100valid. Using the instrumental variables, the regression results for PR and NPR are 0.572 and  0.667, which
are both signiﬁcant at the 1% level (z = 3.88, z =  5.29). When the dependent variable is LMGap, the results
are almost the same. Therefore, after addressing the endogeneity problem, the results of the study still hold. In
short, salaried directors appointed by block shareholders signiﬁcantly increase their companies’ pay gap, while
non-salaried directors appointed by block shareholders signiﬁcantly decrease their companies’ pay gap.
5.4. Additional tests
5.4.1. The eﬀects of industry competition
Table 6 shows the regression results for the eﬀects of diﬀerent levels of industry competition on the gover-
nance eﬀects of directors appointed by block shareholders, with the total number of companies in the industry
Table 5
Regression results using instrumental variables.
Dependent variable: LEGap Dependent variable: LMGap
PR 0.572
*** 0.385
***
(3.88) (5.08)
NPR  0.667
***  0.174
***
( 5.29) ( 2.95)
CEOD 0.079
* 0.061
***
(1.83) (2.75)
Bsize 0.126 0.085
**
(1.40) (2.08)
IndepR  0.184 0.501
***
( 0.59) (3.17)
Commit 0.067
* 0.043
**
(1.82) (2.54)
ROA 1.715
*** 0.405
***
(9.14) (4.56)
Size 0.128
***  0.022
**
(6.82) ( 2.41)
Lev 0.098 0.085
(0.60) (1.09)
Risk  0.178 0.035
( 0.83) (0.34)
Q  0.020
**  0.007
( 2.52) ( 1.60)
Exch 0.022 0.022
(0.20) (0.42)
ST  0.062 0.039
*
( 1.34) (1.73)
Intercept  0.848
* 1.039
***
( 1.91) (4.88)
Industry Control Control
Year Control Control
N 7266 7266
Adj. R-sq 0.143 0.069
N_clust 1597 1597
F 14.784 7.184
Weak instrumental-variable test PR: F = 963.62 PR: F = 963.62
NPR: F = 1531.82 NPR: F = 1531.82
Overidentifying-restrictions J-test and P-value J = 3.170, P = 0.2049 J = 5.236, P = 0.0729
Note: All of the coeﬃcient estimates are adjusted using heteroskedasticity and company clustering to obtain
robust standard errors. Adjusted z-Statistics are provided in brackets.
* Signiﬁcance at the level of 10% (two-tailed test).
** Signiﬁcance at the level of 5% (two-tailed test).
*** Signiﬁcance at the level of 1% (two-tailed test).
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the sample into a group of ﬁrms facing high competition and a group of ﬁrms facing low competition, accord-
ing to the magnitude of each company’s industry. When the dependent variable is LEGap, PR’s regression
coeﬃcients in the high-competition group and the low-competition group are 0.414 and 0.405 respectively,
and both are signiﬁcantly positive at the 1% level (t = 2.85, t = 3.05). The diﬀerences in the regression coeﬃ-
cients for these two groups do not pass the signiﬁcance test (p-value = 0.94), so diﬀerent levels of industry
competition can be considered to have no signiﬁcant eﬀects on the relationship between the governance of sal-
aried shareholder-appointed directors and the pay gap. NPR’s regression coeﬃcients in the high-competition
and low-competition group are  0.664 and  0.432, respectively, and are signiﬁcant at the 1% level (t =  5.40,
t =  3.68). It is clear that when an industry is highly competitive, the role of non-salaried shareholder-
appointed directors in decreasing the pay gap is much larger, with this diﬀerence statistically signiﬁcant
(p-value = 0.09). When the dependent variable is LMgap, the results are consistent. In highly competitive
industries, the governance eﬀects of non-salaried shareholder-appointed directors on the pay gap are more
Table 6
Regression results of the eﬀects of product market competition.
Dependent variable: LEGap Dependent variable: LMGap
(1) High competition (2) Low competition (3) High competition (4) Low competition
PR 0.414
*** 0.405
*** 0.199
*** 0.368
***
(2.85) (3.05) (2.69) (5.65)
NPR  0.664
***  0.432
***  0.255
***  0.088
( 5.40) ( 3.68) ( 4.54) ( 1.59)
CEOD 0.050 0.115
** 0.030 0.070
***
(1.04) (2.23) (1.32) (2.62)
Bsize  0.051 0.329
*** 0.078 0.109
**
( 0.41) (3.17) (1.46) (2.21)
IndepR  0.085 0.006 0.574
** 0.329
*
( 0.18) (0.02) (2.34) (1.94)
Commit 0.104
** 0.025 0.062
*** 0.042
**
(2.31) (0.60) (2.97) (2.17)
ROA 2.080
*** 1.349
*** 0.575
*** 0.110
(8.52) (6.01) (4.96) (1.03)
Size 0.102
*** 0.131
***  0.025
**  0.020
*
(3.91) (5.62) ( 2.16) ( 1.78)
Lev 0.265 0.080 0.137 0.061
(1.08) (0.42) (1.19) (0.67)
Risk  0.427  0.026  0.170 0.118
( 1.52) ( 0.09) ( 1.28) (0.88)
Q  0.014  0.021
**  0.005  0.009
*
( 1.09) ( 2.22) ( 0.76) ( 1.78)
Exch 0.027 0.063  0.027 0.060
(0.18) (0.48) ( 0.42) (0.93)
ST  0.070  0.064 0.072
**  0.005
( 1.11) ( 1.10) (2.36) ( 0.18)
Intercept  0.185  1.747
*** 1.013
*** 0.875
***
( 0.32) ( 3.32) (3.84) (3.43)
Industry Control Control Control Control
Year Control Control Control Control
N 4240 4946 4240 4946
Adj. R-sq 0.133 0.162 0.065 0.065
N_clust 1045 1143 1045 1143
F 12.158 14.018 7.794 7.099
Note: All of the coeﬃcient estimates are adjusted using heteroskedasticity and company clustering to obtain robust standard errors.
Adjusted t-Statistics are provided in brackets.
* Signiﬁcance at the level of 10% (two-tailed test).
** Signiﬁcance at the level of 5% (two-tailed test).
*** Signiﬁcance at the level of 1% (two-tailed test).
94 S. Chen et al./China Journal of Accounting Research 7 (2014) 81–100signiﬁcant. The regression results indicate that the pay-gap phenomenon exhibited by China’s listed compa-
nies is due to agency problems within the companies, rather than the result of incentivizing pay. This is at odds
with our competitive hypothesis: that the increased pay gap is due to the use of incentives. It also shows that
the presence of non-salaried directors appointed by block shareholders and external industry competition play
complementary roles in the process by which eﬀective governance decreases the pay gap.
5.4.2. The inﬂuence of state ownership
We also examine diﬀerences in the governance eﬀects of directors appointed by block shareholders between
state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises. In Table 7, we report the regression results for the
eﬀects of salaried and non-salaried directors appointed by block shareholders on the pay gap in state-owned
enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises. As shown in the table, when the dependent variable is LEGap,
PR’s regression coeﬃcients are 0.482 and 0.256, signiﬁcant at the 1% level (t = 3.26) and the 5% level (t = 2.00)
Table 7
Regression results for the eﬀects of state ownership on the governance of directors appointed by shareholders.
Dependent variable: LEGap Dependent variable: LMGap
(1) State-owned (2) Non-state-owned (3) State-owned (4) Non-state-owned
PR 0.482
*** 0.256
** 0.392
*** 0.150
**
(3.26) (2.00) (5.64) (2.10)
NPR  0.247
**  0.497
***  0.053  0.097
( 2.13) ( 3.69) ( 1.05) ( 1.35)
CEOD 0.077 0.034 0.017 0.044
*
(1.29) (0.81) (0.61) (1.86)
Bsize 0.068 0.426
*** 0.070 0.184
***
(0.67) (3.73) (1.60) (3.13)
IndepR  0.325 0.947
** 0.412
** 0.690
***
( 0.97) (2.19) (2.58) (2.79)
Commit 0.070
* 0.066 0.065
*** 0.040
*
(1.73) (1.51) (3.69) (1.70)
ROA 1.440
*** 1.620
*** 0.356
*** 0.116
(6.05) (7.25) (3.37) (0.95)
Size 0.110
*** 0.220
***  0.023
** 0.013
(5.03) (8.10) ( 2.35) (0.94)
Lev 0.099 0.649
*** 0.086 0.225
*
(0.53) (2.75) (0.99) (1.73)
Risk  0.217  0.301  0.011  0.026
( 0.82) ( 1.08) ( 0.09) ( 0.18)
Q  0.013  0.027
**  0.004  0.010
*
( 1.28) ( 2.53) ( 0.79) ( 1.68)
Exch 0.149 0.259 0.039 0.209
*
(1.47) (1.13) (0.81) (1.67)
ST  0.076  0.042 0.035 0.030
( 1.31) ( 0.71) (1.37) (0.91)
Intercept  0.787  3.809
*** 0.939
***  0.003
( 1.55) ( 6.28) (4.28) ( 0.01)
Industry Control Control Control Control
Year Control Control Control Control
N 5301 3885 5301 3885
Adj. R-sq 0.127 0.206 0.058 0.044
N_clust 1011 1120 1011 1120
F 8.602 12.349 4.734 3.097
Note: All of the coeﬃcient estimates are adjusted using heteroskedasticity and company clustering to obtain robust standard errors.
Adjusted t-Statistics are provided in brackets.
* Signiﬁcance at the level of 10% (two-tailed test).
** Signiﬁcance at the level of 5% (two-tailed test).
*** Signiﬁcance at the level of 1% (two-tailed test).
S. Chen et al./China Journal of Accounting Research 7 (2014) 81–100 95for the group of state-owned enterprises and the group of non-state-owned enterprises, respectively. NPR’s
regression coeﬃcients are  0.247 and  0.497, respectively, signiﬁcant at the 5% level (t =  2.13) and the
1% level (t =  3.69). When the dependent variable is LMGap, PR’s regression coeﬃcients are 0.392 and
0.150, signiﬁcant at the 1% level (t = 5.64) and the 5% level (t = 2.10) for the group of state-owned enterprises
and the group of non-state-owned enterprises, respectively. NPR’s regression coeﬃcients are  0.053 and
 0.097 respectively, but are insigniﬁcant (t =  1.05, t =  1.35). The regression results indicate that salaried
Table 8
Regression results for the eﬀects on pay gap of directors appointed by controlling shareholders and non-controlling shareholders.
Dependent variable: LEGap Dependent variable: LMGap
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PR 0.403
*** 0.282
***
(4.01) (5.51)
NPR  0.532
***  0.165
***
( 6.10) ( 4.07)
CPR 0.392
*** 0.233
***
(3.41) (3.98)
NCPR 0.309 0.464
***
(1.62) (4.78)
CNPR  0.774
***  0.194
***
( 7.57) ( 4.06)
NCNPR  0.113  0.113
*
( 0.91) ( 1.90)
CEOD 0.089
** 0.079
** 0.052
*** 0.050
***
(2.47) (2.22) (2.82) (2.74)
Bsize 0.161
** 0.133 0.093
** 0.084
**
(1.98) (1.64) (2.51) (2.26)
IndepR  0.018  0.040 0.432
*** 0.429
***
( 0.06) ( 0.14) (2.97) (2.96)
Commit 0.064
** 0.063
** 0.052
*** 0.051
***
(2.03) (2.00) (3.59) (3.53)
ROA 1.704
*** 1.721
*** 0.334
*** 0.341
***
(9.88) (10.00) (4.07) (4.15)
Size 0.117
*** 0.127
***  0.022
***  0.020
**
(6.60) (7.09) ( 2.67) ( 2.36)
Lev 0.184 0.188 0.110 0.112
(1.19) (1.22) (1.51) (1.53)
Risk  0.267  0.276  0.038  0.043
( 1.34) ( 1.38) ( 0.40) ( 0.45)
Q  0.018
**  0.019
**  0.007
*  0.007
*
( 2.30) ( 2.44) ( 1.79) ( 1.84)
Exch 0.052 0.052 0.021 0.016
(0.50) (0.51) (0.44) (0.33)
ST  0.070  0.064 0.033 0.032
( 1.59) ( 1.47) (1.57) (1.55)
Intercept  1.025
**  1.163
*** 0.952
*** 0.927
***
( 2.53) ( 2.87) (5.04) (4.88)
Industry Control Control Control Control
Year Control Control Control Control
N 9186 9186 9186 9186
Adj. R-sq 0.145 0.151 0.063 0.065
N_clust 1985 1985 1985 1985
F 18.289 17.698 9.251 9.051
Note: All of the coeﬃcient estimates are adjusted using heteroskedasticity and company clustering to obtain robust standard errors.
Adjusted t-Statistics are provided in brackets.
* Signiﬁcance at the level of 10% (two-tailed test).
** Signiﬁcance at the level of 5% (two-tailed test).
*** Signiﬁcance at the level of 1% (two-tailed test).
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shareholders decrease the pay gap, and that there is no diﬀerence in these relationships between state-owned
enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises. In other words, the relationship between the pay gap and the
presence of directors appointed by block shareholders is not aﬀected by state ownership.
5.4.3. The eﬀects of directors appointed by controlling shareholders and non-controlling shareholders
To assess the diﬀerent motivations of directors appointed by controlling shareholders and non-controlling
shareholders, we examine separately the eﬀects on the pay gap of directors appointed by controlling share-
holders and those appointed by non-controlling shareholders. We manually obtain the data for the two vari-
ables (directors appointed by controlling shareholders and directors appointed by non-controlling
shareholders) by extracting details of the directors appointed by all types of shareholders from the CSMAR
Table 9
Regression results for the eﬀects of directors appointed by shareholders on pay gap when the individual with the highest compensation has
diﬀerent administrative positions.
Dependent variable: LEGap Dependent variable: LMGap
Chairman of the board General manager Others Chairman of the board General manager Others
PR 0.265
** 0.438
*** 0.535
** 0.170
*** 0.390
*** 0.305
**
(2.11) (3.37) (2.12) (2.85) (5.66) (2.32)
NPR  0.459
***  0.395
***  0.711
***  0.159
***  0.170
***  0.201
*
( 3.70) ( 3.62) ( 3.40) ( 2.70) ( 3.38) ( 1.77)
CEOD 0.054 0.150
*** 0.083 0.064
*** 0.041
* 0.099
**
(1.30) (3.59) (1.01) (2.94) (1.88) (2.17)
Bsize 0.233
** 0.080 0.456
** 0.094
** 0.076
* 0.084
(2.15) (0.85) (2.27) (2.00) (1.77) (0.80)
IndepR 0.437  0.315  0.073 0.365
* 0.445
***  0.141
(1.09) ( 0.96) ( 0.11) (1.76) (2.76) ( 0.41)
Commit 0.071
* 0.066
* 0.061 0.060
*** 0.048
*** 0.083
*
(1.75) (1.68) (0.71) (3.09) (2.65) (1.92)
ROA 1.723
*** 1.771
*** 1.119
*** 0.394
*** 0.317
***  0.130
(7.09) (8.29) (2.86) (3.34) (3.33) ( 0.62)
Size 0.170
*** 0.108
*** 0.016  0.019
*  0.024
**  0.007
(7.15) (5.13) (0.42) ( 1.72) ( 2.36) ( 0.33)
Lev  0.007 0.284 0.437 0.111 0.140  0.058
( 0.03) (1.50) (1.25) (1.01) (1.52) ( 0.33)
Risk  0.124  0.288 0.424  0.080  0.155 0.486
*
( 0.47) ( 1.07) (0.76) ( 0.62) ( 1.26) (1.67)
Q  0.029
***  0.011  0.028  0.009  0.006  0.008
( 2.65) ( 1.14) ( 1.37) ( 1.62) ( 1.15) ( 0.86)
Exch  0.099 0.050 0.364
** 0.040  0.024 0.104
( 0.61) (0.47) (2.24) (0.47) ( 0.49) (1.20)
ST  0.026  0.053  0.185
* 0.058
* 0.038  0.006
( 0.44) ( 0.99) ( 1.83) (1.90) (1.52) ( 0.11)
Intercept  2.422
***  0.586 0.348 0.893
*** 1.087
*** 0.735
( 4.47) ( 1.21) (0.39) (3.54) (4.70) (1.45)
Industry Control Control Control Control Control Control
Year Control Control Control Control Control Control
N 4833 5307 832 4833 5307 832
Adj. R-sq 0.150 0.151 0.132 0.055 0.080 0.072
N_clust 1439 1600 490 1439 1600 490
F 10.790 13.563 3.290 5.277 7.532 1.869
Note: All of the coeﬃcient estimates are adjusted using heteroskedasticity and company clustering to obtain robust standard errors.
Adjusted t-Statistics are provided in brackets.
* Signiﬁcance at the level of 10% (two-tailed test).
** Signiﬁcance at the level of 5% (two-tailed test).
*** Signiﬁcance at the level of 1% (two-tailed test).
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ers from those appointed by non-controlling shareholders. To examine further eﬀects of this variable, if any,
on the pay gap, we divide the ratio of salaried directors appointed by shareholders (PR) into the ratio of sal-
aried directors appointed by controlling shareholders (CPR) and the ratio of salaried directors appointed by
non-controlling shareholders (NCPR), and divide the ratio of non-salaried directors appointed by sharehold-
ers (NPR) into the ratio of non-salaried directors appointed by controlling shareholders (CNPR) and the ratio
of non-salaried directors appointed by non-controlling shareholders (NCNPR).
In Table 8, we report the corresponding regression results. When the dependent variable is LEGap, the
regression coeﬃcients of PR and NPR, as shown in column (1), are 0.403 and  0.532, respectively, both sig-
niﬁcant at the 1% level (t = 4.01, t =  6.10). The regression coeﬃcient of CPR, as shown in column (2), is
0.392, signiﬁcant at the 1% level (t = 3. 41), whereas the regression coeﬃcient of NCPR is 0.309, which is insig-
niﬁcant (t = 1.62). The regression coeﬃcient of CNPR is  0.774, signiﬁcant at the 1% level (t =  7.57),
whereas the regression coeﬃcient of NCNPR is  0.113, which is insigniﬁcant (t =  0.91). When the depen-
dent variable is LMGap, the regression coeﬃcients of PR and NPR, as shown in column (3), are 0.282 and
 0.165, respectively, both signiﬁcant at the 1% level (t = 5.51, t =  4. 07). The regression coeﬃcients of
CPR and NCPR, as shown in column (4), are both signiﬁcantly positive, whereas the regression coeﬃcients
of CNPR and NCNPR are both signiﬁcantly negative. Taken together, these results indicate that the gover-
nance of directors appointed by controlling shareholders does not diﬀer from that of directors appointed by
non-controlling shareholders with regard to pay gaps resulting from agency problems.
5.4.4. The inﬂuence of administrative posts
To assess the potential inﬂuence of the administrative post of the company executives who receive the high-
est compensation, we ﬁrst divide the company personnel with the highest compensation into chairmen of the
board (including Vice Chairmen), general managers (including Vice Presidents) and other executive positions.
Next, we use these subsamples to examine the governance eﬀect of directors appointed by block shareholders
on the pay gap. In Table 9, we report the corresponding regression results. The results for the three subsamples
show that salaried directors appointed by shareholders signiﬁcantly increase the pay gap, whereas non-salaried
directors appointed by shareholders signiﬁcantly decrease the pay gap. The results obtained from carrying out
separate regressions on the three categories—chairmen of the board, general managers and other executive
positions—indicates that the administrative post has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the results reported in this paper.
6. Conclusion and discussion
Originally, the pay gap phenomenon could generally be explained by tournament theory. That is, an appro-
priate pay gap can increase employee motivation and productivity. However, in recent years, company pay
gaps have continued to widen, which now seems to be due to the misuse of power by company executives
to inﬂuence the formulation of compensation. Therefore, based on the executive-power theory, this paper
examines the eﬀects of companies’ governance mechanisms on their pay gap. According to the executive-
power theory, CEOs are particularly likely to use their power to inﬂuence the design of compensation pack-
ages in order to increase their own compensation beyond the optimal pay level, thereby producing an excessive
pay gap. Such a pay gap has a series of negative economic consequences, such as the failure of salary–related
incentive mechanisms and a decline in company performance. Therefore, it is necessary to examine how com-
panies’ governance mechanisms ease the agency problem during the formulation of salary structure and
thereby reduce excessive pay gaps.
Using a sample of Chinese A-share listed companies during the 2005–2011 period, we ﬁrst examine the
eﬀects on pay gap of the presence of directors appointed by shareholders. The results show that on average,
directors appointed by shareholders have a negative eﬀect on the pay gap. Next, we distinguish between share-
holder-appointed directors according to whether they are salaried by the company or an external source. The
results show that the presence of salaried directors appointed by shareholders signiﬁcantly increases the pay
gap, while the presence of non-salaried directors appointed by shareholders signiﬁcantly decreases the pay
gap. Therefore, it may be diﬃcult for salaried directors appointed by the shareholders of listed companies
to eﬀectively supervise the company’s executives, due to a lack of independence. In contrast, non-salaried
98 S. Chen et al./China Journal of Accounting Research 7 (2014) 81–100directors appointed by block shareholders are better able to represent shareholders’ interests in carrying out
eﬀective supervision of executives. In this paper, we also use the instrumental-variable regression method to
eliminate the potential adverse eﬀect of endogeneity and conduct some further tests to reduce the potential
eﬀect of correlated factors on the results of the paper. Our conclusions cast light on the pay-gap phenomenon
exhibited by China’s listed companies and oﬀer insights into the decision-making behavior of salaried and
non-salaried directors appointed by block shareholders to supervise executives.
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In the corporate governance ﬁeld, relations among directors are one kind of social network that cannot be
ignored (Conyon and Muldoon, 2006; Engelberg et al., 2012; Fracassi and Tate, 2012). The behavior of direc-
tors depends simply not only on their own contacts, but also on the inﬂuence of other people’s contacts within
social networks (Granovetter, 1985). Independent directors not only play a role in monitoring the company,
but also play many other social roles, such as serving as company executives, industry association leaders, gov-
ernment oﬃcials, university professors and members of a variety of associations. Directors with many social
roles naturally have a variety of social network connections, such as through their membership of professional
associations, alumni networks and clubs, fellowships, in-law relationships and kinship networks. This paper
focuses on one of the unique forms of social networks – interconnections forged among directors of listed
companies by serving on at least one common board at the same time – to investigate the governance role
of independent directors in China.
1
Speciﬁcally, this paper examines the role of independent director board networks in mitigating agency
problems between large shareholders and minority shareholders. That is, whether the network centrality of
independent directors pushes them to deter tunneling by controlling shareholders. In comparison with the
U.S. and a few countries with characteristics of dispersed ownership, most countries have more concentrated
equity ownership (La Porta et al., 1999), and most ﬁrms are controlled by one or a few large shareholders. The
existence of controlling shareholders gives prominence to agency problems with minority shareholders and
tunneling
2 is the most direct form of evidence of controlling shareholders’ agency problems that seriously
damage the interests of minority shareholders.
3 The tunneling behavior of controlling shareholders in China’s
capital market hinders its healthy development (Chen and Wang, 2005; Jiang et al., 2010). A series of policies
have been issued to restrain tunneling behavior by controlling shareholders. However, these policies have not
achieved their goals in practice (see Section 3 for more details). Many tunneling events have occurred in Chi-
na’s capital market to date. Moreover, these events are becoming increasingly serious.
4
This paper does not examine all types of network relations among directors and is limited to an investiga-
tion of the network centrality and governance role of independent directors. There are three reasons for this
approach: ﬁrst, the weak tie and structural hole theories hold that independent directors play the key role in
board networks, whereas most inside directors are isolated and their network characteristics are not obvious.
Second, most inside directors are also executives, which reduces their monitoring role (Fama and Jensen,
1983). This is especially in China, where the chairman of the board plays a role somewhat similar to that
of the CEO in the U.S. (Firth et al., 2007; Ye et al., 2011). Third, due to the mandatory policies on indepen-
dent directors implemented in China’s capital market from 2003 to date, many prior studies ﬁnd that the aver-
age proportion of independent directors is one third, just meeting the CSRC requirement, and that they have
no obvious governance role in China. Hence, given this institutional background, this paper only investigates
independent director networks and their economic consequences.
Among the various mechanisms designed to prevent controlling shareholders from tunneling in China, gov-
ernance by independent directors has been one of the key measures since it was introduced for A-shares in
1 For example, I1, I2 and I3 are three independent directors. I1 and I2 do not serve on the same board, so there is no direct connection
between them; however, when I1 and I3 both serve on the board of Company B, and I2 and I3 both serve on the board of Company C,
then I1 and I2 are indirectly connected by I3.
2 The word “tunneling” was proposed by Johnson et al. (2000) to describe the behavior of company controllers transferring the
company’s assets and proﬁts to further their own interests.
3 Under certain circumstances, controlling shareholders prop up listed companies. For example, Jian and Wong (2010) ﬁnd that
controlling shareholders prop up listed companies through abnormal related party transactions to reach reﬁnancing standards or avoid
delisting. However, they also point out that such propping behavior is accompanied by controlling shareholders transferring listed
company funds in the next period.
4 Based on CSRC data on penalties imposed on controlling shareholders for using listed company funds from 2007 to the end of 2010,
we ﬁnd that such penalties were imposed in relation to 30 listed companies (involving 80 year-observations). During this period, the
number of penalty observations for the use of company funds by large shareholders was still 38 in years after 2007, accounting for 23% of
all such observations between 2000 and 2010.
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supervision of “signiﬁcant related party transactions and related ﬁnancial problems,” one of six regulatory
requirements. Thus, independent directors must monitor and issue independent opinions on signiﬁcant related
party transactions and the use of related funds. While no clear conclusion can be drawn from existing empir-
ical evidence on the governance role of independent directors (Gao et al., 2006; Ye et al., 2007), this paper
adopts a board network perspective to provide detailed new evidence on the role of independent directors
in curbing tunneling behavior by controlling shareholders. Using various measures for the use of controlling
shareholders’ funds, the empirical results show that the higher the degree of network centrality among inde-
pendent directors, the smaller the extent to which controlling shareholders use shareholders’ funds, especially
when the use of non-operating funds is used as the tunneling measure. These empirical results imply that the
network centrality of independent directors promotes their governance role in deterring tunneling by control-
ling shareholders. In other words, board networks can contribute to the governance practices of independent
directors and reduce Type II agency problems (problems between large shareholders and minority sharehold-
ers). This paper diﬀers from studies focusing on the role of director networks in the United States. For exam-
ple, Hwang and Kim (2009) ﬁnd that independent directors who have social networks with the ﬁrm lose their
independence. Fracassi and Tate (2012) ﬁnd that internally prompted earnings restatements and value-
decreasing M&A activities occur in ﬁrms with more extensive relations among their directors.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Following a review of the literature in Sections 2 and 3
analyzes the institutional background and develops our hypothesis. Section 4 describes the research design.
Section 5 provides the empirical analysis and Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Literature review
As the ﬁrst researchers to use the word “tunneling” to describe the misuse of company funds by controlling
shareholders, Johnson et al. (2000) list several methods by which it is achieved: transferring growth opportu-
nities belonging to listed company to themselves or their subsidiaries; transferring proﬁts via intra-group
transactions from listed companies to other subsidiaries they own or control; using assets or capital belonging
to the listed company or using them as collateral or guarantees for their ﬁnancing activities; and capital oper-
ations aimed at diluting the interests of other shareholders. Friedman et al. (2003) propose a model showing
how large shareholders tunnel or prop listed companies in diﬀerent ﬁnancial positions. Meanwhile, companies
with a pyramid ownership structure are more likely to be tunneled, but are more likely to be propped when
facing adverse shocks.
In the Chinese capital market, Yu and Xia (2004) ﬁnd that related party transactions are signiﬁcantly more
prevalent in companies with controlling shareholders. Li et al. (2004) ﬁnds that the use of listed company funds
by controlling shareholders exhibits an inverted U-shaped nonlinear relationship with the proportion of equity
held by the largest shareholders. Wang and Xiao (2005) ﬁnd that the use of funds by the 10 largest shareholders
for related party transactions is signiﬁcantly less common in listed companies with institutional investors and
that an increase in the stake held by institutional investors is signiﬁcantly negatively related to the extent of
funds used by related parties in listed companies. Chen and Wang (2005) ﬁnd that the value of related party
transactions is signiﬁcantly positively related to ownership concentration and that increasing the number of
controlling shareholders holding more than 10% reduces both the probability of related party transactions
occurring and the value of such transactions. Jiang and Yue (2005) ﬁnd a negative relationship between the
use of funds by large shareholders and future proﬁtability in listed companies, and show that the use of funds
by large shareholders has a negative eﬀect on the company. Gao et al. (2006) conclude that tunneling by con-
trolling shareholders is exacerbated by ownership concentration and business group control, but is inhibited by
managerial ownership and fund holdings, information disclosure transparency, investor protection and prod-
uct market competition. Luo and Tang (2007) observe that the less the regional government intervenes in the
market and the more developed are ﬁnancial markets, the lower the probability of tunneling by controlling
shareholders in listed companies in the region. Ju and Pan (2010) ﬁnd that listed ﬁrms that are smaller, have
higher leverage or lower operating margins, or in which non-operating proﬁt accounts for a larger proportion
of total proﬁt are more likely to engage in related party transactions. Du et al. (2010) ﬁnd that high-quality
auditing can signiﬁcantly inhibit the use of company funds by large shareholders of listed companies, but that
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ity audits performed. Jiang et al. (2010) examine other receivables in Chinese listed companies to examine the
nature, content and economic consequences of controlling shareholder behavior. Jian and Wong (2010) point
out that abnormal related sales are one means of propping used by the controlling shareholders of listed com-
panies, and that it is more prevalent in state-owned listed companies and regions with a poor institutional envi-
ronment. They also show that abnormal related party transactions take place in conjunction with the next
phase of associated lending for cash transfers among controlling shareholders. Using Chinese data to verify
the model of Friedman et al. (2003), Peng et al. (2010) ﬁnd that in ﬁnancially healthy (ﬁnancially distressed)
listed ﬁrms, controlling shareholders are more likely to tunnel (prop) the ﬁrm through related party transac-
tions, and that the market reacts negatively (positively) to such transactions. They also ﬁnd that all types of
related party transactions can be used as a means of tunneling or propping. Wang and Xiao (2011) investigate
the relationship between the tunneling behavior of listed company controlling shareholders and executive com-
pensation incentives in China, and ﬁnd that tunneling by controlling shareholders reduces executives’ pay-for-
performance sensitivity. This implies that controlling shareholders lower the incentives in the relationship
between managerial pay and performance for their own interests.
Prior studies have examined the relationship between the supervision of independent directors and related
party transactions or company fund use by listed company controlling shareholders. Among these studies,
Tang et al. (2005) ﬁnd that independent directors play a governance role in suppressing channel excavation
by large shareholders through related party transactions, such as the use of company funds, asset sales and
security and cash dividends, but that these eﬀects are not obvious. In contrast, Gao et al. (2006) ﬁnd that inde-
pendent directors have no monitoring eﬀect on tunneling behavior by controlling shareholders. After control-
ling for the endogeneity of independent directors, Ye et al. (2007) ﬁnd that increasing the number and
proportion of independent directors may deter controlling shareholders from using company funds. Huang
and Pan (2010) ﬁnd that the professionalism of independent directors has a signiﬁcant monitoring eﬀect on
related party transactions between controlling shareholders and listed companies. They also demonstrate that
independent director compensation is signiﬁcantly positively related to the frequency of related party transac-
tions between controlling shareholders and listed companies, but that the proportion of independent directors
has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on such transactions.
Although the literature has yet to explore the relationship between social networking among corporate
boards and the tunneling behavior of controlling shareholders, some recent studies examine the nexus between
board social networks and corporate ﬁnance. Hochberg et al. (2007) ﬁnd that venture capital companies with
more network relationships perform better in the follow-up ﬁnancing and exit stages. Kuhnen (2009) shows
that mutual fund directors and fund administration consulting ﬁrms prioritize appointing each other based
on the degree of contact they have had in the past, but that such strong director-consultant links do not lead
to better or worse consequences. Based on a sample of 29,637 ﬁrm observations in the United States from 2000
to 2007, Larcker et al. (2013) ﬁnd that ﬁrms with more central director positions earn higher stock returns.
They measure centrality by the number of directors common to two companies. If a portfolio is constructed
by buying stocks of ﬁrms with a central position in a board network and selling stocks of those without, an
average annual excess return of 4.68% can be obtained. Their results show that the board of director network
is a signal of economic beneﬁts not immediately reﬂected in stock prices. In the Chinese capital market, Chen
and Xie (2011, 2012) investigate the relationship between the board network of independent directors of listed
companies and investment eﬃciency or executive incentives.
In sum, ﬁndings on the eﬀect of independent director governance on the tunneling behavior of controlling
shareholders are not conclusive. This paper provides further empirical evidence on this question from the
board network perspective.
3. Background and hypothesis development
3.1. Independent directors and tunneling by controlling shareholders
In ﬁrms with concentrated ownership, controlling shareholders can rely on their controlling capacity to
gain private beneﬁts via various types of transactions with the ﬁrm (e.g., selling assets, commodities or services
104 Y. Chen et al./China Journal of Accounting Research 7 (2014) 101–118to the ﬁrm at a high price or acquiring assets at a low price). This can occur more frequently in countries with
an ineﬃcient legal environment and weak corporate governance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). In the emerging
and transitional market of China, most ﬁrms are controlled by large shareholders. The concentration of own-
ership among Chinese ﬁrms means that Type II agency problems (between controlling and minority share-
holders) are more prevalent and tunneling is one of the most direct ways in which controlling shareholders
misuse company assets at the expense of minority shareholders. Controlling shareholders use various methods
to tunnel listed ﬁrms, such as related party transactions and the use of company funds, the latter of which is
the most visible and serious means of tunneling in the Chinese capital market (Jiang et al., 2010; Wang and
Xiao, 2011).
Because the primary objective of the Chinese capital market is to broaden the ﬁnancing channels of
SOEs, most of the listed companies are SOEs controlled by the government and its aﬃliated bodies.
The non-tradable shares problem these shareholders face further strengthens their tunneling motivation
(Jiang and Yue, 2005).
5 Moreover, weak investor protection and penalties for violations provide additional
impetus for tunneling behavior. From 2003 to 2006, regulators implemented penalties for tunneling behav-
ior by controlling shareholders. For example, on August 28, 2003, the CSRC and the State-Owned Assets
Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC) jointly announced the “nor-
malization of external guarantees between listed companies and related parties,” and speciﬁed the method
by which tunneling would be prevented among related shareholders. On July 27, 2004, the CSRC and the
SASAC issued a policy relating to debt-equity swaps involving controlling shareholders to use this method
to solve the tunneling problem. In June 2005, the CSRC required listed companies to resolve their cash
occupation problems by the end of the year. On November 7, 2006, eight councils of the Chinese govern-
ment jointly issued the “announcement on cleaning up the use of listed company cash by controlling share-
holders,” and also required that a continuing policy be established. Though regulators have issued various
policies to prohibit tunneling behavior, the governance eﬀect of these measures is not clear. An interesting
phenomenon is that while the CSRC has penalized many ﬁrms, ﬁrms’ controlling shareholders act in their
own way through more implicit methods. From 2007 to 2010, 38 ﬁrms were sanctioned for the illegal use
of cash. Tunneling by controlling shareholders remains a major problem in the Chinese capital market
(Jiang et al., 2010).
Among various corporate government mechanisms, the independent director policy is aimed at monitoring
controlling shareholders and protecting investors’ interests. On August 16, 2001, the CSRC issued the
“announcement on implementing the independent director policy in listed companies” and endowed indepen-
dent directors with six special powers, the ﬁrst one being that major related party transactions must be
approved by independent directors before being submitted to the board for discussion. In addition, indepen-
dent directors were required to express their own views on whether loans or cash transferred to listed compa-
nies’ shareholders, ultimate controllers and related parties amount to more than 5% of total assets. On August
28, 2003, the announcement on the normalization of external guarantees between listed companies and related
parties required independent directors to express their own views on the ﬁrm’s guarantees. All of the foregoing
policies provide independent directors with more powers to prevent tunneling behavior by controlling share-
holders in China. The 2004 Annual Report of the Shanghai Stock Exchange shows that nearly 80% of inde-
pendent directors considered their role were limited to related party transactions and the use of company
funds.
6 However, evidence on their success in fulﬁlling this role is mixed. Gao et al. (2006) and Huang and
Pan (2010) ﬁnd that independent directors have no eﬀect on tunneling behavior by controlling shareholders,
whereas Tang et al. (2005) and Ye et al. (2007) ﬁnd that they have a positive eﬀect. As the proportion of inde-
pendent directors in most ﬁrms is about 33%, which just meets the CSRC requirement, their monitoring role
could not be distinguished because of the small degree of variance in the data. Thus, research on the network
characteristics of independent directors is more important in China.
5 Xu (2009) ﬁnds that although the non-tradable share reform has reduced this problem, Type II agency problems haven’t been entirely
resolved.
6 For details, see the 2004 Corporate Governance Report on Chinese Companies: Independence and Eﬃciency of Board Directors,
Research Centre of Shanghai Stock Exchange, Fudan University Press.
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We follow Xie and Chen (2012) by deﬁning a board network as directors’ connection sets based on direct
ties established when serving on at least one common board. From the sociology perspective, network rela-
tionships can be expressed as a structure comprising nodes and connections. Thus, in a board network, the
nodes can be seen as the directors and the connections can be seen as the relationships among the directors.
If two directors serve on at least one common board, they are jointly related and directly connected. The set of
direct and indirect connections forms a board network (Larcker et al., 2013). Based on this deﬁnition of a net-
work and on the measurable characteristics of networks, their nature and network data, we deﬁne a board
network as the relationships among board members, which is diﬀerent from other social relations such as
school ties, club relations and kinship. We consider that this type of network is more suitable for empirical
study than others, because weak tie theory and structural hole theory in the social network ﬁeld imply that
independent directors, rather than inside directors, play the key role in board networks. Thus, we focus on
networks among independent directors in this paper.
Fig. 1 illustrates the board network of three listed ﬁrms (Xie and Chen, 2012). The ﬁgure shows that inde-
pendent director O1 will certainly be inﬂuenced by his own attributes when making corporate governance
decisions. For example, as an accounting professor, he will be an expert in the ﬁnancial disclosure ﬁeld. Mean-
while, because independent director O2 has the same background as O1, they may have the same corporate
governance eﬀect according to prior research (assuming their other attributes are the same). Independent
director I11 in ﬁrm A has a legal background, and inside director I33 in ﬁrm C is an industry expert (we
assume that ﬁrms B and C are in the same industry). Therefore, O1 can gain information and professional
knowledge about the law and the industry when communicating with I11 and I33 respectively. However,
O2 cannot obtain similar information and knowledge because he serves on the board of ﬁrm B. Hence, in ﬁrm
B, O1 has a more signiﬁcant eﬀect on corporate governance than O2 because of the embeddedness of the
board network. This is the logic of board networks.
We consider that the governance role of directors can be inﬂuenced by their board network and that the
embeddedness of networks can mediate both over-socialization and under-socialization (Granovetter,
1985). On the one hand, network embeddedness can maintain individual directors’ independence and help
them make decisions based on their professional background and preferences. On the other hand, the net-
work view shows that directors’ governance and decision behavior can evolve into a dynamic and interac-
tive process. Directors in a network can exchange information and obtain speciﬁc knowledge from each
other to improve the eﬃciency of governance. Therefore, director behavior is embedded in their social
networks.
People’s positions in the social structure and social connections can inﬂuence their ability to gain informa-
tion and resources, which in turn inﬂuences their economic actions (Luo, 2010). The network centrality of
independent directors means that they play an active and important role in the overall board network, through
which they can gain more information and broaden their knowledge. Diﬀerences in network positions can
inﬂuence independent directors’ reputational incentives and ability to exercise independence. First, the net-
work positions of directors are an important channel by which they can build a reputation (Freeman,
1979). Sitting in the middle of the entire board network, independent directors can obtain more governance
information and knowledge, strengthen their inﬂuence on the board, and gradually accumulate a reputation
for corporate governance, and may eventually be more likely to secure additional board seats.
7 All of these
can be described as the expert reputation the board network provides.
8 Second, Lin (2002) considers that net-
work-based prestige has a “symbolic eﬀect”; even if actors cannot gain the resources embedded in the social
7 Cashman et al. (2010) ﬁnd that if board network centrality increases, the probability of securing additional board seats in the future is
greater.
8 Although Fich and Shivdasani (2006) and Andres and Lehman (2010) ﬁnd that interlocking relationships among directors may reduce
their corporate governance eﬀect, Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983) demonstrate that the external market for directors is the
channel by which independent directors build their reputation (we refer to this as the reputation capital perspective). In addition, more
academic evidence shows that interlocking directorships can increase the corporate governance eﬀect. Many studies use the number of
seats a director has as an indicator of their reputation in the external labor market (Tan et al., 2010; Ye et al., 2011).
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central the independent director’s network position, the more prestige he gains. Third, if an independent direc-
tor’s position is central, a virtual group can be formed around him, and most members of this group are elite
members of society, which is called an elite circle (Davis et al., 2003; Nguyen, 2009). Wang (2007) ﬁnds that
there is mutual recognition among members of the elite group.
9 The greater the network centrality of indepen-
dent directors, the more attention they will pay to others’ recognition and the more time they will spend mak-
ing corporate governance decisions. In contrast, if directors with central positions in the network cannot
prevent tunneling behavior, the “outrage cost” from media and the public could be extremely large and their
reputation within the network will be damaged, a possibility that independent directors should take seriously.
In sum, the expert reputation, social prestige and recognition of the elite group can make independent direc-
tors who attain a central position in the network more sensitive to their reputation, and can give them more of
an incentive and greater pressure to make decisions to prevent tunneling behavior by controlling shareholders.
Moreover, as independent directors with a more central position do not worry about their future board
seats (Cashman et al., 2010), they have greater bargaining power with controlling shareholders, and have more
opportunities to make independent decisions to restrict the tunneling behavior of controlling shareholders,
such as related party transactions or the use of company funds. Furthermore, public pressure may force con-
trolling shareholders to change their tunneling methods in a more implicit way. Because the ability of directors
to collect information can be diﬀerentiated by the diﬀerent network positions they occupy, independent direc-
tors in a central network position can gain more speciﬁc knowledge of how to detect implicit tunneling behav-
ior than those in non-central positions. Hence, the “learning eﬀect” indicates that independent directors with
more central positions are more likely to become aware of and prevent tunneling by controlling shareholders.
We thus hypothesize as follows:
Where the network centrality of independent directors in the ﬁrm is greater, tunneling by controlling share-
holders is less likely to occur and is likely to be less prevalent.
4. Research design
4.1. Measurement of board network centrality
In sociology, network centrality is used to measure diﬀerent degrees of involvement in a social network
(Freeman, 1979; Wasserman and Faust, 1994). We follow the sociology literature by using network centrality
Figure 1. Sample board network.
9 Zhou (2010) ﬁnds that in China, relationships between people have changed from those based on traditional relation-based trust
represented by “diﬀerential patterns” to those characterized by relation-based recognition as represented by “colleagues, friends and
‘friends of friends’”.
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work.
10 There are four basic network centrality measures: degree centrality, betweenness centrality, closeness
centrality and eigenvector centrality (see Appendix A for more details). Wasserman and Faust (1994) point
out that as each speciﬁc centrality measure has its own advantages and disadvantages, researchers should
not use only one measure and ignore the others. For the degree of network centrality, if a director’s degree
of centrality is small, his position isolates him from other directors in the board network and weakens his par-
ticipation in ongoing communication. Betweenness centrality gauges the ability of a director to gain informa-
tion from the network with initiative, speed and accuracy. Closeness centrality represents how independently
and accurately a director obtains information. That is, if the director does not occupy a central position in the
network, then he must rely on others to obtain information, which reduces its timeliness and accuracy. Eigen-
vector centrality, a recursive measure of degree centrality, represents the quality of connections. In sum, degree
centrality focuses on participation in communication, betweenness centrality on control and initiative in com-
munication, closeness centrality on independence and eﬀectiveness of communication, and eigenvector central-
ity on quality of communication. We draw on these concepts to construct a new and more comprehensive
integrated measure of network centrality (Wasserman and Faust, 1994; Larcker et al., 2013).
Speciﬁcally, we collect information on all directors of A-share listed ﬁrms and arrange them in matrix form.
We ﬁrst calculate the four network centrality measures for each director for completeness of measurement,
then focus exclusively on independent director networks. To construct a ﬁrm-level network measure, we com-
pute the median and mean values of the network centrality of a ﬁrm’s independent directors to estimate the
ﬁrm’s network centrality. In robustness tests, we also use the maximum and minimum values (Schonlau and
Singh, 2009; Larcker et al., 2013). We have two reasons for doing so: ﬁrst, the median value represents the
typical centrality of the independent directors’ network; and second, one independent director’s inﬂuence is
more representative than that of others. In line with Larcker et al. (2013), to reduce the inﬂuence of diﬀerent
dimensions and outliers, we rank the network centrality measures in 10 groups (labeled 0–9) for every year,
then take the mean value as the measure of the ﬁrm’s network centrality (score_median, score_max).
4.2. Measurement of tunneling by controlling shareholders
We use the amount of funds used by controlling shareholders for related party transactions as a proxy for
tunneling behavior. Controlling shareholders make two types of loans to listed companies. Operating loans
generated by normal related party transactions such as accounts receivable and other receivables beyond nor-
mal transactions, such as the use of non-operating funds. The latter type is the key supervisory target of CSRC
regulations (Ye et al., 2007; Zeng and Chen, 2009). Thus, we use other receivables held by the largest share-
holder and its aﬃliated ﬁrms as a proxy for tunneling behavior (TUN). Peng et al. (2010) ﬁnd that controlling
shareholders use all types of related party transactions for tunneling, two of which are used in this paper: the
use of operating funds (ABNTUN) and the use of non-operating funds (NMTUN). However, the use of non-
operating funds by controlling shareholders is adopted as the main measure in this paper. Gao et al. (2006)
and Zeng and Chen (2009) ﬁnd that listed ﬁrms also use funds from their controlling shareholders. Hence,
we also use the net use of funds in robustness tests (DTUN, DABNTUN, DNMTUN). The speciﬁc deﬁnitions
of the variables are listed in Table 1.
4.3. Model and variables
The model used to test the relationship between the network centrality of independent directors and tun-
neling by controlling shareholders is as follows:
Tunnelt ¼ a0 þ a1CENt þ
X
Controls þ
X
IND þ
X
Year þ e ð1Þ
10 Hochberg et al. (2007), Crespi and Fuster (2009), Barnea and Guedj (2009), Horton et al. (2009), Schonlau and Singh (2009), Farina
(2009), Andres and Lehman (2010), Chuluun et al. (2010), Cashman et al. (2010), Liu (2010) and Larcker et al. (2013) use similar network
measures in the ﬁnance and accounting literature. However, most of them use one or several speciﬁc measures; only Larcker et al. (2013)
use a comprehensive measure.
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fund use measures: TUN, ABNTUN and NMTUN. In robustness tests, we also use DTUN, DABNTUN and
DNMTUN as additional measures. CENt is the explanatory variable. We predict that a1 is negative, that is,
the greater the network centrality of the independent directors, the greater their monitoring eﬀect and the less
prevalent tunneling is by controlling shareholders. We run a Tobit regression for TUN/ABNTUN/NMTUN/
DTUN/DABNTUN/DNMTUN to account for the signiﬁcant number of zero observations.
Similar to those of Jiang et al. (2010), Jian and Wong (2010) and Ye et al. (2007), our control variables
include the ultimate controller’s ownership (SOE), the proportion of the ﬁrm’s equity owned by the largest
shareholder (FSHR), the sum of the ownership stakes of the second to ﬁfth largest shareholders (HFD), sep-
aration of the ownership and control rights of the ultimate controlling shareholder (CO), whether the listed
ﬁrm is part of a group (GROUP), ﬁrm performance (ROE) and the market environment (MKT). Given
the ﬁnding of Zhang et al. (2010) that the largest shareholder’s role changed after the non-tradable share
reform was implemented, we control for this phenomenon (GG). As there was a focus on cleaning up the mis-
use of funds at about the same time as the non-tradable share reform, the GG variable also controls for reg-
ulatory policy. We also control for variables inﬂuencing the governance role of independent directors such as
Table 1
Variable deﬁnitions.
Name Symbol Deﬁnition
Controlling shareholders’
tunneling
TUN Sum of accounts receivable, account prepayments and other receivables held by
controlling shareholders, scaled by total assets
ABNTUN Other receivables held by controlling shareholders, scaled by total assets
NMTUN Sum of accounts receivable and account prepayments held by controlling shareholders,
scaled by total assets; equals (TUN   ABNTUN)
DTUN (accounts receivable + accounts prepayments + other receivables   accounts
payable   receivables in advance   other payables) held by controlling shareholders,
scaled by total assets
DABNTUN Other receivables held by controlling shareholders minus other payables held by the
listed ﬁrm, scaled by total assets
DNMTUN DTUN   DABNTUN
Network centrality of
independent directors
CEN The integrated network centrality of independent directors at the ﬁrm level
(score_median and score _max)
Ultimate controller’s
ownership
SOE An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the ﬁrm is state-owned and 0 otherwise
Concentration of ownership FSHR The ratio of shares held by the largest shareholder divided by the total number of shares
outstanding at the end of the year
Equity restriction HFD The proportion representing the combined ownership stakes of the second to ﬁfth largest
shareholders at the end of the year
Separation of ownership and
control
CO The proportion of control rights and cash ﬂow rights held by the ultimate controller. See
Claessens et al. (2000) for the calculation process
Firm group GROUP An indicator variable that takes the value of 0 if the ﬁrm’s ultimate controller is an
individual, the SASAC, a university, a social organization, a research institution, an
ESOP association or an investment corporation, and 1 otherwise (Li et al., 2004; Tang
et al., 2005)
Performance ROE Net income scaled by equity at the end of the year
Size SIZE The natural logarithm of total assets at the end of the year
Leverage LEV Total liabilities divided by total assets
Market environment MKT A dummy variable equal to 1 if the index of the market environment is above the median
and 0 otherwise. See Fan et al. (2010) for index details
Non-tradable shares reform GG An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the ﬁrm’s non-tradable reform process
is successful and 0 otherwise
Board size BOARD The number of board directors
Duality DUAL An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the board chairman and CEO are the
same person and 0 otherwise
Proportion of independent
directors
OUT The proportion of independent directors on the board in the current year
Industry/year IND/YEAR The industry dummies are based on CSRC benchmarks (2001) and six year dummies
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other common control variables such as ﬁrm size (SIZE), leverage (LEV) and industry (IND) and year
(YEAR) dummy variables.
4.4. Sample and data
We start with observations for all Chinese A-share listed ﬁrms from 2003 to 2009. Financial industries are
removed from the original dataset. The removal of items with missing data substantially reduces the number
of observations, yielding a ﬁnal sample comprising 9757 ﬁrm-year observations. All of the data are from the
CSMAR database, among which the data on controlling shareholders’ use of funds for related party transac-
tions are from the “cash transfers for related party transactions” CSMAR sub-database. All observations in
the top and bottom 1% for continuous variables are winsorized to control for outliers, and t-values are clus-
tered at the ﬁrm level. The Matlab and Pajek software applications (the most widely recognized software for
analyzing large amounts of social network data) are used to calculate directors’ network centrality.
5. Empirical analysis
5.1. Descriptive statistics and correlation analysis
Table 2 lists the descriptive statistics of all variables. The results show that controlling shareholders’ tun-
neling of operating funds (TUN) has a mean of 2.13% and a maximum of 51.38%. The mean and maximum
for tunneling of non-operating funds (ABNTUN) are 1.15% and 43.47%, respectively. These results imply that
tunneling is a serious problem among controlling shareholders in China. The means of score_median and scor-
e_max are 3.49 and 4.03, respectively. The mean of FSHR is 38% and the median is 36.08%, indicating a need
to improve the monitoring incentives and tunneling suppression capacity of independent directors in Chinese
ﬁrms with highly concentrated ownership. The mean and median of OUT are 35.22% and 33.33%, respec-
tively, implying that the proportion of independent directors in most listed ﬁrms meets or just exceeds the
CSRC requirement.
Table 3 lists the correlations among the main variables.
11 There are negative correlations between score_-
median, score_max and all proxies for tunneling by controlling shareholders, especially TUN and ABNTUN.
Table 2
Descriptive statistics.
Variables Obs. Mean Median Max Min STD
TUN 7572 0.0213 0.0008 0.5138 0.0000 0.0659
ABNTUN 6714 0.0115 0.0000 0.4347 0.0000 0.0517
NMTUN 6714 0.0102 0.0001 0.2077 0.0000 0.0295
score_median 9757 3.4861 3.0000 9.0000 0.0000 2.7506
score_max 9757 4.0323 4.0000 9.0000 0.0000 2.8066
SOE 9757 0.6141 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.4868
FSHR 9757 0.3830 0.3608 0.7584 0.0923 0.1603
HFD 9757 0.0193 0.0073 0.1160 0.0000 0.0259
CO 9757 1.5013 1.0000 6.6051 1.0000 0.9819
GROUP 9757 0.1698 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.3755
ROE 9434 0.0520 0.0694 0.4325  1.2033 0.2019
SIZE 9754 21.3576 21.2416 25.0182 18.7185 1.1797
LEV 9754 0.5303 0.5132 1.9083 0.0728 0.2773
MKT 9757 0.7483 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.4340
GG 8247 0.4422 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.4967
BOARD 9642 9.4105 9.0000 17.0000 5.0000 2.0450
DUAL 9757 0.1444 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.3515
OUT 9639 0.3522 0.3333 0.5000 0.0000 0.0495
11 Due to the length of this paper, the correlation values of the control variables are not reported.
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Although there are generally negative correlations between the network centrality of independent directors
and tunneling by controlling shareholders, this relationship does not exist when measured by the use of oper-
ating funds. The correlation matrix, however, merely shows the univariate results. Multivariate tests are
needed to obtain more meaningful empirical ﬁndings. The correlations of the non-listed variables are no
higher than 0.5, thus indicating that multicollinearity is not a serious problem in this study.
5.2. Multivariate regression analysis
Table 4 lists the main regression results and shows that when the dependent variable is TUN, the coeﬃcient
on score_median is negative and marginally signiﬁcant (t-value of  1.58) and the coeﬃcient on score_max is
signiﬁcantly negative at the 5% level. When the dependent variable is ABNTUN, the coeﬃcients on both scor-
e_median and score_max are signiﬁcantly negative. However, when the dependent variable is NMTUN, the
coeﬃcients on score_median and score_max are insigniﬁcant. These results imply that controlling sharehold-
ers are more likely to tunnel by using non-operating funds than by appropriating operating funds and that the
eﬀect of independent director network centrality is mainly reﬂected in the use of non-operating funds. Thus,
the empirical results reported above show that the greater the network centrality of independent directors, the
less pervasive tunneling is by controlling shareholders. Our prediction is thus supported, showing that the
board networks of independent directors have the eﬀect of suppressing tunneling by controlling shareholders.
These empirical results demonstrate that studying independent director networks is more meaningful than
merely testing the ratio of independent directors on each board.
Among the control variables, the coeﬃcients on SOE are signiﬁcantly positive at the 1% level, thus indicat-
ing that tunneling is more likely to occur in SOEs, which is similar to the ﬁnding of Gao et al. (2006). The
coeﬃcients on FSHR are signiﬁcantly positive at the 1% level, implying that the larger the ownership stake
of the largest shareholder, the more serious tunneling is likely to be, thus corroborating the ﬁndings of Yu
and Xia (2004) and Li et al. (2004). MKT is signiﬁcantly negatively related to all of the dependent variables,
other than ABNTUN, thus showing that tunneling by controlling shareholders is weaker under better market
environments, a result conﬁrming that of Luo and Tang (2006). GG is signiﬁcantly negatively related to tun-
neling, thus demonstrating that the incentive for tunneling diminished as shares owned by controlling share-
holders became tradable after the non-tradable share reform.
5.3. Robustness tests
12
When testing for tunneling by controlling shareholders, the transfer of funds from controlling shareholders
to the listed company must also be considered (Gao et al., 2006; Zeng and Chen, 2009). Therefore, the ﬁrst
Table 3
Correlation matrix.
score_median score_max TUN DTUN ABNTUN DABNTUN NMTUN DNMTUN
score_median 0.828
***  0.006
*  0.04
***  0.034
***  0.025
**  0.045  0.022
*
score_max 0.850
***  0.015
**  0.039
***  0.045
***  0.021
*  0.044  0.024
**
TUN  0.057
***  0.071
*** 0.807
*** 0.844
*** 0.651
*** 0.607
*** 0.545
***
DTUN  0.045
***  0.049
*** 0.532
*** 0.716
*** 0.889
*** 0.445
*** 0.526
***
ABNTUN  0.063
***  0.074
*** 0.648
*** 0.391
*** 0.779
*** 0.144
*** 0.144
***
DABNTUN  0.04
***  0.037
*** 0.296
*** 0.722
*** 0.472
*** 0.099
*** 0.127
***
NMTUN  0.019  0.036
*** 0.788
*** 0.331
*** 0.25
*** 0.026
** 0.87
***
DNMTUN  0.029
**  0.044
*** 0.461
*** 0.603
*** 0.132
*** 0.108
*** 0.532
***
Note: Spearman correlations are listed in the upper right of this table and Pearson correlations in the lower left.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
12 Results not reported here can be provided to interested readers.
Y. Chen et al./China Journal of Accounting Research 7 (2014) 101–118 111robustness test measures the net balance of tunneling by controlling shareholders. Since Gao et al. (2006) ﬁnd
that there are two types of incentives for related party transactions, tunneling and propping, we exclude prop-
ping ﬁrms from our sample. We delete observations with negative values for DTUN, DABNTUN and
DNMTUN and rerun the regressions.
13 The results are reported in Table 5, which shows that the network cen-
trality of independent directors is signiﬁcantly negatively related to tunneling by controlling shareholders and
that this holds for both total tunneling (DTUN) and the use of non-operating funds (DABNTUN). Tunneling
by using non-operating funds (DNMTUN) is, however, insigniﬁcantly related to network centrality, reﬂecting
the main results in Table 4. Because controlling shareholders tunnel listed ﬁrms mainly by using company funds
in related party transactions and independent directors have diﬃculty recognizing whether operating transac-
tions constitute tunneling behavior, as do investors (Ye et al., 2007), most of the eﬀect of independent directors
in suppressing tunneling by controlling shareholders is reﬂected in the use of non-operating funds.
Table 4
Multivariate results for independent director network centrality and tunneling.
TUN ABNTUN NMTUN
score_median score_max score_median score_max score_median score_max
CEN  0.0006  0.0008
**  0.0009
**  0.0010
*** 0.0001  0.0001
( 1.58) ( 2.46) ( 2.55) ( 3.03) (0.59) ( 0.49)
SOE 0.0101
*** 0.0107
*** 0.0069
*** 0.0069
*** 0.0072
*** 0.0072
***
(5.21) (5.45) (3.38) (3.40) (5.39) (5.45)
FSHR 0.0536
*** 0.0485
*** 0.0286
*** 0.0285
*** 0.0360
*** 0.0358
***
(9.40) (8.36) (4.79) (4.77) (9.19) (9.16)
HFD 0.0200 0.0123  0.0075  0.0095 0.0292 0.0284
(0.59) (0.36) ( 0.22) ( 0.27) (1.28) (1.24)
CO 0.0003  0.0001  0.0007  0.0007  0.0002  0.0001
(0.32) ( 0.10) ( 0.62) ( 0.62) ( 0.23) ( 0.21)
GROUP 0.0037
* 0.0027 0.0001 0.0001 0.0005 0.0005
(1.84) (1.25) (0.04) (0.03) (0.36) (0.35)
ROE  0.0629
***  0.0645
***  0.0682
***  0.0681
***  0.0117
***  0.0116
***
( 12.53) ( 12.69) ( 13.59) ( 13.56) ( 3.41) ( 3.36)
SIZE  0.0017
**  0.0003 0.0014 0.0014 0.0007 0.0008
( 2.00) ( 0.35) (1.49) (1.52) (1.16) (1.29)
LEV 0.0118
*** 0.0088
* 0.0130
*** 0.0130
***  0.0043  0.0044
(2.66) (1.92) (2.78) (2.79) ( 1.42) ( 1.43)
MKT  0.0044
**  0.0047
*** 0.0010 0.0011  0.0049
***  0.0047
***
( 2.56) ( 2.72) (0.58) (0.61) ( 4.20) ( 4.07)
GG  0.0109
***  0.0064
*  0.0047  0.0046  0.0014  0.0014
( 5.06) ( 1.72) ( 1.18) ( 1.15) ( 0.56) ( 0.57)
BOARD  0.0009
**  0.0008
*  0.0016
***  0.0016
*** 0.0001 0.0002
( 2.26) ( 1.82) ( 3.79) ( 3.64) (0.49) (0.66)
DUAL  0.0031  0.0026 0.0019 0.0018  0.0052
***  0.0052
***
( 1.30) ( 1.08) (0.77) (0.74) ( 3.17) ( 3.19)
OUT  0.0721
***  0.0654
***  0.0584
***  0.0545
***  0.0368
***  0.0363
***
( 4.12) ( 3.71) ( 3.29) ( 3.06) ( 3.14) ( 3.09)
Constant 0.0502
*** 0.0172  0.0132  0.0153  0.0328
***  0.0340
***
(2.83) (0.93) ( 0.69) ( 0.81) ( 2.65) ( 2.74)
IND/YEAR
pp pp pp
Pseudo R
2 (R
2) 0.061 0.079 0.211 0.212 0.058 0.058
LR chi2 (F-Value) 565.9 729.24 790.29 792.94 525.94 525.84
Obs. 6305 6259 5609 5609 5609 5609
Note: t-values are reported in brackets.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
13 The results do not change if these observations are not deleted from the sample.
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(2007) and Armstrong et al. (2010) ﬁnd that the governance role of independent directors depends on the
ﬁrm’s information environment. We therefore choose a number of instrumental variables related to the infor-
mation environment for inclusion in the regression: daily stock volatility over one year (STD), analyst follow-
ing (NUM) and growth (TQ). In the ﬁrst stage, we regress the network centrality of independent directors on
the three instrumental variables, the ownership stake of the largest shareholder, the sum of the square of the
second to ﬁfth largest shareholders’ ownership stakes, SOE, management ownership ratio, ﬁrm size, debt ratio
and industry and year dummy variables. The model is speciﬁed as follows:
CENt ¼ b0 þ b1STDt þ b2NUMt þ b3TQt þ b4FSHRt þ b5HFDt þ b6SOEt þ b7ESHRt þ b8SIZEt
þ b9LEV t þ
X
IND þ
X
YEAR þ c ð2Þ
where STD is the standard deviation of daily stock returns during the year; NUM is the analyst following in
year t; TQ = (stock price   outstanding shares + net assets per share   non-trading shares + book value to
Table 5
Results for the net value of tunneling and independent director network centrality.
DTUN DABNTUN DNMTUN
score_median score_max score_median score_max score_median score_max
CEN  0.0010
*  0.0014
***  0.0012
**  0.0013
*** 0.0002  0.0000
( 1.86) ( 2.98) ( 2.17) ( 2.58) (0.62) ( 0.05)
SOE 0.0097
*** 0.0098
*** 0.0124
*** 0.0125
*** 0.0053
*** 0.0053
***
(3.46) (3.50) (4.02) (4.05) (3.29) (3.33)
FSHR 0.0255
*** 0.0251
*** 0.0022 0.0020 0.0282
*** 0.0281
***
(3.07) (3.04) (0.25) (0.22) (5.96) (5.93)
HFD  0.0195  0.0232  0.0450  0.0481 0.0065 0.0060
( 0.40) ( 0.48) ( 0.87) ( 0.94) (0.23) (0.22)
CO 0.0001 0.0001  0.0007  0.0007 0.0001 0.0001
(0.06) (0.08) ( 0.45) ( 0.45) (0.11) (0.12)
GROUP 0.0023 0.0022 0.0029 0.0028  0.0004  0.0004
(0.75) (0.74) (0.91) (0.90) ( 0.24) ( 0.24)
ROE  0.0900
***  0.0895
***  0.0919
***  0.0916
***  0.0155
***  0.0154
***
( 12.54) ( 12.48) ( 12.51) ( 12.48) ( 3.76) ( 3.73)
SIZE  0.0015  0.0013  0.0003  0.0003  0.0013
*  0.0012
*
( 1.14) ( 1.02) ( 0.22) ( 0.20) ( 1.73) ( 1.65)
LEV  0.0104  0.0105 0.0042 0.0042  0.0074
**  0.0074
**
( 1.57) ( 1.59) (0.59) (0.60) ( 1.99) ( 2.00)
MKT  0.0048
*  0.0045
* 0.0023 0.0024  0.0039
***  0.0038
***
( 1.93) ( 1.84) (0.85) (0.89) ( 2.79) ( 2.70)
GG  0.0081  0.0080  0.0119
*  0.0118
*  0.0014  0.0015
( 1.48) ( 1.47) ( 1.88) ( 1.86) ( 0.48) ( 0.49)
BOARD  0.0016
***  0.0015
**  0.0022
***  0.0021
***  0.0001  0.0000
( 2.65) ( 2.40) ( 3.48) ( 3.34) ( 0.23) ( 0.13)
DUAL  0.0019  0.0020 0.0016 0.0015  0.0047
**  0.0048
**
( 0.56) ( 0.57) (0.45) (0.42) ( 2.40) ( 2.41)
OUT  0.0837
***  0.0778
***  0.0738
***  0.0686
***  0.0394
***  0.0394
***
( 3.35) ( 3.11) ( 2.83) ( 2.62) ( 2.79) ( 2.78)
Constant 0.0561
** 0.0515
* 0.0281 0.0253 0.0102 0.0094
(2.09) (1.91) (0.96) (0.87) (0.67) (0.62)
IND/YEAR
pp pp pp
Pseudo R
2 0.429 0.433 0.187 0.187 0.064 0.065
LR chi2 675.91 681.29 840.52 842.45 281.48 281.1
Obs. 6259 6259 5609 5609 5609 5609
Note: t-values are reported in brackets.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
Y. Chen et al./China Journal of Accounting Research 7 (2014) 101–118 113liabilities)/total assets at the end of the year (if all shares are tradable, TQ = (total market value of equity + -
book value of total liabilities)/total assets at the end of the year). The predicted value of the network centrality
of independent directors from the ﬁrst-stage regression is then added to the second regression model as
follows:
TUNNELt ¼ a0 þ a1PCENt þ
X
Controls þ
X
IND þ
X
YEAR þ k ð3Þ
As shown in Table 6, the results based on this two-stage regression are consistent with those of the main
tests, regardless of whether score_median or score_max is used.
We also follow Xiao et al. (2009) and Chen et al. (2010) by running a proxy variable two-stage regression.
14
In the ﬁrst stage, we regress the network centrality of independent directors on director size, duality, indepen-
dence of directors, and the ownership stake of the largest shareholder, the square of the sum of the ownership
Table 6
Two-stage instrumental variable regression results.
TUN ABNTUN NMTUN
score_median score_max score_median score_max score_median score_max
PCEN  0.0050
*  0.0045
*  0.0075
*  0.0039
*  0.0037  0.0029
( 1.84) ( 1.87) ( 1.85) ( 1.67) ( 1.61) ( 1.59)
SOE 0.0060
*** 0.0061
*** 0.0050
** 0.0047
** 0.0051
*** 0.0051
***
(2.80) (2.84) (2.41) (2.28) (4.09) (4.14)
FSHR 0.0291
*** 0.0291
***  0.0023  0.0044 0.0292
*** 0.0286
***
(4.61) (4.60) ( 0.38) ( 0.72) (8.04) (7.94)
HFD 0.0623 0.0623 0.0508 0.0354 0.0348 0.0332
(1.61) (1.60) (1.36) (0.96) (1.57) (1.51)
CO 0.0002 0.0003 0.0005 0.0008  0.0007  0.0006
(0.22) (0.25) (0.45) (0.72) ( 1.10) ( 0.96)
GROUP  0.0007  0.0007  0.0034  0.0028 0.0010  0.0002
( 0.30) ( 0.27) ( 1.45) ( 1.20) (0.72) ( 0.11)
ROE  0.0992
***  0.0990
***  0.0923
***  0.0921
***  0.0129
***  0.0125
***
( 16.83) ( 16.76) ( 16.58) ( 16.62) ( 3.84) ( 3.73)
SIZE  0.0020
*  0.0020
* 0.0009 0.0003 0.0012
* 0.0011
*
( 1.90) ( 1.81) (0.75) (0.33) (1.73) (1.71)
LEV 0.0276
*** 0.0278
*** 0.0294
*** 0.0288
*** 0.0036 0.0038
(5.39) (5.41) (5.87) (5.84) (1.22) (1.30)
MKT  0.0013  0.0014 0.0057
*** 0.0061
***  0.0040
***  0.0040
***
( 0.68) ( 0.71) (2.94) (3.18) ( 3.56) ( 3.52)
GG  0.0069  0.0068  0.0087
**  0.0091
** 0.0012 0.0001
( 1.61) ( 1.59) ( 2.07) ( 2.17) (0.51) (0.08)
BOARD  0.0013
***  0.0013
***  0.0015
***  0.0015
***  0.0002  0.0002
( 2.82) ( 2.69) ( 3.31) ( 3.22) ( 0.58) ( 0.60)
DUAL  0.0031  0.0032 0.0012 0.0013  0.0057
***  0.0058
***
( 1.17) ( 1.23) (0.45) (0.52) ( 3.77) ( 3.82)
OUT  0.0957
***  0.0966
***  0.0680
***  0.0695
***  0.0277
**  0.0248
**
( 4.84) ( 4.88) ( 3.59) ( 3.67) ( 2.48) ( 2.23)
Constant 0.1152
*** 0.1105
*** 0.0683
*** 0.0497
**  0.0179  0.0197
*
(5.48) (5.32) (3.24) (2.48) ( 1.45) ( 1.66)
IND/YEAR
pp pp pp
Pseudo R
2 (R
2) 0.061 0.062 0.107 0.103 0.047 0.046
LR chi2 (F-Value) 749.71 755.87 839.15 809.4 647.16 637.49
Obs. 7375 7375 6904 6904 6904 6904
Note: t-values are reported in brackets.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
14 This proxy variable approach provides useful information from the residual values of the model with which to run the second-stage
regression, but no regression is run on the explanatory variables. This approach can be used to ﬁnd the instrumental variables more easily.
114 Y. Chen et al./China Journal of Accounting Research 7 (2014) 101–118stakes of the second to ﬁfth largest shareholders, SOE, ﬁrm size, debt ratio, and return on total assets in the
previous year. The residuals of the ﬁrst-stage regression are then added to the second stage model. Unreported
results show that the CEN_residual is negatively related to TUN at the 5% or 10% level of signiﬁcance.
In a third robustness test of the main results, we use the two integrated measures of score_median and scor-
e_max to proxy for the network centrality of independent directors. Our results also hold when using the mean
and minimum values of ﬁrm-level centrality. The results show that the coeﬃcients for two of the three mea-
sures of centrality are signiﬁcant, the exception being that for the eigenvector centrality of the network. Rank
index values of network centrality also provide similar results. In summary, all of our robustness tests support
our hypothesis.
Moreover, because Jiang and Yue (2005) and Jiang et al. (2010) ﬁnd that all “other receivables” can be used
for tunneling, we also use this measure. In untabulated analysis, our main results hold when using “other
receivables” as the proxy for controlling shareholders’ tunneling behavior.
6. Conclusions
In China, the motivation for establishing a system of independent directors was to constrain the tunneling
behavior of controlling shareholders and protect the interests of minority investors. However, because the
appointment of independent directors is controlled by controlling shareholders themselves, the expectation
that the monitoring ability of independent directors would be enhanced by increasing their number and pro-
portion has undoubtedly proven futile. Moreover, given their concern with social status and reputation, not all
independent directors are willing to serve as whistleblowers. Hence, more attention should be paid to the moti-
vations and abilities enabling prospective independent directors to monitor controlling shareholders. Few
prior studies focus in detail on the relationship between social networks and corporate governance. This paper
adopts a social networking perspective to investigate the governance role of independent directors in China.
Speciﬁcally, using various indicators of the use of company funds by controlling shareholders, we examine the
relationship between the network centrality of independent directors and controlling shareholders’ appropri-
ation of ﬁrm funds. Empirical evidence shows that tunneling behavior is negatively related to network central-
ity, especially when non-operating cash is used as the measure of tunneling. All of our results imply that
independent directors can reduce tunneling by large shareholders through their board network and play a
positive and meaningful role in corporate governance.
Although we deﬁne networks as direct connections among directors sitting on at least one common board,
we also recognize that other networks of independent directors that are unrelated to their board activities,
such as school ties, will also have an eﬀect on their governance role. We look forward to collecting data rel-
evant to such networks for further study.
Appendix A. Measurement of board network centrality
We follow Freeman (1979), Wasserman and Faust (1994) and Xie and Chen (2012) by using network cen-
trality analysis, which is part of social network analysis, to represent independent directors’ positions in the
board network of all listed ﬁrms. The basic measures are degree centrality, betweenness centrality, closeness
centrality and eigenvector centrality, which together characterize the diﬀerent elements of network centrality.
The speciﬁc calculation methods are as follows:
(1) Degree centrality: Degreei ¼
P
jXji
g 1
This measure represents the number of direct ties a director has in a board network, which characterizes the
director’s participation in the network. Where i measures a director, j measures all directors other than i in one
year; Xji is a network relation indicator that takes the value of 1 if director i and director j are on the same
board and 0 otherwise; g is the number of directors in the board network in one year. As the scope of the
board network diﬀers between years, (g   1) is used to eliminate the scale diﬀerence.
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P
j<kgjkðniÞ=gjk
ðg 1Þðg 2Þ
This measure represents the degree to which one director controls communication among others and reﬂects
the degree to which the same director reduces the path distance between all pairs of other directors. It is a
measure of the extent to which the director acts as a “bridge” in helping others to form connections. Where
gjkðniÞ is the number of geodesics in which director j communicates with director k.
P
j<kgjkðniÞ=gjk means the
geodesics of all pairs of other directors including director i. We use (g   1)(g   2)/2 to eliminate diﬀerences
in board size (Freeman, 1979).
(3) Closeness centrality: Closenessi ¼
Pg
j¼1dði;jÞ
g 1
    1
This measure is deﬁned as the reciprocal value of the sum of distances travelled when director i communicates
with all other directors and indicates how quickly and independently one director can relate to others. Where
d(i, j)is the distance between director i and director j. If one director does not connect with all other directors,
then this method cannot be used to accurately calculate the degree of centrality. Therefore, similar to Liu
(2010), we divide the number of directors to whom he can relate directly in the network, then multiply the
result by the proportion it bears to the total number of directors in the board network.
(4) Eigenvector centrality: Eigenvectori ¼ 1
k
P
jbijEj
This measure is the weighted value of a director’s direct connections and indicates the extent to which a direc-
tor’s network centrality is related to that of his neighbors (Bonacich, 1972). The weights represent the impor-
tance of the directors to whom he connects. Eigenvector centrality can be calculated by the standard
“eigenvalue–eigenvector” model: BE = kE, where bij is an adjacency matrix that takes the value of 1 if director
i and director j are on the same board and 0 otherwise. k is the largest eigenvalue and Ej is the eigenvalue of
director j’s centrality. In the social network ﬁeld, actors who receive more information are valuable sources of
information. This measure of centrality is aimed at ﬁnding the most central actor, but does not focus on the
fractional structure (Bonacich, 1972).
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Investment eﬃciency has long been a hot topic in accounting research (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen,
1986; Stulz, 1990; Wei and Liu, 2007), with Jensen (1986) initially investigating the problem using the agency
theory framework, followed by Narayanan (1988) and Malmendler and Tate (2005) exploring the issue from
the perspectives of information asymmetry and managerial overconﬁdence, respectively. The three main
causes of enterprises’ overinvestment are found to be agency problems, information asymmetry, and manage-
rial overconﬁdence. Subsequently, Fazzari et al. (1988), Aggarwal and Samwick (2006), Tang et al. (2007), Xin
et al. (2007) and Jiang et al. (2009) separately conduct in-depth assessments of the problem from the perspec-
tives of ﬁnancing constraints, management incentives, cash dividends, executive compensation, and manage-
ment background, based on the theories of agency conﬂicts and information asymmetry.
The studies listed above restrict their focus to ﬁrm-level factors, which certainly do not cover all of China.
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China are controlled by either the central or the local governments at dif-
ferent levels. The agency conﬂicts between the government, which is the biggest shareholder in most circum-
stances, and external minority shareholders are quite diﬀerent from the common conﬂicts between managers
and shareholders and between shareholders and bondholders (La Porta et al., 1999; Jensen and Meckling,
1976). Yang and Hu (2007), Cheng et al. (2008) and Chen et al. (2011) investigate the investment eﬃciency
problem from the perspectives of the speciﬁc institutional environment and government intervention in China.
They ﬁnd that the institutional environment in China and government intervention inﬂuence the relationship
between the factors of ﬁrms’ free cash ﬂow, debt ﬁnancing, cash dividends, management compensation, and
corporate governance and the level of corporate overinvestment, creating a non-negligible factor that leads to
ﬁrms’ overinvestment.
Controlled by the government, SOEs are endowed with the responsibility for assisting the corresponding
regional government in achieving various goals, such as the economic, social, and political goals of boosting
regional economic growth; facilitating increases in regional tax revenues and employment rates; maintaining
social stability; and ensuring that investments in emerging industries ﬂourish. This decreases the focus on the
elementary goal of eﬀective operations, compared to non-SOEs (Chen et al., 2011; Wei and Liu, 2007). SOEs
bear heavy policy burdens that can lead to multiple targets and ineﬃcient operations. Thus, SOEs may suﬀer
from low investment and decreased operational eﬃciency, in addition to low pay performance sensitivity
(PPS) among executives. Studies ﬁnd that there have been incentives for local governments to boost their
regional GDP by forcing the local SOEs under their control to overinvest (Tang et al., 2010) and that such
activity has been an important approach for local bureaucrats to obtain promotions. Moreover, Xue and
Bai (2008) and Chen et al. (2012) both ﬁnd that local governments have an incentive to lift the local employ-
ment rate through overemployment in local SOEs.
Following China’s decentralization reform in the 1980s, the planned economy has disintegrated gradually,
providing local governments with extensive autonomous rights, including the right to control tax revenue. As
a result, local governments acquire ﬁnancial incentives to compete with each other (Jin et al., 2005; Young,
2000). After the 1994 reform of the tax system, tax revenue became a crucial source of local ﬁscal revenue
and ﬁscal health became a core economic and social objective of local governments (Chen et al., 2011),
together with the goal of regional economic development. In addition, it became an important approach to
help local governments to implement their government functions and maintain social stability, along with
the goal of regional employment. Each social and political goal is an important incentive for the local govern-
ment to press political interventions into the operation of local SOEs and the ﬁrms that bear policy burdens
from the government should behave diﬀerently from those without. However, studies on local ﬁscal and ﬁnan-
cial conditions’ inﬂuence over the operation of local SOEs are rare, and this paper aims to ﬁll this gap in the
literature.
The State Council of China issued the Decision of the State Council to Implement Tax Distribution Financial
Management System on December 15, 1993. It announced that every province, including provincial-level
autonomous regions and municipalities, should abandon the present local ﬁscal responsibility system and
switch to the tax distribution ﬁnancial management system on January 1, 1994. The tax categories would
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dardized system of tax returns and transfers from the central to local governments would be gradually estab-
lished,
2 which is called the reform of tax system. Under the newly established tax distribution system, tax
returns from the central government constitute a certain portion of local ﬁscal expenditures, ensuring suﬃcient
supply for the needs of local ﬁscal expenditure.
3 The dependence on tax returns and transfers from the central
government varies greatly across regions, based on their diﬀerent levels of economic development. According
to the ﬁnancial statistics of each province (including provincial-level autonomous regions and municipalities),
approximately 12.41–86.34% of local ﬁscal revenue comes from tax returns and transfers from the central gov-
ernment, and the levels of each province’s deﬁcit (the gap between ﬁscal revenue and expenditure) vary from
4.91% to 94.7%,
4 indicating that tax returns and transfers from the central government constitute a large, non-
negligible portion of local ﬁscal revenue that reﬂects local government’s demand for funds. Thus, we deﬁne a
situation in which a provincial local government faces a deﬁcit based on their corresponding ﬁscal revenue and
expenditure, which requires the assistance of funds from tax returns and transfers from the central government
to pay the post-deﬁcit expenditures prompted by local ﬁscal distress. The level of the deﬁcit and the ratio of tax
returns and transfers from the central government on the local government’s total revenue can then be used as
proxies for the measurement of local ﬁscal distress.
Based on the decentralization reform in the 1980s and the 1994 tax system reform, in this paper, we inves-
tigate the relationship between the level of local ﬁscal distress and the investment eﬃciency of local SOEs,
along with the inﬂuence of total taxes paid by the ﬁrm on the above relationship, using the data of all A-share
listed ﬁrms between 2002 and 2010. The sample is classiﬁed into local SOEs, non-SOEs, and central SOEs for
robustness checks, with Richardson’s (2006) overinvestment model, adjusted based on China’s economic
regions and diﬀerent development levels, measuring the extent of investment distortions. The results show that
the level of local SOEs’ overinvestment (underinvestment) is positively (negatively) related to the extent of cor-
responding local governments’ ﬁscal distress and that paying lower corporate taxes enhances the positive (neg-
ative) relationship between the extent of local ﬁscal distress and ﬁrms’ overinvestment (underinvestment).
These patterns do not exist for non-SOEs. Moreover, following further study, we also ﬁnd that raising ﬁrms’
investment scales leads to an increase in total corporate taxes paid, including both income and turnover taxes,
which further results in higher local ﬁscal revenue. Underinvested ﬁrms should increase their investment level
directly, whereas those that have already overinvested should adjust their production, operation, and capital
structures to match the present investment level before expanding their investment scale. In addition, we per-
form robustness checks with a sample of central SOEs, rather than local SOEs, to rule out alternative expla-
nations, such as the existence of abundant investment opportunities or other factors unrelated to government
intervention or political promotion tournaments, and with 2SLS instead of OLS to rule out the potential for
reverse causality between the dependent and the independent variables. Pearson correlation tests of corporate
taxes paid on adjusted/unadjusted BTD and ETR are used to rule out the alternative approach of increasing
tax revenue through stronger tax enforcement instead of forcing local SOEs to invest more, with tax intensity
rather than the level of corporate tax paid to rule out the competitive explanation that ﬁrms pay fewer taxes,
thereby preserving more money, which can lead to overinvestment. Basu’s (1997) accounting conservatism
model is also used to rule out the possibility of the government helping hand hypothesis.
This paper makes at least four contributions. First, prior studies such as Tang et al. (2010), Zhou (2004),
Xue and Bai (2008) and Chen et al. (2012) study the eﬀect of political burdens on the behavior of SOEs from
the perspectives of economic growth and employment rates, whereas we investigate the eﬀect of government’s
social and political goals on SOEs’ operational behavior from a ﬁnancial perspective, which supplements the
literature on the political burdens from the government that result in ﬁrms’ multiple objectives. Second, we
ﬁnd that local governments have an incentive to increase ﬁscal revenue by forcing local SOEs to expand their
investment scale and that such intervention leads to local SOEs’ overinvestment or a lowering of the level of
underinvestment due to other reasons. Moreover, the local government’s intervention can, to some extent,
2 Refer to the Decision of the State Council to Implement Tax Distribution Financial Management System.
3 Refer to the Decision of the State Council to Implement Tax Distribution Financial Management System.
4 Each percentage is calculated based on statistics from the Financial Year Book of China (2003–2011), and the level of the deﬁcit is
calculated by the ratio of the absolute value of the deﬁcit divided by the corresponding year’s local expenditure.
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Based on the above ﬁnding, we provide theoretical bases and references for the ways in which local govern-
ments make ﬁscal policies and improve the supervisory roles they play in relation to local SOEs. Third, we
provide empirical evidence of the government grabbing hand theory through the perspectives of local public
ﬁnance and enterprise investment. Finally, we oﬀer a new research perspective for the study of ﬁscal issues
through ﬁrm-level aspects.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature and describes China’s insti-
tutional background to develop the research hypotheses. Section 3 describes the research design and sample
selection procedure. Descriptive statistics and empirical results, including robustness checks and further anal-
ysis, are in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Literature, institutional background and hypotheses development
IntheperfectworlddescribedbyModiglianiandMiller(1958),enterpriseinvestmentdependsonthenetpres-
ent value of the project and has nothing to do with other factors. In reality, scholars in ﬁnancial ﬁelds ﬁnd that
Modigliani and Miller’s perfect market theory does not eﬀectively explain actual investment activities. In fact,
some enterprises invest in projects of negative net present value (NPV) (Jensen, 1986; Aggarwal and Samwick,
2006). They conﬁrm that factors such as agency problems (Jensen, 1986), information asymmetry (Myers and
Majluf, 1984), and managerial overconﬁdence (Roll, 1986; Malmendler and Tate, 2005) aﬀect ﬁrms’ investment
decisions. The mainstream view argues that agency problems aﬀect the level of enterprise investment expendi-
ture, further resulting in underinvestment or overinvestment (Jensen, 1986; Aggarwal and Samwick, 2006).
Theseparationofownershipfrommanagementrenderstheinterestsofmanagersandshareholdersinconsistent,
and managers make decisions that distract from the shareholders’ primary goal of value maximization for their
ownprivateinterests.Thisresultsinoverinvestmentmostofthetime(JensenandMeckling,1976;Stulz,1990).In
contrast, theresourcescontrolledbythemanagergenerallyincreasewiththefreecashﬂowpreservedintheﬁrm,
whichbringsthemmoreprivatebeneﬁtsandbetterreputations.Asaresult,managershaveanincentivetoengage
inempirebuilding(Chenetal.,2011),whichresultsinoverinvestment(Jensen,1986).Fromanotherperspective,
informationasymmetryscholarssuggestthatoverinvestmentismostlikelywheninsidershavemoreinformation
thanshareholders,especiallyregardingthevalueofpresentassetsownedbytheﬁrmortheprospectivecashﬂows
of investment projects, in which the ﬁnancing securities of the ﬁrm are probably overvalued or undervalued
(Myers and Majluf, 1984). The theory of managers’ overconﬁdence suggests that overinvestment may be due
to managers’ overconﬁdence in their ability or the ﬁrm’s competitiveness, even though the manager is utterly
loyal to shareholders’ goal of value maximization (Malmendler and Tate, 2005).
The traditional agency theory suggests thatagency conﬂicts mainly exist between shareholders and managers
(Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen andMeckling, 1976) and between shareholders and bondholders (Myers, 1977).
However, studies based on China’s capital markets ﬁnd that there exists a third agency conﬂict, namely that
between the government and the minority shareholders. In most situations, the government is also the biggest
shareholder (La Porta et al., 1999; Chen et al., 2011). On the one hand, the government is an owner of the enter-
prise andobtains beneﬁtsfrom its operational activities, as do other owners.On the other hand,the government
simultaneously acts as society’s administrator, responsible for boosting regional economic development (GDP
growth) to facilitate increases in regional tax revenues and employment rates (Chen et al., 2011; Zhang and
Wang, 2010). This leads to the multiple goals of SOEs, which usually diﬀer from the primary goal of sharehold-
ers’ value maximization (Zhang and Wang, 2010). Moreover, the government may act as the grabbing hand in
pursuingitssocialandpoliticalgoals(FryeandShleifer,1997),reducingthevalueoflocalSOEsbytunneling.To
summarize, all of these activities conﬂict with the interests of minority shareholders.
The literature ﬁnds that local governments have an incentive to boost local GDP growth through overin-
vestment by local SOEs (Tang et al., 2010) and to help local bureaucrats succeed in political promotion tour-
naments – the main criterion for which is GDP growth (Li and Zhou, 2005). In addition, Jin et al. (2005),
Young (2000) and Montinola et al. (1995) suggest that China’s decentralization reform in the 1980s has
created incentives not only for political promotion among local bureaucrats, but also for ﬁscal revenue. Chi-
na’s tax system reform, which began in 1994, speciﬁes that both SOEs and non-SOEs should pay business and
income taxes to the government, declaring an end to a history in which SOEs need not pay taxes under the
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sources of local ﬁscal revenue and local bureaucrats compete for both local economic growth and tax revenue
(Zhou, 2004). Compared to the central government, local governments control fewer resources and thus have
stronger incentives to seek help from the local SOEs under their control (Chen et al., 2011). Jin et al. (2005)
also suggest that local governments have an incentive to increase local ﬁscal revenue by forcing local SOEs to
increase their investment level.
Based on the ﬁnancial statistics of each province (Table 1), income taxes constitute about 20% of local gov-
ernments’ tax revenue each year, with the remaining 80% represented by turnover taxes, which make up the
vast majority of tax revenue. The objects of taxation for turnover taxes are the amount of transfers generated
by the production and circulation procedures for commodities and the number of turnovers for non-commod-
ities, so increasing a ﬁrm’s investment level ought to result in transfer activities for commodities or turnover
for non-commodities, leading to an increase in turnover taxes. In addition, increasing the investment level
could help to expand a ﬁrm’s scale, given a normal level of investment, thus improving its production capacity,
further raising its proﬁtability, and ultimately increasing the income taxes paid by the ﬁrm. In addition, Jian
and Wong (2010) and Cheung et al. (2008) ﬁnd that compared to central SOEs, it is more common for local
SOEs to transport resources and interests to the local government under which they operate. In terms of non-
SOEs, they are relatively free from the intervention of local governments and thus are less likely to invest in
negative net present value projects for the sake of the government’s social and political goals, such as local
GDP growth, tax revenue, and employment rate factors. Therefore, as the ultimate controllers of local SOEs,
local governments have an incentive to force local SOEs to raise their investment level – thereby achieving
their goals of increasing ﬁscal revenue and the easing of ﬁnancial crises when faced with ﬁnancial distress,
and continuous increases in investment, which inevitably leads to local SOEs’ investment levels becoming mis-
matched with the present production, operation, and capital structures. This can result in an upward bias of
investment scale and, eventually, in overinvestment. Furthermore, the probability and extent of such an
upward bias should be higher when local governments have a stronger incentive to increase investments, lead-
ing to more severe overinvestment of local SOEs.
The above discussion leads to our ﬁrst hypothesis:
H1. The level of overinvestment for local SOEs is positively related to the extent of local ﬁscal distress,
whereas this relationship does not exist for non-SOEs.
From the perspective of the grabbing hand theory, the government has an incentive to exploit public ﬁrms.
Thus, not only local governments have an incentive to raise ﬁscal revenue by forcing local SOEs under their
control to raise their investment scales when the government faces ﬁnancial distress, which supports H1, but
also the motivation and eﬀect of such intervention should be stronger for ﬁrms that contribute less to local
ﬁnance.
Table 1
Tax revenue structure of local government (provincial level).
Year Income Tax (%) Turnover Tax (%) Turnover Tax
Value-added Tax (%) Business Tax and surcharges
Business Tax (%) Surcharges (%) Sum (%)
2002 20.19 79.81 26.45 40.08 33.46 73.55
2003 16.19 83.81 27.71 39.95 32.33 72.29
2004 17.87 82.13 24.23 44.08 31.69 75.77
2005 18.21 81.79 28.41 42.57 29.01 71.59
2006 18.44 81.56 28.13 42.45 29.42 71.87
2007 19.51 80.49 27.01 42.26 30.73 72.99
2008 20.10 79.90 25.71 41.34 32.95 74.29
2009 18.49 81.51 21.84 43.47 34.69 78.16
2010 18.95 81.05 20.07 43.87 36.06 79.93
Total 19.82 80.18 25.80 41.95 32.25 74.20
Note: The data is based on statistics collected from the Finance Year Book of China (2003–2011).
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tially turned over to the government. After the 1994 reform, SOEs paid the government business and income
taxesinsteadofproﬁtsforalongperiodoftime.InDecember2007,theMinistryofFinanceandtheState-owned
AssetsSupervisionandAdministrationissuedtheTransientmanagementregulationoftheproﬁtsgeneratedbythe
state-ownedcapitalofcentralSOEs,whichrequirescentralSOEstoturnovertheproﬁtstheygenerate.But,local
SOEs are not included in this regulation. So based on the institutional background suggesting that local SOEs
need only pay taxes as opposed to turning over their proﬁts, tax revenue becomes one of the most important
sourcesoflocalﬁscalrevenueandavitalfactorinbalancinglocalﬁscalrevenueandexpenditures. Withoutturn-
ingoverproﬁts,thenotionthatpayingfewertaxesisequivalenttothatofcontributinglesstolocalﬁscalrevenue.
Asaconsequence,localgovernmentshaveanincentivetoforcelocalSOEsthatcontributelesstolocalﬁnanceto
increase their investment level, leading once again to an upward bias of investment and, ultimately, overinvest-
ment.ThesepredictionsareconsistentwithBrennanandBuchanan’s(1980)beliefthatthegovernmentisalways
seeking to maximize tax revenue, and thus, our second hypothesis is as follows:
H2. Fewer taxes paid by local SOEs enhance the positive relationship between the level of overinvestment for
local SOEs and the extent of local ﬁscal distress, whereas this relationship does not exist for non-SOEs.
The factors aﬀecting corporate investment are complicated (Jensen, 1986; Myers and Majluf, 1984; Narayanan,
1988; Malmendler and Tate, 2005; Chen et al., 2011, etc.), and they usually behave interactively, resulting in overin-
vestment or underinvestment depending on the interaction eﬀects. The grabbing hand theory suggests that the gov-
ernmentextractsvaluefromlocalSOEsfortheirsocialorpoliticalsakesthroughtunneling(FryeandShleifer,1997),
and the leviathan hypothesis developed by Brennan and Buchanan (1980) deﬁnes government as an agent that max-
imizes tax revenue.Thus,local governments have an incentive to force localSOEs undertheir controlinto increasing
their investment levels to achieve their goal of increasing ﬁscal revenue. This results in a relief of underinvestment for
ﬁrmsthathave alreadyunderinvesteddue to other factors, and the eﬀects of such intervention should be stronger
for the ﬁrms that contribute less to local ﬁnance. Finally, we have our third hypothesis:
H3. For underinvested ﬁrms, the extent of the local government’s ﬁscal distress mitigates the level of local
SOEs’ underinvestment, and this negative relationship is stronger for ﬁrms that pay fewer taxes, whereas this
relationship does not exist for non-SOEs.
3. Research design
3.1. Model construction and variable description
3.1.1. Overinvestment model
We construct our overinvestment model following Richardson (2006) and adjust it based on regional eco-
nomic eﬀects, LocalEco, according to the striking diﬀerences in investment opportunities across regions, see
Model (1):
Investi;t ¼ b0 þ b1Growi;t 1 þ b2Levi;t 1 þ b3Cashi;t 1 þ b4Agei;t 1 þ b5Sizei;t 1 þ b6Reti;t 1
þ b7Investi;t 1 þ
X
Industry þ
X
Year þ
X
LocalEco þ e ð1Þ
In Model (1), Investi,t measures the investment level in year t, and the variables on the right are all measured
in year t   1, with Growi,t 1 representing growth opportunities, Levi,t 1 representing the debt-to-asset ratio,
Cashi,t 1 representing cash ﬂow, Agei,t 1 representing the time in years since the ﬁrm went public, Sizei,t 1
representing corporate scale, Reti,t 1 representing stock returns and Investi,t 1 representing the investment
level. We also use R Industry, R Year, and R LocalEco to control for industry, year, and regional eﬀects,
respectively. The regions comprise the east coastal, central, and the western frontier areas,
5 representing the
5 The east coastal areas include the provinces and provincial-level autonomous regions and municipalities of Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei,
Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, Chongqing, Guangdong, Guangxi and Hainan. The central areas comprise
Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei and Hunan. The western frontier areas include Sichuan,
Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia and Xinjiang.
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investment, with positive or negative values, respectively. We deﬁne overinvestment as OverInvi,t and the abso-
lute value of underinvestment as UnderInvi,t with a larger value to represent a more severe underinvestment
situation.
Finally, regarding the model’s systematic errors, there must be some diﬀerence between the predicted value
and the corresponding observed value, and not all of the gaps between these two values are necessarily over-
investment or underinvestment. Therefore, we select the observations that are larger than the tenth percentile
of OverInvi,t and UnderInvi,t as our research sample.
3.1.2. The empirical model
We construct Model (2) to test H1 and Model (3) to test H2 and H3. The deﬁnitions and descriptions of the
variables are presented in Table 2. We perform cluster treatments on provincial eﬀects.
OverInvi;tðUnderInvi;tÞ¼b0 þ b1Distressi;t 1 þ b2Sizei;t þ b3Roai;t þ b4Fcfi;t þ b5Duali;t þ b6Exeowni;t
þ b7Herfi;t þ b8Dividi;t þ b9Debti;t þ b10Salaryi;t þ b11GDPgtht
þ b12GovIntvnt þ
X
Industry þ
X
Year þ e ð2Þ
In Model (2), we construct two proxies for the measurement of local ﬁscal distress. In measuring corporate
ﬁnancial distress, Wu and Lu (2001) deﬁne a ﬁrm being ST or PT as an indicator of ﬁnancial distress. Dahiya
et al. (2003) deﬁne ﬁnancial distress as a ﬁrm being unable to pay its matured debt with suﬃcient cash ﬂow.
Table 2
Variable deﬁnitions and descriptions.
Variable Name Deﬁnition and Description
Panel A: Dependent Variables
OverInvi,t (UnderInvi,t) Overinvestment (Underinvestment) The gap between the observed value and the predicted value of
corporate investment
Panel B: Independent Variables
Distress1i,t-1 Financial distress of local
government
[(Local Expenditure - Local Revenue)/ Local Revenue]  100%
Distress1i,t-1 N_Taxi,t-1 The interaction of Distress1i,t-1 and
N_Taxi,t-1
The interaction of ﬁnancial distress and negative taxes paid
Distress2i,t-1 Financial distress of local
government
(Transfers from Central Government/ Total Revenue)  100%
Distress2i,t-1 N_Taxi,t-1 The interaction of Distress1i,t-1 and
N_Taxi,t-1
The interaction of ﬁnancial distress and negative taxes paid
N_Taxi,t-1 Negative corporate taxes paid Negative logarithm of the sum of Income Tax Expense and
Business Tax and Surcharges on income statement
Panel C: Control Variables
Sizei,t Scale of the ﬁrm Logarithm of total assets
Roai,t Return on total assets Ratio of ﬁrm’s net proﬁt to total assets
Fcfi,t Free cash ﬂow Ratio of free cash ﬂow to total assets
Duali,t Duality One if the board chairman is also the CEO of the corporation,
otherwise zero
Exeowni,t Management stock ownership Shareholding ratio of management
Herfi,t Ownership concentration Sum of shareholdings of top three shareholders
Dividi,t Cash dividend per share Ratio of cash dividends on total shares outstanding
Debti,t Long-term debt ratio (Long-term loan + Long-term bonds payable +Long-term account
payable)/ Total assets
Salaryi,t Executive salary Logarithm of the sum of top three managers’ salaries
GDPgtht GDP growth GDP growth rate compared to the previous year
GovIntvnt Index of reducing government
intervention to enterprises
The item “1c reducing government intervention to enterprises” in
Fan Gang marketization index
Industry Industry Industry dummy variables
Year Year Year dummy variables
X. Liao, Y. Liu/China Journal of Accounting Research 7 (2014) 119–147 125Liao and Chen (2007) classify ﬁnancial distress as a ﬁrm’s EBITDA being less than interest expense for two
consecutive years, or becoming insolvent. One of the common features of these corporate ﬁnancial distress
criteria is that the ﬁrm cannot make end meet. Similarly, government ﬁnance includes ﬁscal revenue and
expenditure, with a ﬁscal expenditure larger than the revenue referred to as a ﬁscal deﬁcit. Regarding the
determination of corporate ﬁnancial distress, we deﬁne the existence of a ﬁscal deﬁcit to be the criterion of
government ﬁscal distress. Moreover, the extent of ﬁscal distress is considered more severe if the government
has more ﬁscal expenditures than their counterparts with the same ﬁscal deﬁcit. As a result, we use the per-
centage of ﬁscal deﬁcit on Local Expenditure of the local government to measure the extent of local ﬁscal dis-
tress, deﬁned as Distress1. From the perspective of ﬁscal revenue alone, in addition to Taxes and Non-tax
revenue, the item of local Total Revenue also consists of Transfers from Central Government (Including Tax
Returns), Revenue of Loans from National Debt, and Balance Revenue of Last Year, etc., comprising the Total
Revenue – the amount equivalent to that of Total Expenditure, comprising Local Expenditure and other items
such as Transfers to Central Government and Added Budgetary Revolving Fund. Transfers from Central Gov-
ernment (Including Tax Returns) generally constitutes a great portion (from 12.41% to 86.34%) of the govern-
ment’s Total Revenue, which serves as supplementary funds when the local government cannot make ends
meet. Therefore, we argue that the ratio of Transfers from Central Government (Including Tax Returns) on
Total Revenue is a good proxy for the local government’s ﬁscal distress, demonstrated as Distress2.
As Table 1 demonstrates, the objects of taxation for turnover taxes, which constitute 80% of local revenue,
are the amount of transfers generated by the commodity production and circulation procedures and the
amount of turnovers for non-commodities. Thus, it increases with corporate investment. In terms of income
taxes, it is paid only after operating proﬁts are generated, so there is usually a time lag between the increase in
corporate investment and the corresponding payment of income taxes. However, since income tax comprises
only 20% of total tax revenue for the local government, the problem of the time lag is not severe, and only
1 year lagged values of Distress are needed.
Incorporating the interaction term of local ﬁscal distress and corporate taxes paid into Model (2), we obtain
Model (3).
OverInvi;tðUnderInvi;tÞ¼b0 þ b1Distressi;t 1 þ b2Distressi;t 1   N Taxi;t 1 þ b3N Taxi;t 1 þ b4Sizei;t
þ b5Roai;t þ b6Fcfi;t þ b7Duali;t þ b8Exeowni;t þ b9Herfi;t þ b10Dividi;t
þ b11Debti;t þ b12Salaryi;t þ b13GDPgtht þ b14GovIntvnt þ
X
Industry
þ
X
Year þ e ð3Þ
Feltenstein and Iwata (2005) argue that all tax revenue is collected by the local government and then shared
between the local and the central governments, so local governments in China have an incentive to reduce their
eﬀorts on the types of tax they must share with the central government under China’s tax distribution system
established after 1994. Wu et al. (2011) demonstrate that income taxes from enterprises, business taxes from
sales and services and personal income taxes constitute local governments’ major tax revenue. Under China’s
tax law, Business Tax, Urban Maintenance and Construction Tax, Contract Tax, Housing Property Tax, Vehi-
cle and Vessel Usage Tax, Stamp Tax, Tax on the Use of Arable Land, Tobacco Tax, Land Value-added Tax,
and Urban Land Using Tax, etc., comprise local governments’ regular revenue – 100% of which is turned over
to local governments along with Resource Tax, whereas Income Tax and Value-added Tax should be shared
between local and central governments with 40% and 25%, respectively, taken away by the central govern-
ment. In terms of the income statement, Business Tax and Surcharges consist of all tax items belonging to local
governments’ regular revenue, and Income Tax refers to the income taxes currently paid by the ﬁrm. Although
the content of Value-added Tax is not provided in the income statement, it is not signiﬁcant in this study
because Business Tax and Surcharges account for 75% of the total turnover taxes, which constitute 80% of
total local tax revenue, leaving the remaining 25% to be Value-added Tax.
Consequently, the Business Tax and Surcharges on the income statement, to some extent, could be a good
proxy for turnover taxes with the sum of Business Tax and Surcharges and Income Tax properly measuring the
taxes paid by the ﬁrm. The amount of taxes actually paid by the ﬁrm is usually aﬀected by items such as
Deferred Income Tax Assets, Deferred Income Tax Liabilities, and Tax Returns, etc., with Tax Payments on
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not appropriate to measure the amount of corporate taxes paid with Tax Payable on the balance sheet or with
Tax Payments on the income statement. The sum of Income Tax Expense and Business Tax and Surcharges on
the income statement appropriately measures the current taxes paid by the ﬁrm, and we use its negative log-
arithm value as a proxy for corporate taxes paid, denoted by N_Tax, to properly demonstrate the relationship
in H2. Hence, we have a higher value of N_Tax with lower corporate taxes paid and vice versa.
For details regarding the selection of the control variables in Models (2) and (3), please refer to the
Introduction.
3.2. Data source and sample procedure
We collect our ﬁnancial data from the Finance Year Book of China (2003–2011) and all other ﬁrm-level data
from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research database (CSMAR). Our sample comprises all A-share
ﬁrms between 2002 and 2010, eliminating observations that are as follows: (i) attributed to the ﬁnancial indus-
try, (ii) listed less than 1 year, or (iii) have missing data. Finally, we obtain 10244 ﬁrm-year observations and
winsorize the sample at the 1% and 99% levels.
4. Results
4.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for local government ﬁscal distress. The minimum and maximum
values for Distress1 are 4.91% and 94.70%, respectively, and those for Distress2 are 12.41% and 86.34%,
respectively. The results show that there is no great diﬀerence between the two proxies of Distress1 and
Distress2.
Table 4 displays descriptive statistics for all of the variables. Tables 5 and 6 provide descriptive statistics for
the subsamples of ﬁrm-years with overinvestment and underinvestment and for the subsamples of local SOEs
and non-SOEs, respectively.
The results of the two-tailed t-tests shown in Table 5 reveal that the majority of variables for overinvested
ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from that for their underinvested counterparts and that overinvested ﬁrms are
more concentrated in regions with more severe ﬁscal distress, compared to underinvested ﬁrms. The results of
the two-tailed t-tests shown in Table 6 display that each variable for local SOEs is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
that for non-SOEs, except for GDP growth. Likewise, local SOEs are more concentrated in regions with more
severe ﬁscal distress, compared to non-SOEs.
Table 7 provides the Pearson correlation matrix for all of the variables. The results show that the absolute
values of the correlations between most of the control variables are less than 0.3, which suggests that there are
no collinearity problems between the control variables. Moreover, the correlation between the two proxies of
Table 3
Descriptive statistics for local ﬁscal distress.
Distress1 (%) Distress2 (%)
Year Obs Mean Median S.D Min Max Mean Median S.D Min Max
2002 898 38.75 31.36 18.87 15.02 94.70 37.18 27.55 13.98 20.17 85.16
2003 988 38.27 32.63 17.51 18.58 94.41 36.79 28.15 13.76 21.23 84.77
2004 1062 39.19 35.45 17.49 17.12 92.51 38.52 31.70 15.06 19.94 86.34
2005 1118 35.93 26.81 19.48 13.14 93.51 33.83 26.77 16.15 16.58 84.31
2006 1093 34.56 26.03 20.79 11.80 92.73 34.02 26.98 16.70 16.01 78.59
2007 1061 34.35 25.93 22.74 4.91 92.69 34.77 25.98 18.32 13.69 77.92
2008 1046 34.43 27.64 23.33 6.22 93.46 32.95 26.94 18.81 12.41 75.27
2009 1387 38.67 32.72 22.29 12.61 93.60 34.20 30.13 18.20 14.18 79.02
2010 1591 36.46 32.07 21.61 13.00 93.35 32.44 28.63 17.16 15.21 76.59
Total 10244 36.73 32.07 20.79 4.91 94.70 34.76 28.63 16.80 12.41 86.34
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consistent measures of the same variable.
4.2. Empirical results
Table 8 shows the regression results for local ﬁscal distress and the extent of overinvestment among local
SOEs and non-SOEs. The ﬁndings suggest that the coeﬃcients of Distress1 and Distress2 for local SOEs are
positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level, whereas those for non-SOEs are not signiﬁcant at all,
which is consistent with H1.
Table 9 reports the results of the eﬀect of corporate taxes paid on the positive relationship between local
ﬁscal distress and the level of overinvestment demonstrated in Table 8. The results show that the coeﬃcients
of Distress1   N_Tax and Distress2   N_Tax for local SOEs are positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the
0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, indicating that lower taxes paid by local SOEs strengthens the positive rela-
tionship between local ﬁscal distress and the extent of their overinvestment, while those for non-SOEs are not
signiﬁcant at all, which is consistent with H2.
Table 5
Descriptive statistics for all variables for overinvestment and underinvestment groups.
OverInv UnderInv Two-tailed
Variable Obs Mean Median S.D Obs Mean Median S.D t-test
Distress1 3369 37.25 32.72 20.74 6875 36.48 32.05 20.80 1.7570
⁎
Distress2 3369 35.24 29.65 16.71 6875 34.52 28.63 16.83 2.0465
⁎⁎
Size 3369 21.19 21.11 1.00 6875 21.54 21.44 1.06  15.9115
⁎⁎⁎
Roa 3369 0.04 0.04 0.07 6875 0.03 0.03 0.06 5.2949
⁎⁎⁎
Fcf 3357 0.04 0.07 0.17 6859 0.04 0.06 0.14 0.0616
Dual 3369 0.15 0.00 0.35 6875 0.13 0.00 0.33 2.7432
⁎⁎⁎
Exeown 2955 1.35 0.00 5.51 6169 0.88 0.00 4.26 4.5184
⁎⁎⁎
Herf 3033 50.04 50.96 14.68 6313 50.04 50.69 15.21 0.0088
Divid 3020 0.18 0.14 0.16 6285 0.20 0.15 0.18  5.1693
⁎⁎⁎
Debt 3338 0.07 0.03 0.10 6771 0.07 0.03 0.10 0.3471
Salary 3343 13.22 13.27 0.82 6811 13.35 13.39 0.87  6.7039
⁎⁎⁎
GDPgth 3369 14.92 16.24 6.77 6875 15.87 17.02 6.64  6.7828
⁎⁎⁎
GovIntvn 2630 6.21 6.85 3.00 5670 6.18 6.85 3.08 0.8599
p-Values in parentheses.
⁎ p < 0.1.
⁎⁎ p < 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p < 0.01.
Table 4
Descriptive statistics for all variables.
Variable Obs Mean Median S.D Min Max
Distress1 10,244 36.73 32.07 20.79 4.91 94.70
Distress2 10,244 34.76 28.63 16.80 12.41 86.34
Size 10,244 21.42 21.32 1.05 19.07 24.60
Roa 10,244 0.03 0.03 0.07  0.29 0.20
Fcf 10,216 0.04 0.06 0.15  0.63 0.36
Dual 10,244 0.13 0.00 0.34 0.00 1.00
Exeown 9124 1.03 0.00 4.70 0.00 32.98
Herf 9346 50.04 50.76 15.04 16.40 84.55
Divid 9305 0.19 0.15 0.17 0.00 0.90
Debt 10,109 0.07 0.03 0.10 0.00 0.45
Salary 10,154 13.31 13.35 0.86 11.16 15.30
GDPgth 10,244 15.56 16.70 6.69 0.00 34.05
GovIntvn 10,244 6.19 6.85 3.05  12.95 10.13
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ment for local SOEs, and the eﬀect of corporate taxes paid on this relationship. The results show that the coef-
ﬁcients of Distress1 and Distress2 in columns 1 and 2 and Distress1   N_Tax and Distress2   N_Tax in
columns 3 and 4 for local SOEs are all negative and statistically signiﬁcant, whereas those for non-SOEs
shown in columns 5–8 are not signiﬁcant at all, indicating that local ﬁscal distress helps mitigate the extent
of underinvestment for underinvested local SOEs and that this eﬀect is stronger for the ﬁrms that pay fewer
taxes, whereas this pattern does not exist for non-SOEs, which is consistent with H3.
In summary, the results shown in Tables 8–10 suggest that local ﬁscal distress is positively related to the
extent of local SOEs’ overinvestment and that this relationship is stronger when lower taxes are paid by local
SOEs. Meanwhile, local ﬁscal distress is negatively related to the extent of local SOEs’ underinvestment, and
this negative relationship is also stronger when lower taxes are paid by local SOEs. However, the above rela-
Table 6
Descriptive statistics for all variables for local SOE and non-SOE groups.
Local SOEs Non-SOEs Two-tailed
Variable Obs Mean Median S.D Obs Mean Median S.D t-test
Distress1 4284 38.06 34.46 20.46 4016 35.19 26.03 20.78 6.3549
⁎⁎⁎
Distress2 4284 35.99 34.21 16.44 4016 33.26 26.95 16.92 7.4721
⁎⁎⁎
Size 4284 21.61 21.53 1.01 4016 21.08 21.01 0.94 24.8201
⁎⁎⁎
Roa 4284 0.03 0.03 0.06 4016 0.03 0.03 0.08 1.9943
⁎⁎
Fcf 4275 0.06 0.06 0.13 8275 0.03 0.06 0.17 8.3922
⁎⁎⁎
Dual 4284 0.11 0.00 0.31 4016 0.19 0.00 0.40  11.0027
⁎⁎⁎
Exeown 3792 0.12 0.00 1.27 3597 2.43 0.00 7.09  19.7046
⁎⁎⁎
Herf 3868 51.27 52.33 15.14 3701 47.29 47.35 14.65 11.6081
⁎⁎⁎
Divid 3856 0.21 0.16 0.18 3681 0.17 0.13 0.15 9.5336
⁎⁎⁎
Debt 4225 0.08 0.04 0.10 3975 0.06 0.01 0.09 10.5959
⁎⁎⁎
Salary 4245 13.29 13.35 0.84 3989 13.26 13.27 0.87 1.8752
⁎
GDPgth 4284 15.47 16.76 6.85 4016 15.58 16.94 6.51  0.7570
GovIntvn 4284 6.06 6.58 3.05 4016 6.47 6.91 3.18  5.9001
⁎⁎⁎
p-Values in parentheses.
⁎ p < 0.1.
⁎⁎ p < 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p < 0.01.
Table 7
The Pearson correlation matrix for all variables.
Distress1 Distress2 Size Roa Fcf Dual Exeown Herf Divid Debt Salary GDPgthGovIntvn
Distress1 1.000
Distress2 0.986
⁎⁎⁎ 1.000
Size  0.063
⁎⁎⁎ 0.049
⁎⁎⁎ 1.000
Roa  0.007  0.009 0.113
⁎⁎⁎ 1.000
Fcf 0.009 0.012 0.074
⁎⁎⁎ 0.051
⁎⁎⁎ 1.000
Dual  0.037
⁎⁎⁎ 0.041
⁎⁎⁎ 0.071
⁎⁎⁎ 0.000  0.012 1.000
Exeown  0.116
⁎⁎⁎ 0.132
⁎⁎⁎ 0.124
⁎⁎⁎ 0.017 0.000 0.242
⁎⁎⁎ 1.000
Herf  0.024
⁎⁎  0.026
⁎⁎ 0.116
⁎⁎⁎ 0.023
⁎⁎ 0.071
⁎⁎⁎ 0.037
⁎⁎⁎ 0.039
⁎⁎⁎ 1.000
Divid  0.017  0.016 0.466
⁎⁎⁎ 0.036
⁎⁎⁎ 0.091
⁎⁎⁎ 0.059
⁎⁎⁎ 0.015 0.130
⁎⁎⁎1.000
Debt 0.089
⁎⁎⁎ 0.081
⁎⁎⁎ 0.322
⁎⁎⁎ 0.001  0.057
⁎⁎⁎ 0.056
⁎⁎⁎ 0.080
⁎⁎⁎ 0.036
⁎⁎⁎0.287
⁎⁎⁎ 1.000
Salary  0.282
⁎⁎⁎ 0.294
⁎⁎⁎ 0.411
⁎⁎⁎ 0.063
⁎⁎⁎ 0.021
⁎ 0.041
⁎⁎⁎ 0.085
⁎⁎⁎ 0.049
⁎⁎⁎0.255
⁎⁎⁎ 0.069
⁎⁎⁎1.000
GDPgth 0.061
⁎⁎⁎ 0.068
⁎⁎⁎ 0.067
⁎⁎⁎ 0.010 0.016 0.006 0.019
⁎  0.040
⁎⁎⁎0.052
⁎⁎⁎ 0.007 0.017 1.000
GovIntvn 0.738
⁎⁎⁎ 0.727
⁎⁎⁎ 0.039
⁎⁎⁎ 0.006  0.006 0.028
⁎⁎ 0.107
⁎⁎⁎ 0.022
⁎ 0.043
⁎⁎⁎ 0.078
⁎⁎⁎0.256
⁎⁎⁎0.007 1.000
p-Values in parentheses.
⁎ p < 0.1.
⁎⁎ p < 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p < 0.01.
X. Liao, Y. Liu/China Journal of Accounting Research 7 (2014) 119–147 129tionships do not exist for non-SOEs. Therefore, we conclude from the empirical results that there is a positive
relationship between the level of local ﬁscal distress and the extent of local SOEs’ investment expenditure, such
that local governments have an incentive to boost tax revenue by forcing the local SOEs under their control to
raise investment scales. Local governments also have an incentive to exert greater pressure on the ﬁrms that
contribute less to local ﬁscal revenue (those who pay fewer taxes), whereas the investment behavior of non-
SOEs is of no relevance to local ﬁnances.
4.3. Further analysis
Based on the grabbing hand theory, local governments faced with ﬁscal distress have an incentive to
increase ﬁscal revenue by forcing local SOEs to raise their investment expenditure, and the motivation and
eﬀect of such intervention are stronger among ﬁrms that contribute less to local ﬁnances – in line with previ-
ously stated logic. However, lower investment eﬃciency due to overinvestment or underinvestment would the-
oretically lower a ﬁrm’s proﬁtability, leading to less income tax paid by the ﬁrm. Turnover taxes, which make
up local governments’ major tax revenue, are aﬀected by the amount of transfers generated by the commodity
Table 8
Local Fiscal distress and corporate overinvestment.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Local SOEs Local SOEs Non-SOEs Non-SOEs
_cons  0.8585
⁎⁎  0.8335
⁎⁎  0.3104  0.2981
(0.029) (0.030) (0.341) (0.356)
Distress1t 1 0.0021
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0002
(0.007) (0.704)
Distress2t 1 0.0022
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0001
(0.009) (0.879)
Sizet 0.0512
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0504
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0287
⁎⁎ 0.0288
⁎⁎
(0.005) (0.005) (0.049) (0.049)
Roat 0.3599 0.3641  0.0834  0.0837
(0.129) (0.122) (0.603) (0.602)
Fcft 0.1768 0.1795 0.0715
⁎ 0.0714
⁎
(0.202) (0.195) (0.084) (0.085)
Dualt 0.0057 0.0059  0.0063  0.0067
(0.844) (0.838) (0.666) (0.649)
Exeownt  0.0004  0.0006 0.0001 0.0001
(0.844) (0.770) (0.907) (0.926)
Herft 0.0041
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0041
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0027
⁎⁎ 0.0027
⁎⁎
(0.001) (0.001) (0.017) (0.017)
Dividt  0.1249  0.1250 0.0835 0.0833
(0.206) (0.206) (0.383) (0.384)
Debtt 0.3644
⁎⁎⁎ 0.3694
⁎⁎⁎ 0.1295 0.1297
(0.003) (0.002) (0.285) (0.282)
Salaryt  0.0423
⁎⁎⁎  0.0426
⁎⁎⁎  0.0285
⁎⁎  0.0289
⁎⁎
(0.007) (0.007) (0.019) (0.018)
GDPgtht 0.0041 0.0042 0.0049
⁎⁎ 0.0050
⁎⁎
(0.119) (0.111) (0.049) (0.045)
GovIntvnt 0.0018 0.0001  0.0043  0.0050
(0.676) (0.982) (0.257) (0.206)
Industry Y Y Y Y
Year Y Y Y Y
N 1134 1134 977 977
adj. R
2 0.137 0.135 0.074 0.074
p-Values in parentheses.
⁎ p < 0.1.
⁎⁎ p < 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p < 0.01.
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in proﬁtability leads to a reduction in free cash ﬂow and even ﬁnancial distress, which impairs ﬁrms’ commod-
ity production, distribution, and operations to ﬁnally reduce local turnover revenue. Therefore, it is doubtful
that local governmental intervention has achieved the prospective goal of increasing ﬁscal revenue by forcing
local SOEs to raise their investment level, resulting in overinvestment or a reduction in underinvestment, given
that intervention induces a bad eﬀect on corporate performance. The following section addresses these issues.
We construct a set of nested models (Model (4)) and perform F-tests to examine whether there is a signif-
icant diﬀerence between the eﬀects of actual and normal corporate investment levels on the taxes paid to the
government. The eﬀect of the normal investment level on corporate taxes paid is signiﬁcantly greater than that
of the actual level if the coeﬃcient a2 is signiﬁcantly larger than a1 in Model (4.1). Similarly, Model (5) is
Table 9
Eﬀect of corporate taxes paid on local ﬁscal distress and corporate overinvestment.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Local SOEs Local SOEs Non-SOEs Non-SOEs
_cons  1.7517
⁎⁎⁎  1.8504
⁎⁎⁎  0.7797
⁎  0.7163
(0.000) (0.000) (0.079) (0.106)
Distress1t 1 0.0131
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0023
(0.005) (0.519)
Distress1t 1   N_Taxt 1 0.0007
⁎⁎ 0.0001
(0.011) (0.509)
Distress2t 1 0.0170
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0005
(0.004) (0.898)
Distress2t 1   N_Taxt 1 0.0009
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0000
(0.007) (0.876)
N_Taxt 1 0.0701
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0638
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0494
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0532
⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.004)
Sizet 0.1331
⁎⁎⁎ 0.1328
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0772
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0779
⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.006)
Roat 0.9235
⁎⁎⁎ 0.9354
⁎⁎⁎ 0.1514 0.1514
(0.001) (0.001) (0.464) (0.466)
Fcft 0.2296
⁎ 0.2319
⁎ 0.0692 0.0710
(0.079) (0.075) (0.131) (0.119)
Dualt 0.0131 0.0127  0.0068  0.0074
(0.634) (0.646) (0.640) (0.610)
Exeownt 0.0001  0.0001 0.0000 0.0000
(0.971) (0.983) (0.980) (0.992)
Herft 0.0038
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0038
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0025
⁎⁎ 0.0026
⁎⁎
(0.001) (0.001) (0.011) (0.011)
Dividt  0.0518  0.0524 0.1318 0.1317
(0.565) (0.559) (0.187) (0.189)
Debtt 0.2982
⁎⁎⁎ 0.3040
⁎⁎⁎ 0.1261 0.1266
(0.005) (0.004) (0.291) (0.287)
Salaryt  0.0263
⁎⁎  0.0265
⁎⁎  0.0132  0.0137
(0.044) (0.042) (0.269) (0.250)
GDPgtht 0.0058
⁎⁎ 0.0060
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0053
⁎⁎ 0.0052
⁎⁎
(0.011) (0.009) (0.045) (0.043)
GovIntvnt 0.0015 0.0001  0.0043  0.0048
(0.723) (0.974) (0.241) (0.198)
Industry Y Y Y Y
Year Y Y Y Y
N 1134 1134 977 977
adj. R
2 0.224 0.223 0.117 0.117
p-Values in parentheses.
⁎ p < 0.1.
⁎⁎ p < 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p < 0.01.
X. Liao, Y. Liu/China Journal of Accounting Research 7 (2014) 119–147 131constructed to determine whether there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the eﬀects of actual and normal cor-
porate investment levels on corporate performance. We construct three measurements of taxes in Model (4).
One is for total taxes paid Tax_total, which is identical to that in Model (3), and the other two are for the
levels of turnover Tax_turnover and income Tax_income taxes, with Business Tax and Surcharges and Income
Tax Expense on the income statement as the proxies, respectively. Corporate performance in Model (5) has
two proxies: return on assets (Roa) and operating proﬁt margin (Opr), respectively.
The independent variables in the two sets of nested models are the level of actual corporate investment
(Invact) and that of normal investment (Invnor) along with their sum (Invact + Invnor), in which the normal
investment level is calculated with the overinvestment model, namely Model (1). The control variables in
the two sets of nested models are as follows: ﬁrm size (Size), return on total assets (Roa), ﬁnancial leverage
Table 10
Local Fiscal Distress, Corporate Underinvestment and the Eﬀect of Corporate Taxes Paid.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variable Local SOEs Local SOEs Local SOEs Local SOEs Non-SOEs Non-SOEs Non-SOEs Non-SOEs
_cons 0.1960
⁎⁎⁎ 0.2442
⁎⁎⁎ 0.1995
⁎⁎⁎ 0.2629
⁎⁎⁎ 0.3827
⁎⁎⁎ 0.3571
⁎⁎⁎ 0.3835
⁎⁎⁎ 0.3666
⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Distress1t 1  0.0001
⁎  0.0015
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0000  0.0001
(0.061) (0.003) (0.884) (0.944)
Distress1t 1   N_Taxt 1  0.0001
⁎⁎⁎  0.0000
(0.006) (0.929)
Distress2t 1  0.0002
⁎⁎  0.0020
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0000  0.0004
(0.030) (0.001) (0.929) (0.743)
Distress2t 1   N_Taxt 1  0.0001
⁎⁎⁎  0.0000
(0.003) (0.736)
N_Taxt 1 0.0032 0.0041
⁎ 0.0041
⁎ 0.0047
⁎⁎
(0.121) (0.059) (0.058) (0.045)
Sizet  0.0028  0.0024  0.0028  0.0024  0.0125
⁎⁎⁎  0.0089
⁎⁎⁎  0.0125
⁎⁎⁎  0.0088
⁎⁎⁎
(0.164) (0.392) (0.168) (0.402) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.003)
Roat  0.0479
⁎  0.0494
⁎  0.0477
⁎  0.0494
⁎  0.0110  0.0064  0.0110  0.0064
(0.054) (0.059) (0.055) (0.058) (0.621) (0.766) (0.620) (0.765)
Fcft  0.1321
⁎⁎⁎  0.1322
⁎⁎⁎  0.1321
⁎⁎⁎  0.1324
⁎⁎⁎  0.1347
⁎⁎⁎  0.1345
⁎⁎⁎  0.1347
⁎⁎⁎  0.1347
⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Dualt  0.0020  0.0018  0.0019  0.0017 0.0000  0.0007 0.0000  0.0007
(0.707) (0.743) (0.717) (0.749) (0.995) (0.877) (0.997) (0.870)
Exeownt 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017  0.0010
⁎⁎⁎  0.0010
⁎⁎⁎  0.0010
⁎⁎⁎  0.0010
⁎⁎⁎
(0.118) (0.134) (0.121) (0.135) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Herft  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001
(0.897) (0.958) (0.866) (0.936) (0.442) (0.495) (0.441) (0.496)
Dividt 0.0010 0.0009 0.0011 0.0011 0.0218
⁎ 0.0260
⁎⁎ 0.0218
⁎ 0.0259
⁎⁎
(0.911) (0.919) (0.904) (0.904) (0.090) (0.041) (0.090) (0.041)
Debtt 0.0409
⁎⁎ 0.0400
⁎ 0.0407
⁎⁎ 0.0394
⁎ 0.0441 0.0430 0.0441 0.0430
(0.042) (0.051) (0.043) (0.054) (0.148) (0.163) (0.148) (0.162)
Salaryt  0.0051
⁎⁎  0.0051
⁎⁎  0.0052
⁎⁎  0.0053
⁎⁎  0.0038  0.0029  0.0038  0.0029
(0.020) (0.016) (0.015) (0.011) (0.142) (0.270) (0.142) (0.266)
GDPgtht 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0007 0.0008
⁎ 0.0007 0.0008
⁎
(0.795) (0.888) (0.811) (0.908) (0.145) (0.088) (0.142) (0.088)
GovIntvnt 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001
(0.830) (0.835) (0.904) (0.894) (0.888) (0.872) (0.834) (0.833)
Industry YYYYYYYY
Year YYYYYYYY
N 2190 2190 2190 2190 1961 1961 1961 1961
adj. R
2 0.136 0.136 0.136 0.137 0.158 0.160 0.158 0.160
p-Values in parentheses.
⁎ p < 0.1.
⁎⁎ p < 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p < 0.01.
132 X. Liao, Y. Liu/China Journal of Accounting Research 7 (2014) 119–147ratio (Lev), capital intensity (ratio of ﬁxed assets on total assets, CapInt), inventory intensity (ratio of inven-
tory on total assets, InvInt), intangible asset intensity (ratio of intangible assets on total assets, IntInt), invest-
ment opportunities (ratio of corporate market value on corporate book value, MB), ownership concentration
(the shareholding of the ﬁrst majority shareholder, Herf), CEO duality (Dual), corporate growth opportunities
(Growth), and free cash ﬂow (Fcf). Our selection of the control variables follows Zimmerman (1983), Derashid
and Zhang (2003), Porcano (1986) and Gupta and Newberry (1997). Given the endogeneity problem between
the control variables, we use 1-year lagged values of ﬁrm size, return on total assets and ﬁnancial leverage
ratios instead of current values.
Tax ¼ a0 þ a1Invact þ a2Invnor þ a3L Size þ a4L Roa þ a5L Lev þ a6CapInt
þa7InvInt þ a8IntInt þ a9MB þ
P
Industry þ
P
Year þ e ð4:1Þ
Tax ¼ b0 þ b1ðInvact þ InvnorÞþb2L Size þ b3L Roa þ b4L Lev þ b5CapInt
þb6InvInt þ b7IntInt þ b8MB þ
P
Industry þ
P
Year þ e ð4:2Þ
8
> > > <
> > > :
ð4Þ
RoaðOprÞ¼a0 þ a1Invact þ a2Invnor þ a3L Size þ a4L Roa þ a5L Lev
þa6Herf þ a7Dual þ a8Growth þ a9Fcf þ a10CapInt þ a11MB þ
P
Industry þ
P
Year þ e ð5:1Þ
RoaðOprÞ¼b0 þ b1ðInvact þ InvnorÞþb2L Size þ b3L Roa þ b4L Lev þ b5Herf
þb6Dual þ b7Growth þ b8Fcf þ b9CapInt þ b10MB þ
P
Industry þ
P
Year þ e ð5:2Þ
8
> > > <
> > > :
ð5Þ
Table 11 demonstrates the diﬀerence in the eﬀect of the level of actual investment and that of normal invest-
ment, as calculated with the overinvestment model (Model (1)), on corporate taxes paid. Due to this paper’s
length constraints, Table 11 only shows the empirical results of Model (4.1).
Table 11 reveals the following details. The coeﬃcients of Invact in the whole sample and two subsamples are
all signiﬁcantly positive, indicating that an increase in actual investment does lead to an increase in both
income and turnover taxes paid by the ﬁrm. For the turnover taxes (Tax_turnover) in each sample, none of
the coeﬃcients for Invnor are statistically signiﬁcant, while those for Invact are all signiﬁcantly larger than those
for Invnor, with F-values of 8.74, 4.24, and 5.08, respectively, and p-values of 0.0031, 0.0395, and 0.0242,
respectively. This suggests that turnover taxes paid by ﬁrms increase as actual corporate investment increases,
but are irrelevant in relation to corporate investment eﬃciency. For income taxes (Tax_income) in the whole
sample and the underinvestment subsample, the coeﬃcients for Invnor are all signiﬁcantly larger than those
forInvact,w i t hF-values of 3.51 and 5.36, respectively, and p-values of 0.0612 and 0.0206, respectively. The
coeﬃcients for Invnor and Invact in the overinvestment subsample are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent, with an F-value
of 0.04 and a p-value of 0.8477, indicating that the income taxes paid by underinvested ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly
lower than those paid by their normally invested counterparts with the same investment scale and that over-
invested ﬁrms do not pay more income taxes than their normally invested counterparts with the same invest-
ment scale.
These empirical results suggest that a higher investment level generally helps increase both income and
turnover taxes paid by ﬁrms, but investment eﬃciency greatly inﬂuences corporate taxes paid. Speciﬁcally,
for total taxes and income taxes, overinvestment does not induce more tax paid to the government than
the normal level, whereas underinvested ﬁrms pay fewer income taxes than their normally invested counter-
parts with the same investment scale. Turnover taxes are positively related to the actual investment level
but unrelated to the normal investment level, consistent with the theoretical analysis that the turnover taxes
generated by a ﬁrm are irrelevant to its investment eﬃciency, but positively related to the level of actual
investment.
Table A1 presents the diﬀerences in the eﬀects of actual and normal investment levels on corporate perfor-
mance. Due to length restrictions, Table A1 only shows the empirical results for Model (5.1).
Table A1 shows that the coeﬃcients of Invact and Invnor are all positive and statistically signiﬁcant in each
group, and the coeﬃcients for each Invnor are all signiﬁcantly larger than those for the corresponding Invact.
The results suggest that although an increase in the levels of actual and normal investment both lead to
improvements in corporate performance, the performance improvements in underinvested ﬁrms are signiﬁ-
cantly smaller than those observed in normal-level ﬁrms with the same investment scale. The results also
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invested ﬁrms with the same investment scale.
Raising a ﬁrm’s investment scale increases local ﬁscal revenue by increasing the taxes paid by ﬁrms, and it
results in improved corporate performance. Speciﬁcally, turnover taxes are not aﬀected by corporate invest-
ment eﬃciency, whereas total and income taxes are greatly aﬀected by corporate investment eﬃciency. Under-
invested ﬁrms pay much fewer income taxes than their normal-level counterparts, but there is no signiﬁcant
diﬀerence between the income taxes paid by overinvested ﬁrms and those paid by normal-level invested ﬁrms
with the same investment scale. This suggests that local governments should increase their tax revenue by
increasing the investment scales of underinvested ﬁrms to normal levels and by helping overinvested ﬁrms
adjust their production, operation, and capital structures to match the present investment level before expand-
ing their investment scales.
4.4. Robustness checks
4.4.1. Alternative explanation of abundant investment opportunities
In addition to the political intervention of local governments and political promotion tournaments (Zhou,
2004), overinvestment in local SOEs may also be driven by abundant investment opportunities or other factors
unrelated to such intervention or promotion. To rule out this alternative explanation, we rerun the above
Table 11
Diﬀerences in the Eﬀects of Actual and Normal Investment Levels on Corporate Taxes Paid (Model (4.1)).
The Whole Sample Overinvestment Subsample Underinvestment Subsample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Variable Tax_total Tax_turnover Tax_income Tax_total Tax_turnover Tax_income Tax_total Tax_turnover Tax_income
_cons  6.8820
⁎⁎⁎  8.4032
⁎⁎⁎  6.9658
⁎⁎⁎  6.7846
⁎⁎⁎  8.0523
⁎⁎⁎  7.3977
⁎⁎⁎  7.0492
⁎⁎⁎  8.6716
⁎⁎⁎  6.7707
⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Invact 1.0399
⁎⁎⁎ 0.6228
⁎⁎⁎ 1.2301
⁎⁎⁎ 1.0800
⁎⁎⁎ 0.6636
⁎⁎⁎ 1.3212
⁎⁎⁎ 1.0111
⁎⁎⁎ 0.6073
⁎⁎⁎ 1.1734
⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Invnor 0.9475
⁎⁎⁎  0.6406 2.1731
⁎⁎⁎ 0.3464  0.7975 1.1618 1.1572
⁎⁎⁎  0.6047 2.6430
⁎⁎⁎
(0.007) (0.119) (0.000) (0.550) (0.239) (0.143) (0.009) (0.242) (0.000)
Size 1.0273
⁎⁎⁎ 1.0343
⁎⁎⁎ 0.9973
⁎⁎⁎ 1.0182
⁎⁎⁎ 1.0200
⁎⁎⁎ 1.0186
⁎⁎⁎ 1.0368
⁎⁎⁎ 1.0457
⁎⁎⁎ 0.9875
⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Roa 5.2680
⁎⁎⁎ 3.0863
⁎⁎⁎ 8.0375
⁎⁎⁎ 5.5818
⁎⁎⁎ 3.1417
⁎⁎⁎ 8.4548
⁎⁎⁎ 4.9908
⁎⁎⁎ 3.0021
⁎⁎⁎ 7.7049
⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lev  0.2300
⁎⁎⁎ 0.1765
⁎⁎  0.4723
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0757 0.4780
⁎⁎⁎  0.2155  0.3960
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0234  0.6062
⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.016) (0.000) (0.470) (0.000) (0.150) (0.000) (0.799) (0.000)
CapInt 0.1133 0.5703
⁎⁎⁎  0.2411
⁎⁎ 0.3225
⁎⁎ 0.5686
⁎⁎⁎ 0.1422 0.0305 0.5535
⁎⁎⁎  0.4015
⁎⁎⁎
(0.128) (0.000) (0.020) (0.015) (0.000) (0.435) (0.738) (0.000) (0.002)
InvInt 1.6678
⁎⁎⁎ 2.2889
⁎⁎⁎ 1.2053
⁎⁎⁎ 1.4639
⁎⁎⁎ 2.0239
⁎⁎⁎ 1.2081
⁎⁎⁎ 1.7620
⁎⁎⁎ 2.3918
⁎⁎⁎ 1.2259
⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
IntInt  0.3024 0.7017
⁎⁎⁎  1.2248
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0741 0.9686
⁎⁎  0.1442  0.4791
⁎ 0.5487
⁎  1.6874
⁎⁎⁎
(0.149) (0.004) (0.000) (0.847) (0.031) (0.788) (0.056) (0.061) (0.000)
MB 0.1265
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0627
⁎⁎⁎ 0.1553
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0858
⁎⁎⁎  0.0011 0.1315
⁎⁎⁎ 0.1530
⁎⁎⁎ 0.1058
⁎⁎⁎ 0.1744
⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.971) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Industry Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 8599 8571 8258 2935 2920 2824 5664 5651 5434
adj. R
2 0.623 0.560 0.501 0.611 0.555 0.490 0.631 0.563 0.508
F 0.06 8.74
⁎⁎⁎ 3.51
⁎ 1.46 4.24
⁎⁎ 0.04 0.10 5.08
⁎⁎ 5.36
⁎⁎
porb > F 0.8007 0.0031 0.0612 0.2266 0.0395 0.8477 0.7506 0.0242 0.0206
p-Values in parentheses.
⁎ p < 0.1.
⁎⁎ p < 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p < 0.01.
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results show that almost every coeﬃcient of Distress1, Distress2, Distress1   N_Tax, and Distress2   N_Tax
is not statistically signiﬁcant, in either the overinvestment or the underinvestment subsamples, which is deﬁ-
nitely diﬀerent from the results gained from the local SOEs subsample.
Central SOEs are confronted with the same investment opportunities experienced by local SOEs operating
within the same province, but the former are almost free of local governmental intervention. Therefore, the
results in Table A2 rule out the possibility that the overinvestment of local SOEs is driven by abundant invest-
ment opportunities or other factors unrelated to government intervention or political promotion tournaments,
indirectly enhancing support for the perspective that local governments have an incentive to boost tax revenue
by forcing local SOEs to raise their investment scales and to exert greater pressure on ﬁrms that contribute less
to local ﬁscal revenue.
4.4.2. The probability of reverse causality between dependent and independent variables
Based on the grabbing hand theory, we assert that local governments have an incentive to boost tax revenue
by forcing the local SOEs under their control to raise their investment scales and to exert greater pressure on
ﬁrms that contribute less to local ﬁscal revenue. Our assertions are supported by the aforementioned empirical
results. We also determine from the empirical ﬁndings in the Further Analysis section (Section 4.3) that a lar-
ger investment scale could help to increase ﬁscal revenue by increasing both the income and turnover taxes
paid by the ﬁrm, which eﬀectively rules out the potential reverse causality of the overinvestment of local SOEs
leading to local ﬁscal distress. Finally, we perform Hausman tests on the dependent and two independent vari-
ables and get v
2 values of 0.00 and 0.05, respectively, and a p-value of 1.0000 for each, suggesting that only
OLS is theoretically needed in this paper. However, in the interests of robustness, we perform 2SLS robustness
checks of the aforementioned empirical tests.
OverInvi;tðUnderInvi;tÞ¼b0 þ b1Distressi;t 1 þ b2Sizei;t þ b3Roai;t þ b4Fcfi;t
þb5Duali;t þ b6Exeowni;t þ b7Herfi;t þ b8Dividi;t þ b9Debti;t þ b10Salaryi;t
þb11GDPgtht þ b12GovIntvnt þ
P
Industry þ
P
Year þ e ð6:1Þ
Distressi;t ¼ c0 þ c1GovIntvnt þ c2GDPt þ c3Earthquaket þ
P
Year þ e ð6:2Þ
8
> > > <
> > > :
ð6Þ
OverInvi;tðUnderInvi;tÞ¼b0 þ b1Distressi;t 1 þ b2Distressi;t 1   N Taxi;t 1
þb3N Taxi;t 1 þ b4Sizei;t þ b5Roai;t þ b6Fcfi;t þ b7Duali;t þ b8Exeowni;t þ b9Herfi;tþb10Dividi;t
þb11Debti;t þ b12Salaryi;t þ b13GDPgtht þ b14GovIntvnt þ
P
Industry þ
P
Year þ e ð7:1Þ
Distressi;t ¼ c0 þ c1GovIntvnt þ c2GDPt þ c3Earthquaket þ
P
Year þ e ð7:2Þ
8
> > > <
> > > :
ð7Þ
Models (6) and (7) are the 2SLS models. Models (6.1) and (7.1) are the same as Models (2) and (3) in
Section 3, respectively, and the instrument variables (IVs) in Models (6.2) and (7.2) are three provincial-level
variables: the index of reducing government intervention to enterprises in the Fan Gang marketization index,
the logarithm of the local GDP, and the number of earthquakes in the current year. We chose these three
variables as IVs because the local governments with ﬁscal distress are likely to be those with poor governance
and severe intervention into enterprises; because local governmental ﬁnance is generally highly correlated with
local GDP, as the better developed regions usually have suﬃcient ﬁscal revenue, with low probability of being
immersed in ﬁscal distress, and because earthquakes are strongly destructive, infrequent, and unpredictable
natural disasters that signiﬁcantly inﬂuence local ﬁnance. We perform a Pearson correlation analysis on the
proxies of local ﬁscal distress and the IVs and present the results in Table 12.
As Table 12 reveals, the two proxies of local ﬁscal distress and the three IVs are all signiﬁcantly correlated
at the 0.01 level, which satisﬁes the basic assumptions for IVs. The results of 2SLS for local SOEs are pre-
sented in Table 13.
Table 13 shows that except for Distress1t 1   N_Taxt 1, the results of 2SLS for local SOEs do not diﬀer
greatly from those using OLS (Tables 8–10), suggesting the robustness of the results. Moreover, the 2SLS
results rule out the potential reverse causality of the dependent and independent variables, supporting the
grabbing hand theory. Due to length constraints, the 2SLS results for non-SOEs and central SOEs are
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Correlations of proxies for local ﬁscal distress and the IVs.
Distress1 Distress2 GovIntvn GDP Earthquake
Distress1 1.0000
Distress2 0.986
⁎⁎⁎ 1.0000
(0.0000)
GovIntvn  0.735
⁎⁎⁎  0.726
⁎⁎⁎ 1.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000)
GDP  0.563
⁎⁎⁎  0.604
⁎⁎⁎ 0.545
⁎⁎⁎ 1.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Earthquake 0.327
⁎⁎⁎ 0.343
⁎⁎⁎  0.211
⁎⁎⁎  0.185
⁎⁎⁎ 1.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
p-Values in parentheses,
 p < 0.1,
  p < 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p < 0.01.
Table 13
Results of 2SLS for local SOEs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variable OverInv OverInv OverInv OverInv UnderInv UnderInv UnderInv UnderInv
Main Results
_cons  0.8392
⁎⁎⁎  1.0052  0.8264
⁎⁎⁎  1.8494
⁎⁎⁎ 0.1989
⁎⁎⁎ 0.2290 0.2011
⁎⁎⁎ 0.2645
⁎⁎⁎
(0.002) (0.348) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.278) (0.000) (0.000)
Distress1t 1 0.0017
⁎⁎⁎  0.0050  0.0002
⁎  0.0011
(0.009) (0.844) (0.061) (0.843)
Distress1t 1   N_Taxt 1  0.0004  0.0001
(0.804) (0.866)
Distress2t 1 0.0020
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0169
⁎⁎⁎  0.0002
⁎⁎  0.0020
⁎⁎
(0.001) (0.004) (0.014) (0.017)
Distress2t 1   N_Taxt 1 0.0009
⁎⁎⁎  0.0001
⁎⁎
(0.009) (0.033)
N_Taxt 1 0.1111
⁎ 0.0633
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0022 0.0040
⁎
(0.060) (0.000) (0.856) (0.082)
Sizet 0.0514
⁎⁎⁎ 0.1349
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0506
⁎⁎⁎ 0.1331
⁎⁎⁎  0.0028
⁎  0.0025  0.0028
⁎  0.0024
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.092) (0.275) (0.094) (0.271)
Roat 0.3556
⁎ 0.8667
⁎⁎⁎ 0.3589
⁎ 0.9300
⁎⁎⁎  0.0479
⁎⁎  0.0488
⁎⁎  0.0476
⁎⁎  0.0494
⁎⁎
(0.099) (0.000) (0.095) (0.000) (0.013) (0.021) (0.014) (0.013)
Fcft 0.1758
⁎⁎ 0.2204
⁎⁎⁎ 0.1776
⁎⁎ 0.2298
⁎⁎⁎  0.1323
⁎⁎⁎  0.1323
⁎⁎⁎  0.1322
⁎⁎⁎  0.1325
⁎⁎⁎
(0.015) (0.002) (0.014) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Dualt 0.0058 0.0141 0.0064 0.0132  0.0020  0.0019  0.0020  0.0017
(0.841) (0.612) (0.824) (0.628) (0.627) (0.667) (0.640) (0.679)
Exeownt  0.0004 0.0001  0.0005 0.0000 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017
(0.959) (0.988) (0.945) (0.995) (0.187) (0.183) (0.190) (0.185)
Herft 0.0041
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0039
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0041
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0038
⁎⁎⁎  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.930) (0.966) (0.895) (0.953)
Dividt  0.1245
⁎⁎  0.0555  0.1246
⁎⁎  0.0519 0.0010 0.0009 0.0010 0.0010
(0.040) (0.345) (0.040) (0.368) (0.914) (0.918) (0.907) (0.907)
Debtt 0.3633
⁎⁎⁎ 0.2901
⁎⁎⁎ 0.3694
⁎⁎⁎ 0.3042
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0410
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0401
⁎⁎ 0.0406
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0394
⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.013)
Salaryt  0.0423
⁎⁎⁎  0.0291
⁎⁎  0.0428
⁎⁎⁎  0.0268
⁎⁎  0.0051
⁎⁎  0.0051
⁎⁎  0.0052
⁎⁎  0.0053
⁎⁎
(0.004) (0.042) (0.003) (0.049) (0.017) (0.026) (0.012) (0.011)
GDPgtht 0.0040 0.0052
⁎ 0.0042 0.0059
⁎⁎ 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000
(0.190) (0.082) (0.171) (0.041) (0.797) (0.877) (0.812) (0.917)
Industry Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 1134 1134 1134 1134 2190 2190 2190 2190
p-Values in parentheses.
⁎ p < 0.1.
⁎⁎ p < 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p < 0.01.
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and A2).
4.4.3. The alternative approach of tax enforcement
Our H2 argues that governments generate their ﬁscal revenue through taxes and that the incentive to
extract from enterprises is stronger in the ﬁrms that make fewer contributions to local ﬁnance, following
the grabbing hand theory, such that lower taxes paid by local SOEs enhances the positive relationship
described by H1 between local ﬁscal distress and the overinvestment of local SOEs. However, in addition
to the investment approach, local governments could achieve their ﬁnance goal by enhancing their tax enforce-
ment or directly consulting with the enterprises under control. Theoretically, ﬁrms that pay fewer taxes are
probably more aggressive when it comes to tax avoidance, so enhancing the tax enforcement of aggressive
tax-avoiding ﬁrms may be a more eﬀective way to generate local ﬁscal revenue than extracting from local
SOEs.
Two frequently used proxies for the aggressiveness of tax avoidance are the Book-Tax diﬀerence (BTD)
(Mills, 1998; Desai, 2003; Wilson, 2009) and the Eﬀective Tax Rate (ETR) (Zimmerman, 1983; Gupta and
Newberry, 1997; Wilson, 2009). However, tax preferences in China vary, which makes the measurement com-
plex. Some tax preferences in China are linked to the tax basis, by reducing or exempting taxes on ﬁrms’ oper-
ating results. For example, R&D expenditures could be additionally deducted or amortized at the 50% level,
6
and the production of high-tech enterprises is exempt from income taxes in the initial 2 years and must only
pay half in the initial 8 years.
7 Other tax preferences are based on tax rates, such as the income tax rate for
transitional ﬁrms in special zones and the high-tech enterprise certiﬁcate applicable tax rate.
8 The amount
of tax reduction due to tax preferences cannot be totally viewed as the result of tax avoidance because for
ﬁrms, the desire for self-development is more intense than that for tax avoidance, so most tax preferences
are the side beneﬁts of business strategies. For example, the main purpose of R&D activities should be inno-
vation demands to increase ﬁrms’ proﬁtability, not for the tax savings from the additional 50% deduction or
amortization. Moreover, some earnings management activities based on these accounting standards also serve
the goal of tax deduction (Desai and Dharmapala, 2009; Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010).
Based on the above analysis, we construct Model (8), in which the residual (ei,t) represents the aggressive-
ness of corporate tax avoidance, following Desai and Dharmapala (2006, 2009). BTD in Model (8) represents
the Book-Tax diﬀerence scaled by the 1-year lagged value of ﬁrm size. TA represents total accruals, including
the change in (1) Current Assets, (2) Current Liabilities, (3) Cash and Short-Term Investments, and (4) the Level
in Depreciation and Amortization, scaled by the 1-year lagged value of ﬁrm size following Desai and Dharma-
pala (2009). li,t represents ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. In addition, we incorporate the level of R&D Expenditure, also
scaled by the 1-year lagged value of ﬁrm size, based on China’s institutional environment. Finally, the residual
ei,t is deﬁned as the portion of the Book-Tax diﬀerence that could not be explained by corporate earnings man-
agement or R&D activities, namely the aggressiveness of tax avoidance (Desai and Dharmapala, 2006, 2009),
represented by BTD1 (see Table 14).
In considering robustness, we also measure the level of earnings management with the Jones model of dis-
cretionary accruals, denoting BTD11, BTD12, BTD21, and BTD22 as the discretionary accruals with operat-
ing proﬁt under the Jones model, net proﬁt under the Jones model, operating proﬁt under the modiﬁed Jones
model, and net proﬁt under the modiﬁed Jones model, respectively. Panel A in Table 14 shows the Pearson
correlation matrix of corporate taxes paid and tax avoidance aggressiveness for the sample between 2002
and 2010, in which Tax_total is calculated by the logarithm of corporate total taxes paid, including both
income and turnover taxes, and Tax_income is calculated by the logarithm of income taxes.
Public ﬁrms in China did not disclose detailed nominal tax rate and tax preferences in the footnotes to
ﬁnancial statements of their annual reports until 2007, so we calculate the level of corporate tax avoidance
in the 2007–2010 subsample in Model (9), in which Tax_base is a dummy variable representing the tax pref-
erences linked to the tax basis, that takes the value one if there is an exemption or reduction in income taxes
6 See details in The tax law of the People’s Republic of China and Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises.
7 See details in The tax law of the People’s Republic of China and Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises.
8 See details in The tax law of the People’s Republic of China and Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises.
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those in Model (8), and the Pearson correlation matrix of corporate tax paid and tax avoidance aggressiveness
is presented in Panel B of Table 14.
BTDi;t ¼ b0 þ b1TAi;t þ b2R&Di;t þ li;t þ ei;t ð8Þ
BTDi;t ¼ b0 þ b1TAi;t þ b2R&Di;t þ b3Tax basei;t þ li;t þ ei;t ð9Þ
ETRi;t ¼ b0 þ b1Speczonei;t þ b2Highteci;t þ li;t þ ei;t ð10Þ
ETRi;t ¼ b0 þ b1Speczonei;t þ b2Tax ratei;t þ li;t þ ei;t ð11Þ
Models (10) and (11) use the eﬀective tax rate (ETR) to measure the level of tax avoidance. The theory is
basically the same as that for Models (8) and (9), with ETR represented by the item Eﬀective Tax Rate dis-
closed in the operating capacity ﬁle of ﬁnancial reports. Speczone is a dummy variable representing special
economic zones in China, equal to one if the corporation operates in the ﬁve special zones of Shenzhen, Zhuhai,
Shantou, Xiamen, and Hainan, and zero otherwise. Hightec is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if
the ﬁrm is a high-tech ﬁrm or if it applies a transitional income tax rate of 25%, and such is stated in the
footnotes to ﬁnancial statements, and zero otherwise. For the same reasons given for the models using
BTD, we apply the 2002–2010 and 2007–2010 samples to Models (10) and (11), respectively, with the residuals
ei,t representing the level of corporate tax avoidance, denoted by ETR1 and ETR2, respectively. The Pearson
Table 14
Pearson correlations of corporate taxes paid with BTD and ETR.
Variable Tax_total Tax_income BTD BTD1 BTD11 BTD12 BTD21 BTD22
Panel A
Tax_total 1.0000
Tax_income 0.8842
⁎⁎⁎ 1.0000
BTD 0.0379
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0561
⁎⁎⁎ 1.0000
BTD1 0.0277
⁎ 0.0486
⁎⁎⁎ 0.8574
⁎⁎⁎ 1.0000
BTD11 0.0517
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0726
⁎⁎⁎ 0.9891
⁎⁎⁎ 0.8384
⁎⁎⁎ 1.0000
BTD12 0.0198 0.0606
⁎⁎⁎ 0.7071
⁎⁎⁎ 0.6399
⁎⁎⁎ 0.7364
⁎⁎⁎ 1.0000
BTD21 0.0517
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0707
⁎⁎⁎ 0.9822
⁎⁎⁎ 0.8347
⁎⁎⁎ 0.9946
⁎⁎⁎ 0.7220
⁎⁎⁎ 1.0000
BTD22 0.0179 0.0574
⁎⁎⁎ 0.6975
⁎⁎⁎ 0.6327
⁎⁎⁎ 0.7274
⁎⁎⁎ 0.9895
⁎⁎⁎ 0.7232
⁎⁎⁎ 1.0000
Panel B
Tax_total 1.0000
Tax_income 0.9003
⁎⁎⁎ 1.0000
BTD 0.0589
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0692
⁎⁎⁎ 1.0000
BTD1 0.0346
⁎⁎ 0.0458
⁎⁎⁎ 0.8549
⁎⁎⁎ 1.0000
BTD11 0.0581
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0704
⁎⁎⁎ 0.9881
⁎⁎⁎ 0.8351
⁎⁎⁎ 1.0000
BTD12 0.0283
⁎ 0.0578
⁎⁎⁎ 0.7004
⁎⁎⁎ 0.6302
⁎⁎⁎ 0.7300
⁎⁎⁎ 1.0000
BTD21 0.0580
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0685
⁎⁎⁎ 0.9812
⁎⁎⁎ 0.8313
⁎⁎⁎ 0.9945
⁎⁎⁎ 0.7151
⁎⁎⁎ 1.0000
BTD22 0.0263
⁎ 0.0541
⁎⁎⁎ 0.6904
⁎⁎⁎ 0.6226
⁎⁎⁎ 0.7206
⁎⁎⁎ 0.9889
⁎⁎⁎ 0.7162
⁎⁎⁎ 1.0000
Variable Tax_total Tax_income ETR ETR1
Panel C
Tax_total 1.0000
Tax_income 0.8842
⁎⁎⁎ 1.0000
ETR 0.0080 0.0113 1.0000
ETR1 0.0106 0.0136 0.9993
⁎⁎⁎ 1.0000
Panel D
Tax_total 1.0000
Tax_income 0.9003
⁎⁎⁎ 1.0000
ETR 0.0015 0.0030 1.0000
ETR2 0.0026 0.0040 0.9939
⁎⁎⁎ 1.0000
p-Values in parentheses.
⁎ p < 0.1.
⁎⁎ p < 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p < 0.01.
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of Table 14, respectively.
As Panels A and B of Table 14 show, the BTD modiﬁed by earnings management and tax preferences
(BTD1 and BTD11–BTD22) or the unmodiﬁed BTD (BTD) is positively related or unrelated to corporate
total taxes or income taxes paid, indicating no statistical evidence supporting the point of view that ﬁrms that
pay fewer taxes exhibit more aggressive tax avoidance.
In Panels C and D, neither the ETR modiﬁed by tax preferences (ETR1 and ETR2) nor the unmodiﬁed
ETR (ETR) are correlated with corporate total taxes or income taxes paid, indicating no statistical evidence
supporting the point of view that ﬁrms that pay fewer taxes exhibit more aggressive tax avoidance.
The results from Panels A–D provide no evidence to support the point of view that ﬁrms that pay fewer
taxes exhibit more aggressive tax avoidance, furthering the assertion that governments increase tax revenue
by enhancing their tax enforcement on the ﬁrms that pay fewer taxes, which indirectly supports H2.
4.4.4. The mediation of free cash ﬂow
Jensen (1986) argues that high free cash ﬂow triggers agency problems that result in overinvestment, but
this problem could be mitigated by raising debt, which reduces ﬁrms’ free cash ﬂow – an argument supported
by Tang et al. (2007). Wei and Liu (2007) and Tang et al. (2007) indirectly determine the positive relationship
between corporate free cash ﬂow and overinvestment by examining how cash dividends restrain the level of
overinvestment. Therefore, to rule out the potential explanation that ﬁrms that pay fewer taxes are generally
faced with the problem of overinvestment in response to their high free cash ﬂow preserved in the ﬁrm due to
tax saving activities, we scale total taxes paid (the sum of Income Tax Expense and Business Tax and Sur-
charges on the income statement) with total assets, denote corporate tax intensity and rerun the empirical tests
in Table 9 with corporate tax intensity, represented by N_TaxI, instead of corporate taxes paid. The results
presented in Table A5 show that none of the coeﬃcients for the interaction terms of Distress1   N_TaxI
and Distress2   N_TaxI and for N_TaxI are statistically signiﬁcant, suggesting that corporate tax intensity
has no eﬀect on ﬁrms’ overinvestment. Combined with the results in Table 9, our ﬁndings suggest that the
positive eﬀect that low corporate taxes paid has on the relationship between local ﬁscal distress and corporate
overinvestment is triggered by the political intervention of local governments, thus ruling out the possibility of
a mediating eﬀect through free cash ﬂow.
4.4.5. An alternative explanation for H2 – the helping hand theory
We have a potential competing theory for H2 – the helping hand theory. Local governments and local
SOEs have innumerable links through funds and personnel issues, and local governments always have a ten-
dency to protect and support the local SOEs under their control, which is generally called paternalism (Hu,
2001). Local governments may oﬀer a helping hand by serving as an invisible underwriter to help local SOEs
lessen ﬁnancing constraints when applying for bank loans (Zhu and Li, 2008) or by seeking investment pro-
jects for local SOEs to help them out of dilemmas prompted by operational or ﬁnancial problems, which
results in overinvestment by local SOEs. The ﬁrms with low operating and ﬁnancial performance generally
have low proﬁtability, with both low turnover taxes based on corporate operations and low income taxes
based on proﬁts, indicating their limited contribution to local ﬁnance.
While such governmental helping hands can decrease ﬁnancing constraints in the loan application process
or discover investment projects for local SOEs, the latter (discovering investment projects for local SOEs) is
diﬃcult to observe. However, both activities should exist simultaneously in capital markets and satisfy a cer-
tain distribution that will allow us to deduce the existence or even the intensity of governmental helping hands
by observing the activities of the former (decreasing ﬁnancing constraints in local SOEs’ loan application pro-
cess). Given the ubiquitous soft budget constraints of local SOEs, banks’ requirements for accounting conser-
vatism on SOEs are much lower than those for non-SOEs, which is clearly a reﬂection of the government’s
helping hand. Another type of soft budget constraint is for governments to serve as invisible underwriters
by helping SOEs to lessen their ﬁnancing constraints when applying for bank loans. Consequently, following
Basu (1997), we construct a model of accounting conservatism to help rule out the competitive explanation of
paternalism by investigating the eﬀect of 1-year lagged values of corporate taxes paid on banks’ requirements
for accounting conservatism.
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as the stock closing price in year t   1, Retit as the annual stock returns in year t and Drit as a dummy variable,
that takes the value of one if Retit < 0, and zero otherwise. The coeﬃcient of Retit   Drit, b3, determines the
extent of accounting conservatism.
EPSit=Pit 1 ¼ b0 þ b1Drit þ b2Retit þ b3Retit   Drit þ e ð12Þ
Models (13)–(15) measure the eﬀects of the interactions of other variables with corporate accounting con-
servatism by incorporating interaction terms into Basu’s (1997) basic model. Model (13) adds the interactions
of corporate liability levels Nt and other variables in year t on the basis of Model (12), representing the total
debt-to-asset ratio Lev, the ratio of long-term debt on total assets Ldebt and the ratio of short-term debt on
total assets Sdebt, respectively. Hence, the coeﬃcient of Rett   Drt   Nt, b7 represents the eﬀect of corporate
capital structure on accounting conservatism.
Table 15
Corporate tax payment, capital structure and accounting conservatism for local SOEs.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Levt Ldebtt Sdebtt
_cons 0.0351
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0616
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0371
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0518
⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Drt 0.0072  0.0098 0.0058  0.0052
(0.113) (0.391) (0.303) (0.437)
Rett 0.0183
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0053 0.0159
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0158
⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.226) (0.000) (0.000)
Lowt 1  0.0351
⁎⁎⁎  0.0273
⁎⁎⁎  0.0331
⁎⁎⁎  0.0257
⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Rett   Drt 0.0235
⁎⁎ 0.0312 0.0291
⁎⁎ 0.0231
(0.021) (0.284) (0.028) (0.135)
Rett   Lowt 1  0.0144
⁎⁎⁎  0.0004  0.0095
⁎⁎⁎  0.0141
⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.926) (0.000) (0.000)
Drt   Lowt 1 0.0005  0.0163  0.0021  0.0045
(0.927) (0.159) (0.761) (0.570)
Rett   Drt   Lowt 1 0.0301
⁎⁎  0.0308 0.0094  0.0066
(0.043) (0.337) (0.603) (0.751)
Nt  0.0422
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0113  0.0864
⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.693) (0.000)
Rett   Nt 0.0199
⁎⁎ 0.0137  0.0059
(0.014) (0.497) (0.694)
Drt   Nt 0.0172  0.0246 0.0439
(0.449) (0.635) (0.254)
Rett   Drt   Nt  0.0169  0.0532 0.0246
(0.753) (0.632) (0.774)
Nt   Lowt 1  0.0438
⁎⁎⁎  0.1766
⁎⁎⁎  0.0944
⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Rett   Nt   Lowt 1  0.0087  0.0085 0.0422
⁎⁎
(0.318) (0.754) (0.021)
Drt   Nt   Lowt 1 0.0649
⁎⁎⁎ 0.1867
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0966
⁎⁎
(0.004) (0.007) (0.021)
Rett   Drt   Nt   Lowt 1 0.0887 0.2546
⁎ 0.1149
(0.111) (0.088) (0.230)
Industry YYYY
Year YYYY
N 5142 5142 5118 5142
Adj. R-sq 0.131 0.184 0.139 0.185
p-Values in parentheses.
⁎ p < 0.1.
⁎⁎ p < 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p < 0.01.
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Model (14) adds the interactions of a low level of corporate taxes paid and other variables to Model (12), in
which Lowt 1 is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the taxes paid by the ﬁrm in year t   1 are
lower than the median value of the total SOE subsample in the corresponding year, and zero otherwise. Thus,
the coeﬃcient of Rett   Drt   Lowt 1, b7 represents the eﬀect of low corporate taxes paid on accounting
conservatism.
EPSit=Pit 1 ¼ b0 þ b1Drit þ b2Retit þ b3Lowit 1 þ b4Retit   Drit þ b5Rett   Lowt 1 þ b6Drt   Lowt 1
þ b7Rett   Drt   Lowt 1 þ e ð14Þ
EPSit=Pit 1 ¼ b0 þ b1Drit þ b2Retit þ b3Lowit 1 þ b4Retit   Drit þ b5Rett   Lowt 1 þ b6Drt   Lowt 1
þ b7Rett   Drt   Lowt 1 þ b8Nt þ b9Rett   Nt þ b10Drt   Nt þ b11Rett   Drt   Nt
þ b12Nt   Lowt 1 þ b13Rett   Nt   Lowt 1 þ b14Drt   Nt   Lowt 1 þ b15Rett   Drt
  Nt   Lowt 1 þ e ð15Þ
Table A1
Diﬀerences in the eﬀects of actual and normal investment levels on corporate performance (Model (5.1)).
The whole sample Overinvestment subsample Underinvestment subsample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable Roa Opr Roa Opr Roa Opr
_cons  0.0826
⁎⁎⁎  0.3796
⁎⁎⁎  0.0850
⁎⁎  0.4046
⁎⁎⁎  0.1075
⁎⁎⁎  0.4232
⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.019) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
Invact 0.0299
⁎⁎⁎ 0.1386
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0422
⁎⁎⁎ 0.1857
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0224
⁎⁎⁎ 0.1085
⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Invnor 0.2854
⁎⁎⁎ 0.7469
⁎⁎⁎ 0.2572
⁎⁎⁎ 0.5619
⁎⁎⁎ 0.2840
⁎⁎⁎ 0.8039
⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
L_Size 0.0035
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0219
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0040
⁎⁎ 0.0270
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0047
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0225
⁎⁎⁎
(0.001) (0.000) (0.020) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
L_Lev  0.0642
⁎⁎⁎  0.3734
⁎⁎⁎  0.0488
⁎⁎⁎  0.3449
⁎⁎⁎  0.0729
⁎⁎⁎  0.3912
⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Herf 0.0003
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0008
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0003
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0007
⁎⁎ 0.0004
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0009
⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.026) (0.000) (0.000)
Dual  0.0028  0.0192
⁎⁎  0.0061
⁎  0.0276
⁎⁎ -0.0008  0.0139
(0.205) (0.013) (0.084) (0.033) (0.780) (0.149)
Growth 0.0231
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0704
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0172
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0508
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0264
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0820
⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Fcf 0.0600
⁎⁎⁎ 0.1006
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0358
⁎⁎⁎  0.0139 0.0772
⁎⁎⁎ 0.1819
⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.654) (0.000) (0.000)
CapInt  0.0496
⁎⁎⁎  0.1183
⁎⁎⁎  0.0440
⁎⁎⁎  0.0993
⁎⁎⁎  0.0493
⁎⁎⁎  0.1218
⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
MB 0.0131
⁎⁎⁎  0.0036 0.0142
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0003 0.0118
⁎⁎⁎  0.0084
⁎
(0.000) (0.344) (0.000) (0.964) (0.000) (0.097)
Industry Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 7082 7082 2475 2475 4607 4607
adj. R
2 0.200 0.225 0.168 0.187 0.216 0.250
F 89.74
⁎⁎⁎ 40.44
⁎⁎⁎ 23.42
⁎⁎⁎ 5.27
⁎⁎ 58.56
⁎⁎⁎ 34.21
⁎⁎⁎
porb > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.022 0.000 0.000
p-Values in parentheses.
⁎ p < 0.1.
⁎⁎ p < 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p < 0.01.
X. Liao, Y. Liu/China Journal of Accounting Research 7 (2014) 119–147 141Model (15) adds the interactions of Lowt 1 and other variables to Model (13), so the coeﬃcient of
Rett   Drt   Nt   Lowt 1, b15 represents the eﬀect of low corporate taxes paid on the relationship between
corporate capital structure and accounting conservatism.
The results for the eﬀect of low corporate taxes paid on the relationship between corporate capital structure
and accounting conservatism are presented in Table 15 and reveal that the coeﬃcient of Rett   Drt   Lowt 1
in column (1) is positive and statistically signiﬁcant, indicating that banks raise their requirements for account-
ing conservatism on those local SOEs with low operating and ﬁnancial performance. Nt in columns (2), (3) and
(4), respectively, represents Levt, Ldebtt and Sdebtt, in which the coeﬃcients of Rett   Drt   Nt   Lowt 1 in
columns (2) and (4) are positive, but statistically insigniﬁcant while that in column (3) is signiﬁcantly positive,
indicating that the low taxes paid by local SOEs have no eﬀect on the relationship between total liabilities and
short-term debt and accounting conservatism. They do, however, raise banks’ requirements for the accounting
Table A2
Local ﬁscal distress, corporate overinvestment and the eﬀect of corporate taxes paid for central SOEs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variable OverInv OverInv OverInv OverInv UnderInv UnderInv UnderInv UnderInv
_cons 0.4295 0.4032 0.3387 0.2143 0.1327
⁎⁎ 0.1322
⁎⁎ 0.1266
⁎ 0.1265
⁎
(0.372) (0.399) (0.519) (0.735) (0.032) (0.034) (0.076) (0.083)
Distress1t 1  0.0013
⁎  0.0082 0.0001 0.0015
⁎
(0.085) (0.115) (0.366) (0.063)
Distress1t 1   N_Taxt 1  0.0004 0.0001
⁎
(0.240) (0.086)
Distress2t 1  0.0014  0.0057 0.0001 0.0015
⁎
(0.108) (0.479) (0.365) (0.098)
Distress2t 1   N_Taxt 1  0.0002 0.0001
(0.626) (0.133)
N_Taxt 1 0.0494
⁎⁎ 0.0415
⁎  0.0074
⁎⁎⁎  0.0072
⁎⁎⁎
(0.026) (0.083) (0.007) (0.008)
Sizet 0.0090 0.0090 0.0430
⁎⁎ 0.0410
⁎⁎  0.0005  0.0005  0.0051  0.0050
(0.553) (0.554) (0.021) (0.024) (0.854) (0.859) (0.142) (0.155)
Roat 0.1832 0.1806 0.3134 0.3016  0.1209
⁎⁎  0.1209
⁎⁎  0.1320
⁎⁎  0.1320
⁎⁎
(0.384) (0.388) (0.120) (0.132) (0.021) (0.021) (0.012) (0.012)
Fcft 0.1335 0.1329 0.1586
⁎⁎ 0.1586
⁎⁎  0.1628
⁎⁎⁎  0.1629
⁎⁎⁎  0.1677
⁎⁎⁎  0.1674
⁎⁎⁎
(0.105) (0.109) (0.037) (0.040) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Dualt 0.0034 0.0035 0.0006 0.0009 0.0011 0.0010 0.0013 0.0013
(0.923) (0.920) (0.987) (0.981) (0.824) (0.836) (0.787) (0.783)
Exeownt 0.0017 0.0017 0.0021 0.0020  0.0019  0.0019  0.0021  0.0021
(0.357) (0.351) (0.155) (0.208) (0.376) (0.383) (0.310) (0.318)
Herft 0.0001 0.0002  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000
(0.903) (0.862) (0.988) (0.975) (0.883) (0.888) (0.952) (0.964)
Dividt 0.1716 0.1700 0.1774 0.1732  0.0006  0.0007  0.0024  0.0024
(0.149) (0.150) (0.135) (0.144) (0.943) (0.942) (0.787) (0.791)
Debtt 0.1765
⁎ 0.1728
⁎ 0.1520 0.1579 0.0477
⁎⁎ 0.0475
⁎⁎ 0.0544
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0541
⁎⁎⁎
(0.080) (0.083) (0.129) (0.119) (0.022) (0.023) (0.008) (0.009)
Salaryt  0.0412
⁎  0.0400
⁎  0.0347  0.0323  0.0062
⁎⁎  0.0062
⁎⁎  0.0069
⁎⁎  0.0069
⁎⁎
(0.067) (0.079) (0.196) (0.236) (0.046) (0.043) (0.027) (0.024)
GDPgtht 0.0039
⁎ 0.0035 0.0026 0.0024 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007
(0.091) (0.114) (0.300) (0.312) (0.447) (0.432) (0.440) (0.437)
GovIntvnt  0.0162
⁎  0.0151
⁎  0.0176
⁎  0.0164
⁎ 0.0004 0.0004 0.0006 0.0006
(0.066) (0.058) (0.063) (0.051) (0.687) (0.699) (0.605) (0.617)
Industry Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 505 505 505 505 973 973 973 973
adj. R
2 0.074 0.072 0.086 0.083 0.173 0.173 0.176 0.175
p-Values in parentheses.
⁎ p < 0.1.
⁎⁎ p < 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p < 0.01.
142 X. Liao, Y. Liu/China Journal of Accounting Research 7 (2014) 119–147conservatism of local SOEs on long-term debt. In summary, the results suggest that there is no evidence that
banks lessen their requirements for accounting conservatism on local SOEs with low operating and ﬁnancial
performance. Local governments never oﬀer a helping hand on this issue, thus ruling out the possibility that
the paternalism of local governments politically intervenes in the investment activities of local SOEs, resulting
in a greater extent of overinvestment for those SOEs with lower taxes paid.
4.4.6. Systematic errors of the overinvestment model
Given the systematic errors of the overinvestment model, there must be a diﬀerent predicted value from the
corresponding observed value, and not all gaps between these two values are necessarily overinvestment or
underinvestment, so we select the observations that are larger than the tenth percentile of OverInvi,t, and Und-
erInvi,t to be our research sample and obtain the above empirical results. To determine the robustness of our
sample selection procedure, we (1) expand the sample to include the whole sample with no percentile selection
Table A3
Results of 2SLS for non-SOEs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variable OverInv OverInv OverInv OverInv UnderInv UnderInv UnderInv UnderInv
Main results
_cons  0.3516  0.6661  0.3417  0.7559
⁎⁎⁎ 0.3816
⁎⁎⁎ 0.4274
⁎ 0.3817
⁎⁎⁎ 0.3655
⁎⁎⁎
(0.136) (0.411) (0.144) (0.006) (0.000) (0.055) (0.000) (0.000)
Distress1t 1 0.0007  0.0021 0.0000  0.0022
(0.127) (0.930) (0.963) (0.729)
Distress1t 1   N_Taxt 1  0.0002  0.0001
(0.910) (0.730)
Distress2t 1 0.0008 0.0009 0.0000  0.0004
(0.124) (0.848) (0.904) (0.687)
Distress2t 1   N_Taxt 1 0.0000  0.0000
(0.950) (0.673)
N_Taxt 1 0.0608 0.0541
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0090 0.0048
⁎
(0.259) (0.000) (0.549) (0.071)
Sizet 0.0288
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0794
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0287
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0783
⁎⁎⁎  0.0125
⁎⁎⁎  0.0082
⁎⁎  0.0125
⁎⁎⁎  0.0088
⁎⁎⁎
(0.006) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000)
Roat  0.0788 0.1563  0.0768 0.1580  0.0108  0.0055  0.0108  0.0062
(0.592) (0.289) (0.602) (0.283) (0.473) (0.722) (0.471) (0.680)
Fcft 0.0727 0.0757 0.0734 0.0731  0.1347
⁎⁎⁎  0.1356
⁎⁎⁎  0.1347
⁎⁎⁎  0.1347
⁎⁎⁎
(0.120) (0.149) (0.117) (0.110) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Dualt  0.0053  0.0068  0.0054  0.0062 0.0000  0.0011 0.0000  0.0007
(0.790) (0.736) (0.787) (0.749) (0.999) (0.797) (0.997) (0.850)
Exeownt 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000  0.0010
⁎⁎⁎  0.0010
⁎⁎⁎  0.0010
⁎⁎⁎  0.0010
⁎⁎⁎
(0.913) (0.965) (0.940) (0.985) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006)
Herft 0.0027
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0026
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0026
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0025
⁎⁎⁎  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.312) (0.348) (0.311) (0.357)
Dividt 0.0812 0.1289
⁎⁎ 0.0803 0.1287
⁎⁎ 0.0214
⁎ 0.0250
⁎⁎ 0.0215
⁎ 0.0256
⁎⁎
(0.152) (0.021) (0.157) (0.021) (0.082) (0.049) (0.081) (0.039)
Debtt 0.1352 0.1335 0.1388 0.1351 0.0443
⁎⁎ 0.0438
⁎⁎ 0.0443
⁎⁎ 0.0432
⁎⁎
(0.143) (0.140) (0.131) (0.132) (0.025) (0.029) (0.024) (0.027)
Salaryt  0.0289
⁎⁎  0.0144  0.0293
⁎⁎  0.0141  0.0038
⁎  0.0032  0.0038
⁎  0.0029
(0.017) (0.254) (0.014) (0.232) (0.082) (0.186) (0.079) (0.179)
GDPgtht 0.0051
⁎⁎ 0.0053
⁎⁎ 0.0052
⁎⁎ 0.0055
⁎⁎ 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0008
(0.045) (0.039) (0.040) (0.027) (0.180) (0.156) (0.176) (0.125)
Industry Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 977 977 977 977 1961 1961 1961 1961
p-Values in parentheses.
⁎ p < 0.1.
⁎⁎ p < 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p < 0.01.
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UnderInvi,t. We rerun the previous empirical tests with these two samples and ﬁnd that the results are consis-
tent with those in Tables 8–10, ruling out the possibility of bias induced by the sample selection procedure.
5. Conclusion
Our empirical tests and robustness checks support the following conclusions. The extent of local SOEs
overinvestment (underinvestment) is positively (negatively) related to the level of local ﬁscal distress, and
the positive (negative) relationship is enhanced when fewer taxes are paid by local SOEs. There is no evidence
that the investment behavior of non-SOEs or central SOEs is related to local ﬁnance or corporate taxes paid,
with the results for non-SOEs demonstrating the existence of political intervention and the results of central
SOEs ruling out the possibility of abundant investment opportunities. Increasing ﬁrms’ investment scales
Table A4
Results of 2SLS for central SOEs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variable OverInv OverInv OverInv OverInv UnderInv UnderInv UnderInv UnderInv
Main results
_cons 0.2809  1.0418 0.2762 0.0819 0.1397
⁎⁎ 0.2522 0.1364
⁎⁎ 0.1322
⁎⁎
(0.443) (0.640) (0.437) (0.859) (0.014) (0.192) (0.012) (0.049)
Distress1t 1 0.0010 0.0269  0.0000  0.0023
(0.227) (0.639) (0.943) (0.680)
Distress1t 1   N_Taxt 1 0.0015  0.0001
(0.651) (0.681)
Distress2t 1 0.0009  0.0029 0.0000 0.0013
(0.193) (0.708) (0.766) (0.247)
Distress2t 1   N_Taxt 1  0.0002 0.0001
(0.624) (0.260)
N_Taxt 1  0.0369 0.0389
⁎ 0.0014  0.0072
⁎⁎
(0.805) (0.072) (0.918) (0.032)
Sizet 0.0085 0.0250 0.0090 0.0392
⁎⁎  0.0005  0.0038  0.0005  0.0050
⁎
(0.516) (0.470) (0.489) (0.023) (0.825) (0.298) (0.815) (0.096)
Roat 0.1966 0.2526 0.1986 0.3142  0.1212
⁎⁎⁎  0.1352
⁎⁎⁎  0.1209
⁎⁎⁎  0.1320
⁎⁎⁎
(0.407) (0.422) (0.402) (0.189) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Fcft 0.1260
⁎ 0.1534
⁎ 0.1195
⁎ 0.1424
⁎⁎  0.1628
⁎⁎⁎  0.1640
⁎⁎⁎  0.1627
⁎⁎⁎  0.1671
⁎⁎⁎
(0.057) (0.058) (0.070) (0.031) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Dualt 0.0014  0.0036  0.0013  0.0043 0.0011 0.0020 0.0011 0.0014
(0.972) (0.941) (0.975) (0.915) (0.880) (0.788) (0.881) (0.845)
Exeownt 0.0024 0.0017 0.0024 0.0027  0.0019  0.0024  0.0019  0.0022
(0.702) (0.827) (0.698) (0.661) (0.709) (0.650) (0.708) (0.673)
Herft 0.0001 0.0000 0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000
(0.863) (0.999) (0.817) (0.940) (0.881) (0.858) (0.872) (0.985)
Dividt 0.1660
⁎⁎ 0.1524
⁎ 0.1684
⁎⁎⁎ 0.1713
⁎⁎⁎  0.0008  0.0010  0.0007  0.0025
(0.010) (0.071) (0.009) (0.008) (0.948) (0.940) (0.951) (0.838)
Debtt 0.1878
⁎ 0.2500 0.1792 0.1657 0.0486
⁎⁎ 0.0525
⁎⁎ 0.0478
⁎⁎ 0.0543
⁎⁎
(0.098) (0.218) (0.110) (0.142) (0.043) (0.034) (0.045) (0.023)
Salaryt  0.0424
⁎⁎  0.0242  0.0428
⁎⁎  0.0358
⁎⁎  0.0062
⁎  0.0075
⁎⁎  0.0061
⁎⁎  0.0068
⁎⁎
(0.022) (0.437) (0.016) (0.048) (0.054) (0.023) (0.044) (0.025)
GDPgtht 0.0044 0.0049 0.0046 0.0037 0.0007 0.0006 0.0007 0.0007
(0.206) (0.325) (0.172) (0.274) (0.236) (0.358) (0.238) (0.230)
Industry Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 505 505 505 505 973 973 973 973
p-Values in parentheses.
⁎ p < 0.1.
⁎⁎ p < 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p < 0.01.
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higher local ﬁscal revenue. Turnover taxes paid by ﬁrms are not aﬀected by corporate investment eﬃciency
and the income taxes paid by underinvested ﬁrms are much lower than those paid by their normal-level coun-
terparts. Local governments should increase their tax revenue by increasing the investment scales of underin-
vested ﬁrms to meet the normal levels and by helping overinvested ﬁrms to adjust their production, operation
and capital structures to match the present investment level before expanding their investment scale. The
empirical results suggest that local governments could achieve the goal of raising ﬁscal revenue by increasing
the investment scales of local SOEs, which directly results in an increase in total taxes paid. Hausman tests and
2SLS with IVs also exclude the possibility that the overinvestment of local SOEs leads to local ﬁscal distress.
There is no evidence supporting the assertion that local governments increase their tax revenue by enhancing
their tax enforcement on ﬁrms who pay fewer taxes, thus indirectly supporting the hypothesis that local gov-
ernments increase their tax revenue by forcing ﬁrms paying lower taxes to raise their investment scales. There
Table A5
Eﬀect of corporate tax intensity on local ﬁscal distress and corporate overinvestment.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Local SOEs Local SOEs Non-SOEs Non-SOEs
_cons  1.0098
⁎⁎⁎  1.0074
⁎⁎⁎  0.2926  0.2872
(0.001) (0.001) (0.129) (0.138)
Distress1t 1 0.0022
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0005
(0.006) (0.315)
Distress1t 1   N_TaxIt 1 0.0236 0.0011
(0.419) (0.952)
Distress2t 1 0.0026
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0005
(0.007) (0.393)
Distress2t 1   N_TaxIt 1 0.0324 0.0000
(0.366) (1.000)
N_Taxt 1 0.0988  0.1679  0.4874  0.4491
(0.939) (0.909) (0.522) (0.599)
Sizet 0.0614
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0607
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0249
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0249
⁎⁎⁎
0.000 0.000 (0.003) (0.003)
Roat 0.5622
⁎⁎ 0.5690
⁎⁎  0.0939  0.0925
(0.026) (0.025) (0.316) (0.323)
Fcft 0.2093
⁎⁎ 0.2109
⁎⁎ 0.0566 0.0573
(0.014) (0.014) (0.157) (0.151)
Dualt 0.0048 0.0052  0.0100  0.0100
(0.882) (0.871) (0.563) (0.562)
Exeownt 0.0187 0.0186 0.0002 0.0001
(0.712) (0.715) (0.886) (0.899)
Herft 0.0046
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0046
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0019
⁎⁎⁎ 0.0018
⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Dividt  0.1182  0.1181 0.0599 0.0588
(0.102) (0.102) (0.262) (0.271)
Debtt 0.4231
⁎⁎⁎ 0.4285
⁎⁎⁎ 0.1383
⁎ 0.1409
⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.098) (0.091)
Salaryt  0.0502
⁎⁎⁎  0.0505
⁎⁎⁎  0.0226
⁎⁎  0.0230
⁎⁎
(0.003) (0.003) (0.025) (0.022)
GDPgtht 0.0029 0.0031 0.0048
⁎⁎ 0.0049
⁎⁎
(0.405) (0.373) (0.033) (0.030)
Industry Y Y Y Y
Year Y Y Y Y
N 1161 1161 1048 1048
adj. R
2 0.130 0.129 0.052 0.051
p-Values in parentheses.
⁎ p < 0.1.
⁎⁎ p < 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p < 0.01.
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overinvestment and local ﬁnance, thus ruling out the possibility that overinvestment induced by a diﬀerence in
the amount of tax payment is mediated by changes in free cash ﬂow. There is no evidence that governmental
helping hands play a role in helping SOEs with low operating and ﬁnance performance, thus ruling out the
possibility that local governments oﬀer a helping hand by serving as an invisible underwriter to help local
SOEs lessen ﬁnancing constraints when applying for bank loans or by seeking investment projects for local
SOEs. This also indirectly veriﬁes that the intensifying eﬀect of the lower contribution made by local SOEs
to the positive relationship between local ﬁscal distress and the overinvestment of local SOEs is due to the
political intervention of a local governmental grabbing hand.
Above all, we conclude that local governments have an incentive to increase ﬁscal revenue when faced with
ﬁnancial distress, by forcing the local SOEs under their control to raise their investment scales, resulting in
either overinvestment or lowering the level of underinvestment due to other reasons. Likewise, the incentive
and eﬀect of such intervention appear to be stronger on ﬁrms that contribute less to local ﬁnance.
This study enriches the literature on government intervention and investment eﬃciency, providing empir-
ical evidence of the grabbing hand theory through the perspectives of local public ﬁnance and enterprise
investment, in addition to a new research perspective to apply to the problems of ﬁscal issues from the
ﬁrm-level view. In practice, we discover a relationship between local public ﬁnance and the investment behav-
ior of local SOEs, and provide theoretical bases and references for the ways in which local governments make
ﬁscal policies and improve the supervisory roles they have over local SOEs.
Appendix A
See Tables A1–A5.
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